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This dissertation investigates the factors that cause local governments in Mexico to 
improve their performance.  Drawing on a variety of theoretical frameworks, the study 
concentrates on the ability of competitive elections to motivate policymakers to enhance 
the quality of local governance, under the assumption that the threat of being removed 
from office compels local governments to be more accountable to their electorate.  In the 
Mexican case, where the consecutive reelection of local mayors is constitutionally 
forbidden, it is hypothesized that the connection between electoral competition and 
government performance stems from the motivation of municipal presidents to assure the 
victory of their party in the subsequent election. In addition, the dissertation analyzes to 
what extent the variations in local government performance are explained by demand-
driven factors, such as better educated and highly mobilized citizens. 
The four performance dimensions analyzed in the study are the rates of coverage 
of basic services under the responsibility of municipal governments, the willingness and 
ability of municipal officials to build up the institutional capacity of local bureaucratic 
 x
apparatuses, the formulation of local spending choices, and the enforcement of taxing 
authority.  The hypotheses in this dissertation are tested with the aid of multivariate 
statistical techniques on the basis of data covering the majority of Mexican municipalities 
throughout the period 1990-2001.  The research also involved the use of qualitative 
methods, such as semi-structured interviews with state and local officials, and a focus 
group. 
The empirical evidence reveals that competitive elections have expanded the 
policymaking autonomy of local governments, and also have started to encourage them to 
increase their levels of investment on public works.  In addition, the findings demonstrate 
that higher rates of basic literacy and voter turnout encourage local authorities to increase 
the provision of basic services, highlighting the fact that governments are substantially 
responsive to the pressures of mobilized citizens. However, a highly mobilized political 
environment may obstruct the institutionalization of municipal governments, particularly 
when they face strong incentives to use patronage for the allocation of public resources. 
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In 1983 the Mexican constitution was amended to strengthen the political and 
administrative autonomy of municipal governments.1  Local governments were assigned 
important expenditure, taxing, and regulatory responsibilities.  Twenty years after 
assuming these new functions formally, the performance of local governments varies 
considerably across the country.  Consider the case of sanitary sewerage systems, one of 
their principal areas of responsibility since the 1983 reform.  Although the average rate of 
drainage coverage in Mexico increased from 33 percent to 52 percent between 1990 and 
2000, almost fifty percent of all municipal governments in the country failed to give 
access to the service to at least half of their residents in 2000.2  But differences across 
local governments are not restricted to the provision of basic services, but also to other 
public policy areas: a significant number of municipal governments do not enforce their 
authority to collect local taxes, depend almost entirely from the financial and 
organizational resources provided by the federal and state governments, and the operation 
of their public administrations fails to meet minimum legal and technical standards.  In 
contrast, other municipalities have adopted innovative methods of government: they 
promote the participation of society in designing and implementing policies, employ a 
                                                 
1 I will use the terms “municipal government” and “local government” interchangeably. 
2 These figures come from the Mexican population censuses carried out in 1990 and 2000 by INEGI.  
These data are discussed with greater detail in chapter 3. 
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variety of instruments for the delivery of public services, and have modernized the 
operations of their public administrations.  What explains the large differences in 
government performance at the local level in Mexico?  Do structural socioeconomic 
factors account entirely for those differences or are there other political and institutional 
variables affecting the incentives of decision-makers to improve local governance?  This 
dissertation develops a set of empirical models to provide an answer to these questions 
using data from most municipalities in Mexico (over 2,400) for the 1990-2001 period.3 
In this dissertation I investigate how much of the variations in local government 
performance can be explained by the changing political environment at the state and 
municipal levels in Mexico.  Since the 1980s, local governments started to emerge as an 
important arena of electoral competition in the country, allowing opposition parties, for 
the first time in the post-revolutionary period, to defeat the hegemonic Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (the PRI) in state and municipal elections.4  The increase in 
party competition and alternation at the local level has been identified as an important 
source of local governance innovation, given that the new administrations were eager to 
convince the electorate that they represented a genuine departure from the traditional PRI 
governments, which encouraged them to change the prevailing styles in policy 
formulation and implementation.5  An unanswered question is, nevertheless, to what 
extent the higher level of competitiveness in local elections has permeated the decision-
making styles of local governments throughout the country, no matter what are their party 
origins.  The rationale behind this proposition has to do with the new role that electoral 
constituencies have acquired in terms of their power to punish ineffective leaders through 
                                                 
3 The Federal District (Distrito Federal) will not be included in the analysis, given that its legal framework 
is different to the rest of the states in the country.  
4 The other two most important national parties in Mexico are the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the 
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). 
5 See, for example, Rodríguez and Ward (1992, 1994, 1995) and Ward (1998). 
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the use of suffrage.  In other words, electoral competition might have changed the rules 
of the political game in the local arena, in such a way that local policymakers –regardless 
of their party affiliations- find it in their best interest to improve the provision of public 
goods. 
The ability of the local democratic process to induce improvements in the 
performance of local governments might not only derive from the existence of 
competitive elections, but also from the fact that a democratic setting provides citizens 
with the opportunity to exert a more direct influence on their local authorities using 
participatory methods.  Therefore, this dissertation will also investigate to what extent 
variations in local government performance can be explained by differences in citizen 
participation. 
The research approach adopted in this dissertation draws insights from different 
explanatory frameworks trying to understand the causes of good governance.  From 
electoral accountability theories, such as those proposed by Key (1966), Fiorina (1981), 
and Mayhew (1974), it brings into play the assumption that voters have the ability to 
influence the behavior of politicians by rewarding or punishing them in the electoral 
arena.  In other words, that competitive elections serve as an effective mechanism to 
induce government officials to be more responsive to the preferences of their 
constituencies.  From collective action and social capital theories, such as Putnam (1993) 
and Ostrom (1990), the dissertation incorporates the proposition that social cooperation is 
an essential ingredient for a successful institutional performance, given their assumption 
that social norms help people solve collective action dilemmas.  Besides investigating the 
role of electoral competition in improving government performance, this research will 
also address social participation as a potential explanatory variable.  Finally, my study 
draws insights from recent developments in fiscal decentralization research (for example 
 4
Prud’homme,1995; Tanzi, 1995; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998), which emphasizes that the 
only devolution of decision-making authority to lower levels of government does not 
assure that the performance of these levels will inevitably improve, given the substantial 
information asymmetries characterizing the relationship between central and local 
authorities, and the possibility that local institutions might not be effective enough to hold 
sub-national politicians accountable for their decisions.  In the context of this dissertation, 
those claims imply that we should not expect that the 1983 constitutional reform 
automatically improved the performance of municipal governments in Mexico, since 
many other factors (mainly political and institutional) could have also explained the 
ability of decentralization to generate socially desirable outcomes.  My research analyzes 
how the interplay between policy decentralization and the more contested electoral 
environment in the country have transformed the incentives of local policymakers to 
improve the performance of municipal governments.  
In sum, this dissertation adopts a pluralistic theoretical approach based on 
electoral theories of governmental accountability as well as on fiscal decentralization 
arguments, with the aim of investigating how the interaction between those two academic 





1.2. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO 
 
Constitutionally, Mexico is a federal republic comprised by 31 states and a 
Federal District, with powers separated into independent executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches.  In reality, the Mexican presidency has historically been the dominant 
institution, enjoying a number of “metaconstitutional” powers (Garrido, 1989).  Before 
 5
the PRI was defeated in the presidential elections of 2000, for the first time in history, the 
Mexican president used to be the principal arbitrator of the political system.  Acting as 
the de facto leader of his own party, the PRI, the president had the power to select the 
candidate that would compete for the presidency in the next election, which in the 
absence of real electoral competition, meant that he was able to appoint his successor.  In 
addition, the Mexican president had the power to appoint the governors in all the states of 
the republic, the deputies and senators at the national congress, and the judges of the 
Supreme Court.6  The concentration of all these informal powers in the Mexican 
presidency and the non-competitive nature of elections at all levels of government 
implied that the federal arrangement was extremely centralized.  Since the remaining 
political posts in the country (local legislatures and municipal presidencies) were also 
monopolized by the PRI, the career of every politician holding an elected position 
depended on their loyalty to the dominant party and to the president of Mexico, which 
evidently eroded the political autonomy of local and sub-national governments. 
The Mexican political system started to undergo important institutional changes 
since the seventies, allowing opposition parties to obtain, progressively, more political 
positions at the national congress, state legislatures, municipal presidencies, and state 
governments.7  One of the most significant reforms was launched in 1977, when the 
national constitution was amended to increase the total number of seats in the Chamber of 
                                                 
6 This characterization better describes the functioning of the Mexican political system between the years 
1929 to 1994, that is, from the year when president Plutarco Elías Calles  organized the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (the PNR, which constitutes the first antecedent of the PRI), until the presidency of Ernesto 
Zedillo (1994-2000).   It is debatable whether president Zedillo was fully able -and wished- to exert the 
traditional mechanisms of political control during the years of his administration, since electoral 
competition was already under way, forcing the PRI and the government to negotiate any proposed 
legislation with opposition parties. 
7 Some authors, for example Bruhn (1999), Lujambio (2000), and Rodríguez (1998), argue that these 
political reforms had the objective to strengthen the PRI by promoting a more credible opposition, but 
within strict limits, in order to recover some of the legitimacy the PRI and the government lost as a result of 
the decline in voter participation during the presidential election of 1997. 
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Deputies from 237 to 400.  In addition, the number of deputies assigned by proportional 
representation was increased from 41 to 100, thereby allowing a greater presence of 
opposition parties (Lujambio, 2000, 33-41).  The next reform to the system of 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies was made in 1986, where the total number of 
deputies was increased to 500, of which 200 were assigned by proportional 
representation.  The main consequence of these changes over legislative policymaking is 
that, after 1988, the PRI has had to negotiate with other parties the approval of any 
presidential initiative. 
The presidential election of 1988 has been considered a one of the decisive 
moments in the democratization of the country, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (a former 
PRIísta), in conjunction with other prominent members of the PRI, left the party in 1986, 
after he was denied the opportunity to obtain the nomination for the presidential election.8  
Cárdenas formed an extensive coalition with left-wing parties to compete for the 
presidency against Carlos Salinas.  It was believed that Cárdenas obtained the majority of 
votes in that election, but that Salinas was declared the winning candidate as a result of a 
massive electoral fraud.  Nonetheless, the PRI lost its supermajority in the congress, 
which forced it to negotiate with other parties (mainly with the PAN) the several 
constitutional reforms launched during the Salinas administration.  Also, the coalition 
that backed the candidacy of Cárdenas in 1988 gave birth to a new party in 1989, the 
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), which has become one of the three 
principal political forces in the country. Another important outcome resulting from the 
constitutional changes to the system of representation in the Chamber of Deputies took 
place in 1997, when the PRI lost, for the first time in history, the absolute majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies, inaugurating a new period of divided government in the country.   
                                                 
8 This influential election has been widely analyzed by different scholars, such as Molinar (1991a) and 
Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (1989). 
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The political opening in Mexico also reached local and sub-national governments.  
In 1989, for the first time, the PAN defeated the PRI in the gubernatorial election of Baja 
California.  Since then, several states have undergone the arrival of opposition parties to 
power.  From 1989 to 2001, 15 states have been governed by a political party different 
than the PRI.  Something similar has happened in the case of municipal governments.  
Between 1979 and 1987, the PRI controlled virtually every municipality in the country, 
while opposition parties had only won 135 (Lujambio, 2000: 77-100).  However, since 
1988 the number of opposition victories at the level of municipalities has increased 
dramatically: in 2001, 594 municipalities (out of the 2,429 that Mexico had in that year) 
are governed by a party different than the PRI.  Together, these 549 municipalities 
comprise more than 50 percent of the total population of the country, excluding the 
capital city, since the DF does not have municipalities (see chapter 3 for a more detailed 
description of local electoral competition).  In consequence, the process of 
democratization in Mexico can be regarded as a bottom-up phenomenon, where 
opposition parties started winning municipal and state elections, until the PAN finally 
won the national government in 2000. 
A remarkable feature of the Mexican democratization process is its unevenness 
across regions.  Despite the fact that the country, as a whole, has improved the 
competitiveness and transparency of its electoral institutions and processes during the last 
twenty years, there are still considerable differences across states and municipalities: 
some of them exhibit substantial levels of electoral contestation, have undergone 
alternation of parties on at least one occasion, and the final electoral result is broadly 
acknowledged by the political players.  In contrast, other states and municipalities in 
Mexico have never experienced alternation in office, the PRI still wins elections with 
ample margins of victory, there are frequent accusations of electoral fraud, the confidence 
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of citizens and political actors over electoral processes and institutions is relatively low, 
and local bosses still enjoy the power to control the electoral choices of the population by 
means of clientelism or other informal practices, including coercion.9  Nevertheless, even 
these regions seem to be moving towards a more transparent and competitive electoral 
environment. 
At the present time, it is undeniable that electoral competition has become a 
normal feature of Mexican politics at most levels, which many people regard as a very 
positive phenomenon because, under a democratic system, political power has to be 
shared out between different parties (i.e., power is restrained by effective checks and 
balances), and ordinary citizens have the ability to control, through their periodic use of 
suffrage, those who hold governmental authority.  These important assumptions imply 
that under competitive elections, public officials should be more accountable to the 
citizens, since the latter have the ability to remove them from office.  In other words, it 
appears that electoral democracy is not only a good thing by itself, but also a means by 
which the people can induce their governments to achieve better public policy outcomes.  
Is this a reasonable prediction?  Are governments more likely to perform better under a 
more democratic setting?  This dissertation will provide a test of this widespread 
proposition, focusing on the municipal level, which has acquired important policy 
responsibilities over the past twenty years, and constitutes the most direct link between 
Mexican citizens and their public authorities. 
 
                                                 
9 The unevenness of the democratization process across regions in Mexico has been identified as one of the 
major threats to the consolidation of democracy in the country, since sub-national authoritarian enclaves 
continue to operate with relative impunity.  In other words, it has been hypothesized that “the subnational 
political arena will be the principal source of inertia and resistance to democratization” (Cornelius, 1999, 
11). 
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1.3. FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION IN MEXICO 
 
Despite nominally being a federal republic, Mexico is a very centralized country.  
Based on the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics, the World 
Bank reports that in 1997 the total amount of sub-national expenditures in Mexico (which 
include both the state and the municipal levels) represented 29 percent of the total 
expenditures made by the Mexican public sector.10  In contrast, other federal countries 
ranked higher in this indicator in the same year, for example Brazil (42.8 percent), 
Argentina (41.33 percent), and the USA (48.6 percent).  The high degree of fiscal 
centralization in Mexico can also be observed from the perspective of subnational 
revenues, which represented only 22.9 percent of the total public revenues in the country 
in 1997, while in Brazil this indicator was 33.8 percent, 39.8 percent in Argentina, and 
41.7 in the USA. 
The marked fiscal centralization of the country resulted from a gradual process 
started in the 1940s, when the federal government made its first attempts to unify the 
different state tax systems into a coherent national fiscal arrangement.  But the 
constituting elements that gave birth to the current fiscal arrangement in Mexico were 
established in the 1980s, with the creation of the Value Added Tax.  With the aim of 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the tax system, the new fiscal pact asked 
the states to voluntarily cede the application of some indirect taxes, thereby avoiding the 
problem of double taxation. In return, the states started receiving revenue-sharing 
transfers from the federal government, whose distribution was determined through a 
                                                 
10 These data come from the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, which can be accessed at 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm.  The dataset, however, is unable to 
identify expenditure autonomy. Expenditures that are mandated by the central government appear as sub-
national expenditures, even though subnational governments may have no autonomy in these spending 
decisions. 
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formula based on the states’ population size and their relative fiscal effort.  As a result of 
the new system adopted in the 1980s, the federal government was entitled to levy the 
most important taxes in the country, such as the income tax, the value-added tax, and 
special taxes on production and selected services.  Since its creation, the revenue-share 
system has evolved in different aspects, but it has become the principal source of funding 
for states and municipalities.  Also, the distribution formulas have tended to be less 
responsive to taxing effort, while more related to demographic factors.11 
In sum, the centralization of  the fiscal system in Mexico resulted from the pact 
between national elites and sub-national political actors (the governors), in which the 
latter were willing to cede their taxing authority to the federal executive, obtaining in 
return the proceeds from national taxation in the form of revenue-sharing transfers.  The 
fact that no state governor abandoned the original pact was largely explained by the lack 
of political competition characterizing the 1929-1988 period in Mexico, and the 
extraordinary influence of the Mexican president over the political careers of any elected 
post in the country.12  In other words, although the centralization of the tax system 
implied an increased dependency of states on the transfers from the center, the governors 
did not have incentives to leave the pact, since that would have meant the end of their 
political careers.13  As Ward and Rodríguez (1999a and 1999b) have noted, in order to 
make their political careers advance, governors from the PRI tended to carry out the wills 
of the Mexican president, acting as his political appointees.  In exchange for their loyalty 
to the president, governors were rewarded with political careers at the national level.  “As 
                                                 
11 For a review of the historical process by which Mexico centralized its fiscal system see Courchene, 
Díaz-Cayeros, and Webb (2000). 
12 Another reason that explains why every state was motivated to join the new fiscal pact was that they 
would benefit from the proceeds from the oil boom of the 1980s, since oil revenues were a fundamental 
part of the revenue-sharing agreement. 
13 This interpretation is supported by Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, who claims that tax centralization in Mexico 
was a coordination dilemma that was overcome through the control of gubernatorial nominations by the 
president within the PRI, thereby annulling Mexican federalism.  See Díaz-Cayeros (1997). 
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long as a governor could keep his or her state calm avoiding any social unrest, and 
increasingly, keep it in line electorally (i.e., PRI supporting), then he or she would expect 
not to be overly bothered by interference from Mexico City.  But if a governor was not 
providing adept at retaining support for the PRI or fell foul of the president for some 
reason, then they were likely to be replaced” (Ward and Rodríguez, 1999a: 676). 
The arrival of electoral competition at the subnational levels of government at the 
end of the 1980s, as the previous section discussed, started to modify the incentives of 
state and local leaders to accept the terms of the fiscal pact.  The first victories of 
opposition parties in Mexican states implied that the political future of the new leaders 
were not tied up anymore to the president nor to the PRI, which gave them significant 
autonomy as well as incentives to be more responsive to local constituencies, rather than 
to the central government.  For example, the governor of Baja California, Ernesto Ruffo, 
who won under the banner of the PAN in 1989, was the first to openly question the 
system of revenue-sharing transfers, something that would had been unimaginable from a 
governor of the PRI.  Now that electoral competition and party alternation have become 
normal features of Mexican politics at all levels, the current system of fiscal 
intergovernmental relations does not seem operational to fit the increasing needs of 
policymaking autonomy of states and municipalities.  In fact, there is a broad consensus 
among central and subnational authorities that Mexican fiscal federalism requires big 
changes, allowing states and municipalities to recover their taxing authority in order to 
fulfill the demands of local constituencies.  In the concluding part of this dissertation, I 
will revisit this discussion. 
While Mexican fiscal revenues continue to be extremely centralized, there have 
been several attempts to decentralize the operation of public expenditures to the states 
and municipalities over the past two decades.  Probably, the first serious decentralization 
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effort took place during the de la Madrid administration (1982-1988), which seek to 
rationalize the federal administrative apparatus by transferring new policy responsibilities 
to lower levels of government.14  Article 115 of the national constitution was amended to 
make municipalities autonomous legal entities.  The reform also specified the procedures 
that should be followed to remove municipal governments from office, reducing the 
discretionary power of state governors. It required all state legislations to adopt a system 
of proportional representation for the integration of town councils (cabildos) in the 
municipalities, in order to increase the political plurality at the local levels.  Finally, the 
reform assigned municipal governments the responsibility to provide a set of basic local 
services, as well as the authority to administer and enjoy the proceeds from property 
taxes, user fees, and other sources of income.15  Despite these important reforms, the 
marked heterogeneity of Mexican municipalities (especially in terms of their revenue-
raising capacity) prevented them from complying with the goals established by the 
constitutional reform for the delivery of basic public services.  Indeed, the failure of the 
de la Madrid reform to explicitly recognize the diversity of Mexico’s municipalities has 
been pointed out as one of its principal drawbacks.16 The decentralization policies 
launched during the de la Madrid administration did not only focus on municipalities, but 
also on the states.  For example, the provision of health services for the población abierta 
(i.e., for people who are not entitled to receive medical services from the social security 
system) was partially decentralized to a number of states.  The results of the health 
decentralization policy were, however, very limited, since the federal government 
                                                 
14 It is probably inaccurate to label these policies with the term “decentralization”, given that the federal 
government retained considerable decision-making power over the allocation of resources and the setting of 
policy goals.  Instead, they should be regarded as “deconcentration” policies. 
15 For details of the 1983 reform see Rodríguez (1997) and Cabrero-Mendoza (1998). 
16 See, for example, Cabrero-Mendoza and Martínez-Vazquez (2000). 
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retained much decision-making authority.17 During the Salinas administration (1988-
1994), decentralization seemed not to be a central concern, except for basic education, 
which started to be transferred to the state governments in 1992, when the federal 
government, the states, and the national union of workers in education signed up a 
National Agreement to Modernize Basic Education.18  This reform was, nevertheless, 
extremely limited, since the federal government remained in charge of all normative and 
policymaking functions (i.e., setting of standards, curriculum development, teachers 
training, and other important functions), and the resources transferred to the states had a 
very strict earmarking.  Regarding municipal governments, they did not gain any 
significant decision-making authority over the allocation of funds for basic infrastructure, 
especially under the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) launched by the 
Salinas administration, since social infrastructure projects were mainly determined by 
federal agencies in conjunction with community organizations, but without the 
participation of municipal authorities.   The latest important decentralization policy was 
launched during the Zedillo government (1994-2000), when the PRI lost the absolute 
majority at the Chamber of Deputies in 1997.  The congress created a new federal budget 
item called Ramo 33 (Item 33), which comprised resources, earmarked for the financing 
of primary education, health services, public safety, and social infrastructure, transferred 
to state and municipal governments.  Of these, municipalities started to receive funds for 
social infrastructure development that were formerly under the control of federal 
agencies.  Under the new system, only state legislatures are in charge of supervising its 
use.19 
                                                 
17 For more information on the decentralization of health services in Mexico see Cardozo (1993), Flamand 
(1997), and Moreno-Jaimes (2002). 
18 For details of the decentralization of basic education see Ward and Rodríguez (1999b) and Ornelas 
(1998). 
19 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion and analysis of the decentralization of Ramo 33. 
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In sum, the process of policy decentralization in Mexico has been mostly 
circumscribed to the expenditure side, but not to the public revenue system, which 
continues under the centralized control of the federal government.  As a consequence of 
this discrepancy between expenditure and tax assignments, decentralization has entailed 
the creation of transfer fund programs to prevent the emergence of serious vertical 
imbalances.  Also, decentralization policies have been based, predominantly, on a top-
down approach, with the federal government initiating the process, assigning 
responsibilities to state and municipal governments, and providing them with the funds to 
fulfill their new policy assignments.20  This style of policy formulation was 
unproblematic under conditions of non-competitive elections and party monopolization, 
as it occurred in Mexico until the mid-eighties.  However, under the present conditions of 
intense electoral competition, alternation of parties, and vertically divided governments 
(i.e., differences in party membership between national, state, and municipal authorities), 
the top-down policy approach seems to have reached its limits, since locally elected 
officials arriving into power by means of competitive elections are more concerned with 
satisfying the needs of local constituencies, rather than the policy priorities of central 
authorities.  Evidently, as long as the collection of most tax revenues continues under the 
control of the federal government, the scope for a more autonomous subnational 
policymaking will remain limited.  However, it is important to know whether the 
increased competitiveness of local elections are inducing municipal governments (still 
within the restrictions created by the centralization of public revenues) to improve their 
performance and fulfill the obligations that the process of policy decentralization has 
established. 
 
                                                 
20 Rodríguez (1997) has claimed that the variety of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization 
policies adopted by the federal government over the last two decades has, in fact, led to more 
centralization, as state and municipal governments have remained subordinate to the central level. 
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1.4. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Providing an operational definition of the concept of government performance is a 
complex issue.  The notion of “good government” constitutes a normative question, 
which is not free from ideological considerations or value judgments.  Also, the concept 
is multidimensional, given that governments carry out very diverse activities, which 
range from the classical laissez-faire function of protecting the property rights of citizens, 
to other forms of interventions, such as providing welfare benefits to low-income groups 
or managing public services.  Furthermore, given its multidimensional character, it might 
be possible to find some governments that are successful in the provision of a specific 
service but ineffective in other areas.  Thus, a single indicator by itself cannot account for 
the overall performance of a government.21 
In this dissertation I will use a number of performance indicators that the 
empirical literature on decentralization and governance commonly use, and for which 
data are available at the level of municipalities in Mexico.  Although they are not all-
inclusive, the indicators encompass activities over which local governments have either a 
formal responsibility, or at least a reasonable degree of control. They are grouped into 
four broad dimensions: 1) the coverage of municipal public services; 2) the allocation of 
local budgets, namely the relative importance of public works investments in comparison 
with the administrative expenses of the municipal government; 3) the enforcement of 
local taxation (i.e., the collection of local taxes and fees); 4) the development of 
                                                 
21 In her review of the literature addressing the concept of government performance, Tavits (2002) claims 
that each view is to some extent reductionist, since they fail to recognize the multidimensionality of the 
concept.  She proposes that government performance has two equally important though distinct attributes: 
administrative effectiveness and policy activism. 
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managerial capacities, such as the modernization of the local bureaucracy.  Each of these 
dimensions will be analyzed separately throughout the chapters of this dissertation. 
The first performance dimension, the coverage of public services, constitutes a 
clear-cut measure of local government outcomes: what the average citizen can expect, as 
a minimum, from its authorities.  In the case of Mexico, the municipal provision of 
certain services is in fact a constitutional mandate, since article 115 of the Mexican 
constitution assigns municipal governments the responsibility of providing by 
themselves, or in collaboration with other governments, potable water, drainage and 
sewage systems, public lighting, trash collection, public markets, cemeteries, public 
safety, slaughterhouses, local roads, public parks, and road safety.  However, reliable 
information exists only for two of the services listed: water and drainage.  The data 
source of these two services are the Mexican population censuses carried out in 1990 and 
2000, which contain data on water and drainage coverage, disaggregated at the 
municipality level, covering the totality of municipios in the country (2427, as reported 
by the 2000 census).  My analysis of public service provision will focus on the levels of 
coverage of water, drainage, and electrification in 2000, controlling for their coverage 
levels at the beginning of the period (1990).  Although electrification is not a 
constitutional responsibility of municipalities, it is included in the analysis given that 
local governments frequently bargain with higher governmental levels to bring that 
service to their citizens. 
The second performance dimension addressed in this research is the allocation of 
local budgets, namely the importance of public works expenditures (i.e. the budget spent 
in developing basic local infrastructure) vis-à-vis current administrative expenditures.  
Developing basic infrastructure is one of the most urgent expenditure priorities for 
Mexican municipalities, since it is an essential condition for local economic progress.  
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Disparities in the availability of basic infrastructure are still huge across the country, 
despite the fact that the federal government has transferred considerable amounts of funds 
to local governments with the purpose of expanding the provision of water, rural 
electrification, street pavement, and other types of infrastructure.  In contrast, current 
administrative expenditures represent a high proportion of local budgets.  It should be 
noted that municipal governments do not have the formal responsibility to provide some 
of the most labor-intensive public services, such as health care and education (they are 
provided by the federal and state governments), which would justify large current 
expenses.  Administrative expenditures mainly comprise the municipal payroll, which for 
many years has been a useful source of traditional patronage rewarding local political 
supporters.  Therefore, we can think of a locally elected official as a political player 
allocating budgetary resources among a variety of policy goals.  At one of the extremes 
of the policy spectrum, the local politician would dedicate most of the budget to create 
developmental public goods with high social returns for the community. At the other, he 
or she would merely use administrative expenditures to increase the local bureaucracy as 
a means to reward political supporters with public jobs and other “private” benefits.22  
The third performance dimension is the taxing effort of municipalities.  Since 
1983, the national constitution allows municipal governments to collect and enjoy the 
proceeds from the property tax (impuesto predial) and user fees, despite the fact that they 
do not have authority to change tax rates and bases (these are powers of state 
legislatures).  Consequently, variations in local tax revenues across municipalities reflect 
not only differentials in economic prosperity, but also the relative willingness and 
administrative capacity of local officials to enforce the collection of local taxes.  These 
                                                 
22 Given that the available data on local spending do not allow identifying exactly what are the specific 
uses of municipal budgets, this dissertation will only look at the two extremes of the budgetary spectrum: 
public works and administrative expenses. 
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tax revenues represent a very small proportion of municipal funds, again because they 
owe most of their revenue base to federal earmarked and unconditional transfers.  In 
other words, municipal governments are heavily dependent on intergovernmental funds.  
Thus, increases in tax revenues (after controlling for local wealth indicators) should be 
regarded as improvements in local performance, since they constitute the only real 
alternative of municipalities to further their financial autonomy. 
The fourth dimension of performance used in this research is what I call “local 
institutional capacity”, which reflects the extent to which municipal governments develop 
their internal bureaucratic systems to better respond to their policy responsibilities.  
Municipal governments in Mexico have been characterized as lacking adequate technical 
and managerial skills, a fact that can be explained by a number of factors, including the 
strong tradition of centralist decision-making in the country, restrictions on consecutive 
reelection, and the shortness in the term of office.  The weak levels of administrative 
professionalization are reflected in the failure of many municipal governments to 
modernize their internal control systems, the low levels of formal instruction of local 
officials, and persistent personalism in bureaucratic recruitment.  However, there are 
interesting variations in this dimension across municipal governments that provide an 
opportunity for empirical causal analysis.  Based on data from two surveys, my 
dissertation develops a set of institutional capacity indicators measuring the propensity of 
municipal governments to create impersonal rules to control their internal operations, the 
levels of formal education of top officials, and the degree of professionalization of their 







1.5. ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
1.5.1 The roles of electoral competition and party alternation 
 
One of the main premises of classical theories of fiscal federalism is that local 
governments can be more responsive to the policy preferences of their constituents than 
are central authorities, since the former have better information on local priorities, as well 
as a better understanding of the production functions of local public goods.23  Given their 
informational advantages, local governments can be expected to be more efficient in the 
provision of public goods and services, an argument that has been widely used to justify 
the decentralization of taxing and spending responsibilities toward local and sub-national 
governments (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972).  However, the theory asserts that an efficient 
allocation of public resources requires something more than just the geographical 
proximity of decision-makers: local authorities should also face a credible threat from 
local residents to move to alternative jurisdictions.  Therefore, for classical fiscal 
decentralization models, inter-jurisdictional competition was envisaged as the key 
element promoting economic efficiency, but they did not pay attention to the potential 
role that electoral competition could play in improving better governmental outcomes.  In 
other words, local taxpayers do not only have the capacity to move to other jurisdictions 
that better fit their policy preferences, but also to use their vote to remove incumbent 
officials.24  This dissertation will take a closer look at the role of electoral competition in 
explaining improvements in performance across municipal governments, given that this 
                                                 
23 Chapter 2 provides a more comprehensive review of this argument. 
24 The ability of electoral competition to produce governmental accountability has been a persistent issue in 
democratic theory.   For example, in rational choice interpretations of democracy, such as the works by 
Downs (1957) or Mayhew (1974), the political system is assumed to work as a private market in which 
electoral competition generates policy outputs preferred by the majority of voters. 
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variable has significantly increased in municipal elections, and also because there are 
considerable differences across municipalities in their levels of electoral competitiveness. 
The argument I will investigate in this research can be summarized as follows.  
As it was pointed out in a previous section, at the end of the 1980s, state and municipal 
governments became an important arena of electoral competition in Mexico.  Before 
then, the careers of local politicians were absolutely dependent on their links to top 
leaders of the ruling party, the PRI.  As a result, local constituencies played a minor role 
in the nomination of state and municipal candidates.  However, the emergence and 
growth of electoral competition at the state and local levels seems to have produced 
important changes in the motivations of local political leaders, whose careers started to 
depend more on electoral constituencies than in the past.25  While personal links to 
parties continue to be important factors for the political success of local leaders, the 
perception of citizens about the performance of municipal presidents can be expected to 
be important for their political future.  Even though the national constitution forbids local 
mayors to be reelected for consecutive terms, their immediate political future might 
depend on whether their political party remains in office in the next administration, since 
they can be nominated for higher political posts at the state and even the federal levels.  
In summary, there are reasons to believe that assuring the victory of their own parties in 
subsequent electoral contests may provide positive rewards to incumbent leaders.  One of 
the factors affecting the vote of citizens, according to the theory of retrospective voting, 
is their perception of the performance of the current government: when that perception is 
                                                 
25 Several studies on Mexican politics contend that the emergence of electoral competition has changed the 
incentives of parties to select their candidates.  For example, Langston (2001) concludes that the 
competitiveness of the electoral environment forced parties (particularly the PRI) to decentralize their 
mechanism for candidate selection.  A recent book by Caroline Beer (2003) supports the argument that the 
rise in electoral competition has produced more active, professional, and autonomous local legislatures, 
more participatory methods of candidate selection, and more decentralized decision-making processes. 
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favorable, voters will be willing to reelect that party for the next period.26  An implication 
of that argument is that incumbent leaders, being aware that their current performance 
will be taken into account by citizens in their future vote, will tend to improve the quality 
of their policies in order to increase the probability of their parties staying in power.  In 
other words, improving government performance can be understood as a rational strategy 
of self-interested politicians who attempt to maximize their own political careers. 
It is important to note that the validity of the argument outlined above strongly 
depends on the political environment under which local leaders operate.  Specifically, the 
hypothesized situation is likely to occur only when political parties face a credible threat 
of being thrown out of office in subsequent elections.  In an uncontested political 
environment where incumbent leaders enjoy large margins of victory, or where the 
possibility of party alternation is too small (as it has occurred in Mexican municipalities 
during the years of PRI hegemony), local policymakers might be unmotivated to improve 
their performance.  Consequently, from the previous arguments we can derive two key 
hypotheses that can be tested empirically, given the diversity that characterizes the 
political landscape of local governments in Mexico today: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Electoral competition causes improvements in the performance of 
local governments. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The alternation of parties in municipal elections causes 
improvements in the performance of local governments. 
                                                 
26 Certainly, citizens’ retrospective evaluation is only one element in understanding their voting behavior.  
Examples of studies supporting the hypothesis that voters reward positive prior performance are Kramer 
(1971), Norpoth (1996),  and Fiorina (1981).  Regarding the Mexican case, Mizrahi (1999) argues that the 
defeat of the PAN in the gubernatorial election in Chihuahua in 1998 was explained, to some extent, by the 
negative perception voters had on the performance of the incumbent PANista government, particularly 




1.5.2. The influence of social participation 
 
In the last decade, the role of social participation in the design and 
implementation of public policy became a principal concern among scholars, 
practitioners and non-governmental organizations.  Advocates of the “participatory 
approach” claim that involving community in decision-making produces better policy 
outcomes and it also provides a basis for the sustainability of programs.  For example, in 
a recent study of local government innovations in Latin America, Campbell and Fuhr 
assert that “the more participatory and inclusive the design of participatory processes, the 
more likely the new rules will be accepted by participating actors, and better the chances 
for repeated interactions” (Campbell and Fuhr, 2004: 447). In addition, social 
participation is expected to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs for governments, 
and to improve the accountability of public officials.27  This implies that electoral 
competition is not the only force driving improvements in local government performance.  
Better governmental outcomes can also result from informed and well-organized citizens 
capable to press their authorities to improve the provision of public goods.  The vote does 
not constitute the only mechanism through which citizens hold their authorities 
accountable for their actions, since they can also form pressure groups to lobby for more 
and better services, and they can even meet informally with public officials to express 
their demands.  Political parties can also play a role, either by acting as the channels 
through which people articulate their requests, or by directly mobilizing people to press 
                                                 
27 The academic literature on social participation is so extensive that it would be almost impossible to cite 
it exhaustively.  Some interesting empirical works on the topic are Putnam (1993), Tendler (1997), Fizbein 
(1997), and Peterson (1997).  A widely cited theoretical work on democracy and participation is Pateman 
(1970). 
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incumbent authorities.  In short, better governmental outcomes might not be only 
attributable to “supply” influences (i.e. the deliberate attempt of politicians to guard 
themselves against the possibility of being thrown out of power, by improving their 
provision of public goods), but also to the “demand” for good government (i.e. the 
capacity of the electorate to get involved in the local policymaking process by 
mobilizing, lobbying local officials, and promoting the cooperation of other residents to 
obtain more and better services from their governments). 
This dissertation attempts to evaluate the claim that social participation improves 
the performance of local governments in Mexico.  Unfortunately, information on the 
several methods people can employ to participate in local policymaking (for example 
through NGOs, social protests, lobbying, newspaper reading, etc.) is not available at the 
level of municipalities.  For the purpose of this research, I will use voter turnout rates in 
local elections as a proxy for the degree of political involvement of citizens in public 
affairs.  However, this variable should be interpreted with caution, since voter turnout 
might well indicate the strength of parties to mobilize people during an election, rather 
than the level of political awareness among citizens.28  Nevertheless, it will allow us to 
analyze whether a highly mobilized electorate is a condition that improves or deteriorates 
the performance of local governments.  Another variable that I will employ as a surrogate 
for citizen participation are literacy rates, since a better educated society might posses 
better organizational abilities to influence the responses of local officials.  
 
Hypothesis 3.  The involvement of citizens in local affairs improves the 
performance of local governments. 
 
                                                 
28 In addition, the causal relationship between performance and voter participation might also work in the 
opposite direction: better performing governments might induce people to participate more.  I thank 




1.5.3. Vertically divided governments (juxtaposition) 
 
The increasing levels of electoral competition that characterize both the municipal 
and the state levels of government in Mexico have produced the phenomenon of 
vertically divided governments or “juxtaposition”: some municipalities are governed by a 
party that is different than the party of the state governor.29  The appearance of 
juxtaposition at all levels of government in Mexico might have important consequences 
on the performance of governments, although the relationship between juxtaposition and 
performance entails considerable complexities.  For example, the distribution of 
intergovernmental resources across municipalities by state authorities might be 
influenced by political considerations, an outcome that is consistent with the predictions 
made by theories of distributive politics, such as the model proposed by Cox and 
McCubbins (1986).  These authors argue that that the optimal strategy of a risk-adverse 
politician will be to redistribute public resources primarily to their support groups in 
order to maintain existing political coalitions.  Their proposition implies that a state 
politician (for example, a state governor in Mexico) will tend to spend more resources in 
municipalities where he or she enjoys a larger political support.  In contrast, in 
municipalities controlled by opposition parties (i.e., in juxtaposed municipal 
government), the state governor might decide to spend less resources, or even withdraw 
funds.  Given the strong dependency of municipalities on the financial resources of 
                                                 
29 The phenomenon of ‘juxtaposed governments’ occurs “when a well defined territorial sub-national unit 
(such as a state or a municipality) is controlled by a party that is different from the party that controls the 
larger unit (such as the federation or the state)” (De Remes, 1998, 5). 
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higher levels of government, a reduction in intergovernmental funding can significantly 
erode the performance of local governments.30 
On the other hand, there are studies that predict that the phenomenon of 
juxtaposition will encourage opposition governments to improve their performance. For 
example, drawing on William Riker’s theory of federalism (Riker, 1964), Flamand argues 
in a recent study that an important condition for the federal bargain to be maintained is 
the existence of vertically divided governments and party competition.   “Given partisan 
difference, national and subnational executives have fewer tools at their disposal to 
influence their counterparts at the other level and, second, the tenure in office of the 
leaders at either level is not secure in the presence of party competition” (Flamand, 2004, 
5).31  In other words, governmental juxtaposition can be regarded as an element 
promoting the levels of public policy autonomy among subnational and local 
governments.  The previous proposition implies that opposition municipal governments 
will not passively accept the consequences of reduced state funding, since they have a 
strong incentive to satisfy the policy demands of local constituencies.  Having emerged 
from competitive elections (vertically divided governments imply the existence of a 
competitive electoral system), and lacking political ties with state governors, the political 
careers of juxtaposed municipal presidents are closely linked to how voters evaluate their 
performance.  In other words, local politicians are expected to demand greater policy 
autonomy when voters can hold them accountable for policy decisions. Therefore, they 
                                                 
30 A good amount of research has addressed the problem of intergovernmental fund distribution in the 
Mexican case, which has been found to depend on political considerations.  For example, Molinar and 
Weldon (1994) show that the distribution of PRONASOL funds during the Salinas administration, from the 
federal government to the states, was markedly influenced by the regional electoral strength of the PRI.  
The analysis of intergovernmental transfers for municipalities is, however, beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
31 In her doctoral dissertation, Flamand shows that vertically divided governments and electoral 
competition in Mexico have influenced the crafting of federalist policies in the national congress, the 
allocation of federal grants to the states, and the filing of constitutional controversies at the Supreme Court 
involving intergovernmental disputes. 
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will make every attempt to increase their levels of policy autonomy, which normally 
implies improving the collection of revenues coming from local sources, modernizing the 
administrative apparatus of the local government, and spending on areas that allow them 
to claim credit for their actions.  Thus, at the margin (i.e., after controlling for the amount 
of transfers received from state or federal sources), we can expect that juxtaposed 
municipal governments will perform better than non-juxtaposed governments. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Political juxtaposition at the municipal level causes improvements 
in the performance of local governments. 
 
 
1.5.4. Socioeconomic influences 
 
Besides the political motivations that might lead local decision-makers to improve 
their performance, there are structural factors influencing the quality of governance in 
Mexican municipalities.  The most obvious and widely confirmed by studies of 
institutional performance (see for example Putnam, 1993) is the level of regional 
socioeconomic modernization.  Wealthier and more modern regions provide a large 
amount of economic, technological and human resources that are essential for 
governments to accomplish their tasks.  When the level of income and the value of 
property increase, local governments can extract greater revenues from citizens, hire 
better trained people for the public administration, or contract with more local private 
providers to deliver public services.  Another reason to expect a positive relationship 
between socioeconomic development and government quality is that private investors 
might encourage local governments to improve (for example the quality of a local 
government might be a relevant factor in the location decisions of private firms). 
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However, testing a causal relationship between socioeconomic development and 
local government performance entails several complexities.  One of them is that 
socioeconomic levels and local performance may have a simultaneous relationship: high 
socioeconomic levels might cause good government, but at the same time socioeconomic 
development might be the result, at least to some extent, of an effective and efficient 
local governance.  Unraveling the endogenous relationship between socioeconomic 
welfare and government performance would introduce more complexities than the 
available data can support.32  In light of this, my research will treat socioeconomic factors 
simply as exogenous control variables.  Controlling for socioeconomic factors is also an 
essential condition to isolate the effects of our central theoretical variables, such as 
competition, alternation, and participation.  Since socioeconomic development is closely 
related to political modernity (for example, electoral competition is normally higher in 
urban areas), and both are important determinants of government performance, failing to 
control for socioeconomic differences might create serious biases in our results.  
Therefore, throughout this dissertation different socioeconomic indicators will be used, 
depending on the specific issue under consideration. 
 
 
1.6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to empirically test each of the central hypotheses in this dissertation, I use 
a combination of statistical multivariate analyses and qualitative research methods.  In the 
first case, I assembled a very large panel dataset that combines a variety of information, 
disaggregated at the level of municipalities, obtained from several official and non-
                                                 
32 For instance, in order to cope with the problem of endogeneity, the modeling would require the use of a 
good instrumental variable explaining variations in socioeconomic conditions, but exogenous to 
government performance.  However, the available municipal-level data are not enough to adopt such an 
approach. 
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governmental sources.  The dataset merges four different kinds of information: electoral, 
financial, sociodemographic, and administrative.33 It covers practically every 
municipality in the country, excluding the 16 regional departments of the Federal District, 
and municipalities from Oaxaca state that are ruled under usos y costumbres (i.e. 
customary laws by which 412 indigenous municipalities of Oaxaca elect their authorities 
based on a civic-religious hierarchy and popular traditions, rather than through modern 
party systems).34 Thus, the number of municipalities included in the analyses is around 
2015.  In addition to the statistical methods, I conducted three months of fieldwork in a 
set of municipalities in the Estado de México (the most populous and economically 
important state in the country), in order to flesh out some of the findings obtained through 
the quantitative analyses, and to generate additional insights on the mechanisms 
explaining local policymaking processes.   The evidence was collected using semi-
structured interviews with state and municipal officials, and from a focus group exercise 
with community leaders.  The fieldwork focused on the formal and informal mechanisms 
through which the local policy agenda is defined, and on the relationship between 
municipal officials and state authorities, making a special emphasis on the allocation of 
funds for social infrastructure.  From the findings obtained in the fieldwork, additional 
propositions on the spending choices of municipal governments were derived and tested 
using a new dataset based on locality-level data coming from a small sample of 
municipalities. 
Given the nature of the research questions and the limitations imposed by the data 
availability, this dissertation uses different estimation methodologies.  In some analyses 
(particularly those regarding local public finances), it was possible to adopt an 
                                                 
33 A detailed description of the data can be found in appendices C and D. 
34 The system of usos y costumbres was legally established in the state electoral law of Oaxaca in 1995.  
The reason for excluding all these cases is that competition for public office does not go through a modern 
party system. A description of the system can be found in Velásquez (2000). 
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unbalanced panel-data approach, taking advantage of variations occurring both 
throughout time (12 years) and across municipalities (more than 2000).  That is, the 
dataset consists of a combination of cross-sectional and time-series observations, yielding 
a sample size of around 24,000 observations.35  This design considerably reduces 
potential biases arising from unobservable factors.  However, in other analyses it was 
impossible to adopt such an approach (for example in the case of public service provision 
and institutional capacity), since data on municipal performance was only reported at two 
points in time.  In this case, cross-sectional estimation techniques were used, but we 
should be aware that they only allow taking into account the variations taking place 
between municipalities, but not within municipalities.  In other words, the causal 
relationships hypothesized in this dissertation are harder to test using cross-sectional data 
because we can never rule out the possibility that other unobservable factors could have 
been the real cause of the improvements in government performance.  Each chapter 
describes in depth the specific modeling and data employed. 
All electoral variables were constructed from a dataset compiled by the Mexican 
think-tank CIDAC (Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo), which comprises 
publicly available information on the distribution of votes across parties in every 
municipal election taking place in Mexico since 1980.36  Performance indicators 
regarding the provision of public services, as well as all sociodemographic control 
variables, were obtained from the two population censuses conducted by INEGI 
(Mexico’s central statistical agency) in 1990 and 2000.  Fiscal performance indicators 
(tax effort, and local budgetary allocations), were created based on INEGI’s database on 
municipal finances, which includes yearly information on municipal revenues and 
                                                 
35 The sample size is not the same across every analysis, given that there are missing observations for some 
municipalities in some of the years included.  In other words, the panel is unbalanced because some 
municipalities do not report data at every year of the 1990-2001 period. 
36 The data can be accessed on-line at www.cidac.org.mx 
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expenditures from 1989 to 2001.37 Finally, variables measuring the levels of 
administrative institutionalization were constructed using survey data from the Municipal 
Development Censuses conducted by INEGI and INDESOL in 1995 and 2000. 
 
 
1.7. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework that motivates this dissertation.  It 
starts by introducing the recent theoretical and empirical research on governance, a topic 
that has gained academic relevance in explaining why the quality of governmental 
institutions is important for development.  It also reviews the principal premises and 
propositions of the classical literature on decentralization, as well as the recent critiques it 
has received in recent years, particularly when evaluated from the perspective of 
developing countries.  I claim that the classical economic foundations of fiscal 
decentralization theory are overly prescriptive and fail to explain the causes of better 
government performance.  On the other hand, I argue that recent perspectives on 
decentralization have provided compelling reasons that alert us on the risks that fiscal 
decentralization entails in the absence of effective accountability mechanisms.  Drawing 
on a promising line of inquiry that stresses how political and institutional factors can 
shape the consequences of decentralization at the local levels, as well as on research on 
local governments in Mexico, I argue that it is important to consider the interaction of 
electoral competition with decentralization in explaining variations in performance. 
Chapter 3 develops two different measures of government performance, one 
related to the provision of public services, and another to the processes through which 
local governments develop their institutional capacity.  Based on these performance 
                                                 
37 These data can also be accessed on-line through INEGI’s Sistema Municipal de Bases de Datos 
(SIMBAD) at www.inegi.gob.mx. 
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indicators, the chapter presents two empirical models to test whether increases in 
electoral competition, party alternation, and voter turnout lead local governments to 
improve their rates of service coverage and to develop their administrative capabilities.  
The results imply that performance is more responsive to demand-side factors, than to 
increases in the levels of electoral competitiveness.  They also indicate that high levels of 
party mobilization might preclude the development of local institutional capacities, given 
the unwillingness of incumbent policymakers to give up their ability to use public 
resources for political patronage. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the budgetary choices and the revenue-raising capacity of 
municipal governments in Mexico in light of the political pressures created by a more 
contested and participatory electoral environment.  Using panel data estimation 
methodologies, I analyze the consequences of the interaction between policy 
decentralization and electoral competition on the budgetary and taxing choices of 
municipal governments of Mexico.  I also investigate whether the budget allocations and 
taxing enforcement of local governments change during electoral years, and whether the 
phenomenon of governmental juxtaposition (i.e. vertically divided governments) 
encourages incumbent politicians to invest more resources in public works and increase 
their levels of financial autonomy.  The results tend to confirm the hypothesis that 
juxtaposition improves the autonomy of local governments, and that electoral years 
provide local politicians with the opportunity to make their actions more visible to the 
population.  The evidence also indicates that only under conditions of decentralization, 
the competitiveness of elections is capable to induce authorities to invest on projects with 
higher social returns.  
Chapter 5 analyzes how the decentralization of social infrastructure funds 
operates at the very micro level, using the Estado de México as a case study.  Based on 
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semi-structured interviews with state and municipal officials, from a focus group 
exercise, and from electoral, financial, and sociodemographic information disaggregated 
at the level of localities, I generated additional insights on how the resource allocation 
decisions of municipal governments are made, the constraints (formal and informal) they 
face to improve their performance, and how the goals of the decentralization policy are 
transformed when they reach the implementation stage at the local level.  The findings 
imply that municipal governments have a propensity to use party considerations in the 
formulation of their spending choices.  
In the concluding chapter, I assert that the more contested and participatory 
electoral environment that characterizes Mexican municipalities has started to transform 
the decision-making strategies of local politicians, and that it has also increased the 
autonomy of local governments with respect to higher governmental levels.  However, I 
claim that these changes have not yet been translated into better social outcomes, given 
persistent problems of governmental accountability, shortcomings in the design of 
decentralization instruments, and the recurrent opportunistic behavior of local political 
actors. Overall, the findings cast serious doubts on the ability of electoral democracy to 
produce better developmental consequences by itself, which implies that further 
















Local Governance, Decentralization and Performance: A Theoretical 
Overview 
 
Why is local governance an important issue for scholars and practitioners these 
days?  What are its principal consequences on the social and economic development of 
countries?  What are the underlying forces driving improvements in the performance of 
governments, particularly at the local level?  Are there some lessons to learn from the 
experience of other countries, including Mexico?  This chapter presents a review of some 
relevant literature on local governance and decentralization with the purpose of exploring 
how other authors, from different academic disciplines, have attempted to provide some 
answers to those basic questions.  The review attempts to draws insights from the 
literature on policy decentralization as well as from other explanatory frameworks 
heavily rotted in electoral theories of governmental accountability, in order to explore 
how the interaction between these two academic streams helps us to explain the factors 
that cause local governments in Mexico to improve their performance.  The chapter starts 
by introducing the recent theoretical and empirical research on governance, a relatively 
new topic in social science inquiry that analyzes how and why the quality of a country 
system of governance is a determinant factor for development.  Section 2.2 presents an 
overview of decentralization theories, since these have provided the principal arguments 
in favor of devolving policy authority to the local and sub-national levels in order to 
improve the efficiency in the allocation of resources.  The classical decentralization 
arguments, I contend, have basically a prescriptive orientation, rather than an explanatory 
focus.  Furthermore, they do not provide an explanation of why some governments 
perform better than others, since it is taken for granted that policy devolution will provide 
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by itself the incentives to assure an efficient provision of public goods (i.e. that 
government performance will be the logical result of the ability of voters to bring their 
preferences to the policy agendas).  More recent developments in decentralization theory, 
which are also discussed in this chapter, have started to take into consideration the role of 
electoral and institutional factors in explaining the outcomes of different decentralization 
programs, and they have also pointed out that the ability of fiscal devolution to improve 
the performance of local governments depends on the existence of effective 
accountability mechanisms, particularly in the case of developing countries.  In section 
2.3 the chapter discusses in more detail an emerging body of literature that attempts to 
explain the consequences of decentralization on local governance, looking more at how 
local conditions shape the outcomes of a decentralized provision of public goods.  The 
section underlines an incipient but very promising line of inquiry that emphasizes how 
local electoral conditions and institutions affect the effectiveness of decentralization to 
achieve its goals.  Section 2.4 reviews the literature on local governments in Mexico, in 
order to highlight their most relevant insights and discuss some of their limitations.  
Finally, the chapter presents the implications of the literature for this research. 
 
2.1. GOOD GOVERNANCE: A NEW TOPIC OF ACADEMIC RELEVANCE 
 
In the last decade a large number of studies have addressed, directly or implicitly, 
the issue of government performance.  Recent studies –particularly those sponsored by 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, the OECD, and the IADB- have 
started to consider the quality of a country’s governance as an important independent 
variable explaining developmental outcomes, such as economic growth, foreign 
investment, poverty reduction, and income inequality.  Huther and Shah, for example, 
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define the concept of governance as a “multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of 
the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of 
the resource endowment of a state” (Huther and Shah, 1998, 2). The quality of a 
country’s governance is assessed in terms of the impact that the use of power by state 
institutions has on the quality of life of its citizens.  Studies of this type normally rely on 
cross-national comparisons, and they develop performance indices aggregated at the 
national level.  The cited authors, for example, create governance indicators based on a 
government's ability to ensure political transparency and voice for citizens, to provide 
efficient and effective public services, to promote the health and well-being of 
constituents, and to create a favorable climate for stable economic growth. 
Another illustrative example of this type of research are the World Bank working 
papers by Kaufmann et. al. (1999a, 1999b, and 2002), where the authors develop 
governance indicators based on the following dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control 
of corruption. From data covering 175 countries, they find evidence on the importance of 
good governance for economic development, and absence of "virtuous circles" between 
per capita income and better governance (i.e., they find that the causation runs from 
governance to income, but not in the opposite direction). 
There are many other studies for which a specific aspect of a country’s 
governance (for example corruption levels, political instability, rule of law, bureaucratic 
efficiency, institutional credibility, and civic trust and cooperation) is the key 
independent variable explaining economic and social development. Ades and di Tella 
(1996) find that corruption negatively affects investment, and that corruption is positively 
related with the lack of competition in the economic market and with less independent 
judicial systems.  Brunetti et. al. (1997) conclude that business credibility promotes 
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economic growth and private investments.  Also, Chong and Calderon (1997) observe 
that the degree of institutional development of countries (measured through the 
enforceability of contracts, infrastructure quality, bureaucratic promptness, and other 
institutional indicators) positively affects economic growth in development countries, 
although they also find evidence of a reverse causality relationship between those 
variables.  Macroeconomic stability is another developmental outcome that seems to be 
positively affected by governance factors, as found by Cukierman et. al. (1994) in their 
analysis of the consequences of the legal independence of central banks on inflation.  
Many other studies emphasizing the role of institutional arrangements (Alesina et. al, 
1996; Fukasaku and Hausmann, 1998; La Porta et. al, 1998; Wei, 2000) conclude that 
formal institutions, such as the centralization of budget processes, the nature of party 
systems, or the openness of the economy, play a relevant role in providing the incentives 
for good performance among politicians and public bureaucracies.   
In summary, most of these studies suggest that the quality of governance 
constitutes an important variable to explain social and economic development across 
countries, particularly in the case of developing nations.  However, one of the principal 
limitations of these research efforts is, in my view, that although they persuasively 
demonstrate the importance of effective institutions for development, they do not explain 
why and how good governance can emerge.  That is, for none of the studies cited does 
the performance of governments constitute the dependent variable.  Another limitation of 
the current literature on governance is that it generally pays little attention to variations in 
institutional conditions taking place within countries, rather than between countries.  In 
other words, there are relatively few studies for which local or sub-national governments 
within the same country constitute the units of analysis.  I believe that this shortcoming is 
important, given that sub-national governments have acquired important policy 
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responsibilities during the last years all over the world.  Furthermore, local conditions 
and institutions might also play a very relevant role in explaining developmental 
outcomes.  Thus the contribution of my dissertation to the study of governance is 
twofold: it will provide arguments on why some governments perform better than others, 




2.2. THE LITERATURE ON DECENTRALIZATION 
 
2.2.1. Classical decentralization theories 
 
 
The classical foundations of fiscal decentralization theory come from the works of 
Charles Tiebout and Wallace Oates (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972), who provided 
arguments supporting the view that local governments should have the control over a 
number of expenditure functions to improve the efficiency of resource allocations.  
Tiebout offered a solution to the classical problem of public goods provision, arguing that 
local governments are better suited to identify the preferences of their constituents, and to 
incorporate them into their taxing and spending decisions.  Acting like a private market, 
local governments will charge taxes and supply local services, and citizens will reveal 
their true preferences by “voting with their feet”: they will move to jurisdictions that best 
match up with their tastes.  At the margin, the benefit from consuming the public good or 
service will be equal to the cost, approaching a Pareto optimal solution. Despite the fact 
that Tiebout’s model rests on very strong (and presumably unrealistic) assumptions, his 
theory has been advanced as an argument to justify why local governments should be 
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granted with most expenditure responsibilities, such as health, education, infrastructure, 
and public safety.38 
A second important model in fiscal decentralization is the work by Wallace Oates.  
He shares with Tiebout the notion that different areas have different preferences for 
public goods, but he also makes the point that not all public goods have the same 
characteristics.  Some goods, such as defense or macroeconomic stabilization, provide 
benefits to the whole country, while others such as regional transportation systems, 
provide only local benefits.  A centralized government might ignore these spatial 
characteristics and the diversity of preferences, thus it is very likely to provide public 
goods inefficiently.  His conclusion is the following: 
 
for a public good –the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets 
of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output 
of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the respective local 
government—it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local 
governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform 
level of output across all jurisdictions (Oates 1972, 35). 
 
The main implication from Oates’ theory is that decentralization policy should 
assign responsibilities among different government levels, according to the spatial 
characteristics of public goods.  Another implication of both Tiebout and Oates’ theories 
is the belief that local governments are more likely to perform better than central 
authorities, since local constituents can exert pressure –either by voting or by moving to 
alternative jurisdictions—to hold local policymakers accountable for their actions.  In 
other words, local government performance is assumed to result from a decentralized 
system of public goods provision that allows citizens to reveal their policy preferences.  
                                                 
38 Some of the assumptions in Tiebout’s model are that the cost people face to move from one locality to 
another is negligible, that people have perfect information about the amount and quality of services and tax 
rates of different jurisdictions, and that there are no externalities between jurisdictions. 
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2.2.2. Critical views on decentralization 
 
During the nineties, several scholars started to show reservations on the alleged 
virtues of decentralization, particularly when applied to developing countries.39  These 
critical perspectives point out that decentralization can produce adverse effects on several 
aspects of the economy.  Their goal is not to reject the whole idea of decentralization but 
only to make policymakers conscious of the importance of analyzing carefully the 
potential outcomes of decentralization programs.  This body of literature has considered 
that decentralization can produce adverse effects in three different ways: 1) by 
threatening macroeconomic stability; 2) by exacerbating income inequality; 3) by 
weakening economic and production efficiency. 
In his classical article on decentralization, Tanzi claims that sub-national 
governments in developing countries are likely to contribute significantly to the 
aggravation of macroeconomic problems, or at least they make it more difficult to correct 
them.  Although decentralization should ideally be based on a clear and comprehensive 
contract between central and sub-national governments (a contract spelling out the 
obligations of local and sub-national governments, imposing strict limits on the amount 
of transfers they would be entitled to receive, and requiring them to finance any spending 
increase through the use of local taxation), in developing countries such a contract is not 
binding, since spending responsibilities are vaguely defined and subject to changes.  
Also, Tanzi asserts that local policymakers have incentives to overspend or undertax, 
have poor information and expenditure management systems to guide their decisions and 
control their budgets.  “When clear and firm constitutional or legal guidelines are 
                                                 
39 The pioneering critical works are those by Prud’homme (1995), and Tanzi (1995). 
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missing, decentralization may create a situation in which local governments can gain by 
increasing spending while shifting the financing costs to the whole country” (Tanzi, 
1995, 306). 
Decentralization may aggravate structural fiscal problems if, for example, large 
tax bases are assigned exclusively to sub-national governments, while most spending 
areas remain under the responsibility of central authorities.  The reason is that the tax 
resources available for the national government would be too low.40  Sharing major tax 
bases can also be problematic for macroeconomic management for similar reasons: when 
the percentage of tax revenues that the central government shares with sub-national levels 
is too high, the capacity to stabilize the economy is reduced severely.  Finally, sub-
national borrowing is another channel through which decentralization might create 
macroeconomic problems, particularly when the central government tends to bail out the 
debt of states and municipalities.  A significant amount of research has been done on the 
impacts of decentralization on national fiscal performance, particularly referred to the 
fiscal balance of central governments –a major determinant of macroeconomic stability.41 
Besides the problems that decentralization might entail for macroeconomic 
management, Tanzi and other authors assert that decentralization might also aggravate 
                                                 
40 The case of Brazil is a good example of this situation, where the decentralization of major tax bases 
explained its high fiscal deficits (see Bahl and Linn, 1992). 
41 See for example the book edited by Fukasaku and Hausmann (1998), in which the authors explore the 
effects of decentralization, electoral institutions, and the size of central and subnational governments on 
fiscal deficits.  See also the article by Alesina et. al. (1996). The leading authors working on these issues 
commonly frame fiscal deficits as “common-pool” and “agency” problems.  In a nutshell, a common-pool 
problem emerges when each participant can shift the burden of a decision onto others, making everybody 
worse off.  The federal budget is viewed as a common-pool resource because, under decentralization, 
jurisdictions have the incentives to shift the responsibility of their spending decisions onto all taxpayers in a 
country. Since all jurisdictions face exactly the same incentives, central fiscal deficits will emerge.  In 
addition, decentralization creates agency problems when the central government has an imperfect ability to 
monitor the actions of lower levels.  De Mello (1999) presents empirical evidence from a sample of 30 
countries in the period 1970-95, suggesting that decentralization negatively affects national fiscal outcomes 




income inequality. The reason is that local jurisdictions might not have big incentives to 
redistribute: if a local government adopts vigorous redistribute policies by taxing wealthy 
people and providing high benefits for the poor, then the rich will tend to move to 
jurisdictions with low taxes and poor people will tend to leave areas with lower benefits.  
Thus, redistribution would not be financially sustainable at the local level.  For this 
reason the common argument is that central governments should be responsible for 
income redistribution. Prud’homme (1995) points out that income can and should be 
redistributed among jurisdictions as well as among individuals.  He claims that correcting 
interpersonal disparities does not necessarily correct interregional inequalities: 
 
a reduction in income disparities does not necessarily correlate with a reduction in 
regional income differentials.  If income levels in a poor region are more equally 
distributed than in a higher-income region, transfers to poorer citizens will 
primarily benefit the richer region and actually increase regional disparities 
(Prud’homme, 1995, 203). 
 
Prud’homme doubts that a decentralized system is likely to be more effective at 
reducing interjurisdictional disparities than a centralized system, since the empirical 
evidence unambiguously shows that in a centralized system richer regions subsidize 
poorer regions through national budgets, while in a decentralized system local 
jurisdictions collect all taxes from and undertake all expenditures on behalf on its 
residents.  The principal policy implication from these arguments is that central 
governments can reduce interregional disparities by maintaining the control over budget 
resources, but this means that it should impose limits on local and sub-national 
governments in their capacity to raise local taxes. 
Although decentralization has typically been defended on the basis of economic 
efficiency (given the classical assumption, previously discussed, that local governments 
can better match the demands of residents), there is evidence challenging such 
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proposition.  According to Prud’homme, in developing countries the problem is not that 
local jurisdictions have different preferences for public goods, but they have different 
needs (income).  Since basic needs are well know, the welfare gains associated with a 
better match of supply and demand are not large.  Second, the assumption that people 
will express their policy preferences in their votes is very unlikely to hold in developing 
countries, where local elections are usually decided on the basis of personal, tribal, or 
political party loyalties.  Third, the assumption that local officials will satisfy local 
constituents’ preferences is also unlikely, since mayors do not generally have the 
resources nor the incentives to improve their performance, and also because local 
bureaucracies are often unresponsive and unqualified to pursue the policy agenda of 
mayors. 
But the problem of efficiency does not refer only to the capacity of local 
governments to reflect local preferences, but also to provide services in an honest and 
cost-effective manner, as stated by the cited author.  In this respect, decentralization also 
entails risks because local governments in developing countries lack the technical 
capacity to undertake tasks that require highly qualified personnel.  This can be explained 
by the fact that central bureaucracies offer better careers to their employees, with a 
greater diversity of tasks, more possibilities of promotion, less political intervention, and 
a longer view of issues.  They also invest more in technology, research, and innovation.  
A further problem comes from the possibility that decentralization might generate more 
corruption at the local levels.  Local politicians and bureaucrats are more likely to be 
subject to pressing demands from local groups, making it difficult to enforce the law.42  
In order to solve all these potential problems, the literature suggests that the 
design and implementation of decentralization policies should be conducted carefully, 
                                                 
42 Prud'homme estimates that informal taxation in Zaire (payoffs to authorities as well as contributions, 
gifts, and donations) is at least eight times more important than formal taxes. 
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placing special attention to the distribution of expenditure responsibilities among 
governmental levels, the assignment of taxes and bases, the design of intergovernmental 
transfers, and the system of sub-national borrowing.43 Although it would be excessive to 
say that there are key ingredients for a successful decentralization, Bird and Vaillancourt 
(1998) claim that two conditions seem to be particularly important.  The first condition is 
that local decision process must be democratic, in the sense that decisions should be 
transparent and the people affected should have the opportunity to influence them.  The 
second condition for success is that the costs of local decisions must be fully borne by 
those who made the decisions.  In other words, local governments should face hard 
budget constraints with respect to devolved functions in order to ensure accountability.  
However, the approaches taken by many countries are too diverse as to propose unique 
solutions.  As these authors suggest, “policy recommendations in the area of 
intergovernmental finance must be firmly rooted in understanding the rationale of the 
existing intergovernmental system and its capacity for change if they are to be acceptable 
and, if accepted, successfully implemented” (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998, 35). 
In my view, this stream of research has generated interesting insights for our 
understanding of the dangers that decentralization entails in the absence of clear and 
enforceable mechanisms of accountability between government levels.  It has also 
reminded us that the effects of decentralization strongly depend on the existence of 
specific institutional arrangements that facilitate or hinder the accomplishment of its 
social and economic goals.  Nevertheless, I still think that this literature has a number of 
shortcomings.  The first is that it has implicitly adopted a top-down approach to the study 
of decentralization, where this policy is mostly assessed in terms of its effects on national 
priorities, but not that much on the achievement of local outcomes. Typically, empirical 
                                                 
43 I will not discuss in detail these issues.  The prevailing decentralization policy advise can be found in 
Ter-Minassian (1997), Litvack et. al. (1998), Bird and Vaillancourt (1998). 
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analyses of this kind consist of cross-country comparisons, but variations in performance 
across sub-national or local governments are not sufficiently explained.  Furthermore, 
this line of inquiry generally disregards how decentralization can also be shaped by local 
and sub-national conditions.  In other words, it pays no attention to the ability of local 
political processes and actors to influence the objectives, instruments, and outcomes of 
decentralization, from a bottom-up angle.  For example, this literature has disregarded the 
electoral and institutional changes that have taken place at the local levels in many 
developing countries, which might endogenously improve the condition for better local 
governance and, consequently, increase the chances of decentralization to succeed. 
 
2.2.3. Political perspectives on decentralization 
 
There is another interesting stream of literature, developed from the perspective of 
political science, which tries to provide a less normative approach to the study of 
decentralization, stressing the importance of electoral institutions.  For many of these 
studies, the fundamental question is why national governments decide to decentralize 
political, administrative, and fiscal authority to their sub-national units (such as states, 
departments, and municipalities).  A recent book on decentralization in Latin America 
constitutes a good example of this type of research (Montero and Samuels, 2004), where 
decentralization constitutes the dependent variable.  The authors emphasize the role of 
political factors as determinants of decentralization in Latin America. In their view, 
decentralization should be understood as a purposeful strategy of national and sub-
national political elites to guarantee their political survival, either under a context of 
democratization or authoritarianism.  They strongly favor explanatory approaches rooted 
in institutional and electoral elements since these help to understand the incentives of 
politicians (at all levels of government) to support decentralization policies.  Specifically, 
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the incentives of politicians to decentralize are, in the authors’ view, a function of the 
competitiveness of electoral contests, the relative importance politicians ascribe to 
subnational versus national elections, their relative dependence on national versus 
subnational government resources, and the importance of national versus subnational 
power brokers within political parties. 
Regarding the Mexican case, Rodríguez (1997) argues that the decentralization 
policies put into practice by the federal government in the 1980s were the result of a 
deliberate strategy of the government to recover its legitimacy, which was undermined by 
the economic crisis of the early years of that decade.  However, Rodríguez contends that 
the policy-making authority ceded to sub-national governments was in fact very limited 
because the PRI and the central government were unwilling to decentralize political 
power.  In a similar vein, Bruhn (1999) argues that the first electoral victories of 
opposition parties at the local levels were tolerated by the national PRI, in so far as they 
did not undermined its political hegemony at the national level. 
Using also a political analytical framework, other authors have started to 
investigate, not the causes of decentralization, but under what specific conditions 
(political and institutional) decentralization is more likely to accomplish their 
developmental goals, particularly at the local and sub-national levels.  This stream of 
literature evidently raises the issue of why some local governments perform better than 
others once decentralization has occurred.  Interestingly, many of these studies have 
started to use local and sub-national governments as their units of analysis, and also have 
a particular focus on developing countries.  The following section discusses the principal 
contributions of this type of literature.  Also, in the section dealing with the Mexican case 




2.3. THE LITERATURE ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
There is an important academic and policy debate trying to understand how 
decentralization works at the local levels and what consequences it has on local 
governance. 
One of the most influential works is Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 
1993), which analyses the determinants of institutional performance in twenty regions of 
Italy, after new legislation was enacted to strengthen the political autonomy of regional 
governments in 1970.  His central argument is that the variations in civic traditions 
between Italian regions explain the differences in their institutional performance.  In 
other words, good government practices among northern regions have been the result of 
their strong “civic community”, characterized by a high level of associational life to 
accomplish collective tasks.  Putnam’s argument persuasively challenges the main 
conclusions of traditional collective action theorists: that social cooperation can only be 
achieved through hierarchical or “Hobbesian” institutional arrangements, where the state 
enforces the rules that require people to contribute to the public good.44 Based on James 
Coleman’s theory of social action (Coleman, 1990), Putnam argues that social norms of 
trust and reciprocity are key elements in promoting cooperation.  However, one of the 
principal criticisms to Putnam is that the causal mechanism linking “social capital” to 
government performance is not sufficiently explained.  Also, he did not include in his 
argument the role that political and local institutional factors can play in explaining 
variations in performance. 
                                                 
44 The problem of cooperation for collective action is one of the most debated issues in social science 
research.  A dominant assertion among collective action theorists (Olson, 1965) is that rational individuals 
do not have incentives to cooperate, since they prefer to “free-ride” on others.  However, this type of 
behavior produces an inferior social outcome because everyone would be better-off by cooperating, but no 
one has incentives to do it (this is the “prisoner’s dilemma” in game theory).  Some authors have implied 
that vertically enforceable rules are required to solve this dilemma.  However, Putnam is not the only 
author which has criticized this solution (for example, see the excellent work by Ostrom, 1990). 
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Another interesting study addressing the issue of local governance is the work by 
Tendler (1997).  She analyzes why one of the poorest states of Brazil, historically 
characterized by a clientelistic style of government and by the poor quality of its public 
administration, was able to successfully introduce a set of innovative reforms in several 
policy sectors, such as health, agriculture, and employment.  One of the ingredients 
explaining the relative success of these reforms was that the state adopted an original 
approach based on trust, managerial autonomy, indirect monitoring, decentralization to 
municipalities, and social participation.  However, Tendler argues that citizen 
participation did not operate according to the stylized portrayal of decentralization, where 
the central level devolves authority to local governments, and the civil society keeps an 
eye on how social preferences are incorporated into the decision-making process.  
Contrary to this common view, she shows that the state government created and 
organized the “civil society” (i.e., social participation is not necessarily endogenous).  
Two of the limitations of her study are, in my opinion, the lack of variation in her 
dependent variable (she only analyzed a single successful case), and the fact that political 
factors are absent from her analysis. 
Another widely cited study is Fiszbein’s, which analyzes how local capacity was 
strengthened in Colombian municipalities after the national constitution gave local 
governments more resources, responsibilities and decision-making authority (Fiszbein, 
1997) in the mid-1980s.  Based on a sample of 16 municipalities, Fiszbein shows that 
local governments were able to meet the challenge of decentralization in a relatively 
effective way, by making use of existing, but underutilized, capabilities and through 
conscious efforts to upgrade them.  He finds that competition for political office opened 
the doors to responsible and innovative leadership that became the driving force behind 
capacity building.  A second element fostering local capacity was the leadership of 
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mayors, since it enables governments to use underutilized capacities within the 
administration, provides essential skills not previously available, and helps manage 
conflicts between the mayor and the council.  Another capacity-building factor was 
community participation, which forced government accountability and broadened the 
resources on which the municipal administration could draw upon to improve its 
capacity.  Finally, Fiszbein identifies three principal constraints to capacity building: 1) 
the complexity of the legal and regulatory framework under which municipalities operate, 
2) the insufficient inter-municipal coordination, particularly the difficulty of learning 
about the lessons and experiences of others, and 3) the absence of consecutive reelection 
at the local level, since it precludes the sustainability of local capacity development. 
A recent research paper on Uganda and the Philippines provides an interesting 
methodological framework to analyze under what conditions is decentralized governance 
more likely to produce good results (Azfar, et. al. 2001).  The study develops an 
empirical research methodology to measure institutional performance across sub-national 
governments, and to investigate some of its determinants.  It establishes two criteria to 
define performance, namely whether governments provide services that respond to local 
demands, and whether corruption is prevalent in the system.  The paper then analyzes 
how selected institutional arrangements and social practices influence the performance of 
decentralized service delivery.45  Finally, the study examines the causal linkages from 
these formal and informal arrangements to the outputs and outcomes of public service 
provision, such as educational attainment, citizen satisfaction, and infant mortality.  Its 
principal finding is that while decentralization in both countries has certainly transferred 
                                                 
45 Those arrangements are classified into three main types of disciplines: 1) civic disciplines, for example 
the degree of political awareness, information and participation of people in public affairs; 2) 
intergovernmental disciplines, mainly the degree of autonomy and discretion of local authorities to respond 
to local demands; 3) public sector management disciplines, for example whether the recruitment process is 
based on merit rather than on kinship or patronage, the existence of accountability mechanisms, the 
competence of local officials, etc. 
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authority and resources to sub-national governments, the results do not match the most 
optimistic theoretical expectations.  These adverse outcomes are explained largely by the 
relatively unresponsiveness of governments to local preferences, given the prevalent 
procedural, resource and governance constraints they face. 
 
2.4. THE LITERATURE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND DECENTRALIZATION IN 
MEXICO 
 
In 1972, Richard Fagen and William Touhy published a book in which they 
analyzed how the Mexican political system operated at the level of the municipality, 
using Jalapa, the city capital of Veracruz state, as a case study (Fagen and Touhy, 1972).  
The authors saw in that city a microcosm reflecting the bureaucratic and authoritarian 
system that prevailed all around the country at that time.  In their characterization of the 
municipal government institution, the authors highlighted its extremely lack of political 
and administrative autonomy (i.e. its high dependence with respect to the state 
government), its low technical capacity to aggregate social demands, and consequently its 
inability and unwillingness to generate public policies aimed at improving the welfare 
conditions of citizens.  In their view, the institutional weakness of the municipal 
government of Jalapa was the natural consequence of a political system that encouraged 
conservatism (the tendency of incumbent and aspirant politicians to maintain the status 
quo) and detachment from the substance of public policy (decisions made and resources 
allocated more on the basis of political and personal factors, than on developmental or 
social criteria).    The following two quotes illustrate well the authors’ view on municipal 
governments: 
“Chosen as a reward for prior service and  guaranteed election, left almost without 
resources and knowing that they will not have to answer for their performance in 
office, local officials are thus only occasionally at the service of the community.  
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At the municipio level, political irresponsibility and limited responsiveness are 
thus inseparable from powerlessness, centralism, and careerism”(Fagen and 
Touhy, 1972, 65). 
 
“The “good” politician (…) is rewarded not for his innovativeness, initiative, or 
positive accomplishments in the making or implementing of public policy, but 
rather for his capacity to facilitate the functioning of the apparatus through the 
balancing of interests, the distribution of benefits, and the control of potentially 
disruptive or disequilibrating forces.” (Fagen and Touhy, 1972, 27). 
 
Fagen and Touhy persuasively provided a set of institutional explanations for the 
municipal “inaction and non-response”, such as the lack of real electoral competition, the 
short tenure in office of municipal authorities, and their impossibility of reelection.  
Fagen and Touhy’s findings did not only reflect the situation of local politics in Jalapa, 
but actually the governance style that prevailed in Mexico during the years of the PRI 
hegemony. 
More than 20 years after the publication of that book (now a classical study of 
Mexican local politics), the political landscape of state and municipal governments in the 
country started to undergo a rapid process of democratization. The analysis of Mexican 
local governments became one of the central interests among scholars and practitioners, 
as a result of the fact that municipal and state governments became the principal arena of 
electoral competitiveness in the country, giving rise to the arrival of opposition parties for 
the first time in the history of post revolutionary Mexico.  Another reason for the 
widespread interest on local governments in Mexico was the decentralization policies 
launched by the federal government during the eighties and nineties, transferring new 
responsibilities to states and municipalities.  Given the new opportunities for political 
plurality and the fact that local governments are the most direct link between citizens’ 
demands and governmental authorities, the local level started to be regarded as the ideal 
place for reshaping the relationships between state and society in the country. 
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Among the first attempts to systematically evaluate the experiences of municipal 
administration in Mexico, particularly those governed by opposition parties, are the 
several studies produced and coordinated by Rodriguez and Ward during the first half of 
the nineties.46  One of the issues that was explicitly investigated under their research 
agenda was the question about the effectiveness and capacity of opposition parties to 
govern, after a very long period of PRI rule at the state and municipal levels.  Overall, the 
authors observed that the first years of opposition government in the country were 
evidently marked by lack experience or background in urban governance, which were 
aggravated by the shortness of term and the no reelection clause.  In addition, they did not 
find local governments structuring very coherent programmatic agendas, which, once 
more, was a symptom of their inexperience in government.  Another issue explored was 
the extent to which partisan political rationality was intervening the local decision-
making process.  Although partisan considerations were still present, Rodríguez and 
Ward identified that the new local governments (especially those from the PAN) put 
stronger emphasis on efficiency and transparency principles for public budgeting.  
Finally, the authors addressed the issue of intergovernmental relations between the three 
levels (municipal, state, and federal), under a context of “vertically divided” government.  
In this matter, the authors did not find evidence that opposition governments were 
penalized with lower statutory state and federal funds.  However, they observed that 
upper governmental levels employ other, more subtle, mechanisms to punish opposition 
governments, such as delays in the delivery of transfers, or less support coming from 
discretionary lines of funding, particularly for large-scale public works.  Interestingly, the 
result of this type of intergovernmental game created the conditions for more autonomous 
                                                 
46 See Rodríguez and Ward (1992, 1994, 1995). 
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local governments, since they responded by expanding the collection of own-source 
revenues. 
One of the principal topics that became central in the Mexican literature on local 
governance was the new role that social participation was beginning to play in a more 
democratized environment.  Several studies described how local governments were 
adopting innovative approaches to incorporate the participation of citizens and social 
groups in local public affairs.47  In many cases, local governments –particularly those 
governed for the first time by opposition parties- attempted to break the traditional 
governance styles based on political patronage, clientelism, and authoritarianism, typical 
of the PRI administrations, replacing them with more inclusive and horizontal 
mechanisms.  Nevertheless, most authors coincide in stating that Mexican municipalities 
still lack the necessary autonomy (mostly fiscal and legislative) to better deal with the 
multiple demands of their citizens (Rodríguez, 1997). 
Despite the widespread enthusiasm with the new role of social participation in 
local public policy, there were more pessimistic views about the prospects of citizen 
involvement in local affairs.  One important contribution is the work by Guillén López 
(1996), whose central claim is that the political openness created by the increasing 
electoral competitiveness of Mexican municipalities, has not yet permeated the decision-
making processes taking place within local governments.  In other words, that despite the 
fact that local citizens have gained significant influence on the selection of their local 
authorities, the institutional environment of local governments still prevents society to 
play a relevant role in the definition and implementation of local public policies.  Guillén 
López argues that several institutional limitations explain the persistence of a vertical and 
relatively centralized governance style at the local levels, using evidence from 
                                                 
47 The collection of essays and case studies in Merino (1994) and Ziccardi (1995) are good examples of the 
analyses that concentrate in the role of social participation in municipal governance. 
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municipalities located on the Mexico-United States border.  The first reason is that state 
electoral legislations forbid local political organizations to contend in municipal elections 
if they are not represented at the state or even national levels (i.e. only national and state 
parties can contend in municipal elections).  This introduces a strong distortion in the 
quality of representation at the local levels, since state or national political parties do not 
necessarily reflect the political interests of local constituents.  Another important factor 
are the rules for the integration of local councils, also regulated by state laws, namely 
their lack of political plurality.  Even though the national constitution mandates that local 
councils should be formed according to a rule of proportional representation, in reality 
the mayor’s party is the dominant force within the local council.  This is also reinforced 
by the fact that council members (regidores and síndicos) are not authorities elected in 
their own right: they are jointly selected from party lists over which the mayor may have 
considerable leverage.48  As a result, the link between councilors and local constituents is 
generally weak, thus explaining the small influence of society on the content of local 
policies.  In addition to the problems of representation within local councils, these bodies 
generally lack sufficient resources (budgetary, informational) to be able to exert an 
influence on local policymaking.  Nevertheless, Guillén López finds that councilors play 
an important role in identifying problems in the community and acting on behalf of local 
groups.  In my view, although many case studies on Mexican local governments provide 
evidence of new approaches to incorporate social participation in policymaking, I 
consider that the argument of Guillén López implies that those innovative methods might 
                                                 
48 It is important to note, however, that local mayors do not necessarily have an absolute control on the 
nomination of council members, since local party leaders in many instances have greater influence.  Ward 
asserts, for example, that “an unwary municipal president might find that his or her planilla is stacked by 
the party’s municipal committee with people whose loyalty and policy inclinations lean more heavily 
towards the party apparatchiks than to the incoming municipal president” (Ward, 1998, 353). 
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be ephemeral or unable to become institutionalized, given the legal constraints that 
municipalities still face. 
Another group of studies has focused more on the policy and managerial 
dimensions of local governments, rather than concentrating only on the issue of social 
participation.  Cabrero-Mendoza (1996), for example, presents several case studies on 
local government innovations in Mexico.  In all the cases analyzed, he finds that local 
councils were very active in defining and discussing the municipal policy agendas.  From 
interviews with local councilors and a review of the actas de cabildo (council meeting 
proceedings), Cabrero-Mendoza observed a pattern that is uncommon in Mexican local 
governments: the records of discussions taking place at local councils were very well 
organized (a sign of the relative importance of local councils within the municipal 
government), and in most cases council members perceived that their opinions were 
relevant for the local decision-making process.  This result contrasts with the 
predominant pattern observed across the country, where local councils play a secondary 
role.  Cabrero-Mendoza classifies the innovations studied into three main types of 
strategies: some local governments based their innovations on the participation of citizens 
and social groups, creating the necessary structures to facilitate them, or taking advantage 
of preexisting institutions (for example using autochthonous forms rooted in the 
community).  Some other municipalities used leadership as a basic element for 
innovation, trying to restore the credibility of people and articulating their cooperation.  
Finally, a third group of localities introduced innovation strategies by transforming their 
intergovernmental relationships with the federal and state levels, which provided 
important inputs to make the innovation succeed. 
An interesting article that provides a systematic summary of the several case 
studies on local governance in Mexico is a paper by Ward (1998).  His central argument 
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is that the traditional partisan style of governance that characterized local governments in 
Mexico during the years of PRI hegemony, is gradually being replaced by a more 
technocratic approach, and that this shift in governance styles appears to be independent 
–at least to some extent- from which party is in power at the local levels.  Ward 
establishes a governance typology based on two variables: a) the level of technical 
rationality applied for local decision-making (i.e. the inclination of government officials 
to make policy choices according to technical criteria, rather than on partisan 
considerations), and b) the nature of party-government relations (i.e. the degree to which 
government decisions are influenced by party leaders, rather than by elected authorities).  
Assuming that these two dimensions lie on a continuum, Ward derives four types of 
governance styles.  One of the extremes of this categorization is named “machine 
politics”, characterized by strong party-government relationships and a low degree of 
technical rationality.  This was the predominating style of local governance in Mexico 
until the eighties, when electoral competition and party alternation were starting to 
emerge at the local sphere.  The other extreme is labeled “technocratic governance”, in 
which there is a combination of high technical rationality in decision-making with very 
weak party-government relationships.  This category clearly resembles the governance 
style of most urban municipalities won by the PAN in the late eighties and early nineties, 
characterized by a strong use of business management techniques, recruitment patterns 
based more on local credibility than on partisanship, and a more intensive use of public 
consultation mechanisms for agenda-setting.  The other two resulting categories are 
called, respectively, “modernizing governance” and “autonomous government”, being the 
first a combination of high technical rationality and strong party-government relationship 
(the party still exerts a significant influence on the government’s policy agenda, but day-
to-day decisions are largely based on technical considerations), while the second reflects 
 56
just the opposite (this would be the case of most small rural municipalities dominated 
either by strong caciques, or by indigenous practices).  Ward contends that local 
governments in Mexico are gradually moving from the traditional “machine politics” and 
“autonomous government” categories to the more sophisticated technocratic and 
modernizing styles, as can be testified by most case studies on municipal governance in 
Mexico.  Finally, he argues that this shift in governance styles is explained by several 
factors, for example the increasing competitiveness of local elections, the rise in electoral 
victories of opposition parties, the need for parties to exercise effective government in 
order to remain in power, and policy reforms launched by the national government since 
the early eighties to strengthen the autonomy and responsibilities of local governments in 
the country. 
Much of the literature on local governments in Mexico, at least the studies that 
were produced around the first half of the 1990s, were basically grounded on case study 
methodology.  The absence of large-n statistical analyses during those years was 
probably due to the lack of systematic and extensive data at the level of states and 
municipalities.  The proliferation of statistical information on local elections, public 
finances, and the results of the 2000 population census has enabled the use of quantitative 
approaches to the study of local governance issues in the country.   Beside the use of 
statistical methodologies for hypothesis testing, many of the studies that started to emerge 
in the first years of the current decade have a clear focus on institutions and electoral 
processes. 
One illustrative example is a recent study by Hiskey (2005), who analyzes to what 
extent political and institutional factors explained the ability of Mexican states to recover 
from the 1995 economic crisis.  Hiskey shows that the relationship between multiparty 
competition and sub-national economic recovery is not linear due to electoral transition 
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costs: states undergoing democratic transition at the time of the crisis (i.e. those 
characterized by political instability and recurrent challenges to incumbent elected 
officials) were least equipped to respond to it, while states where electoral competition 
had been already accepted as the normal mechanism to solve political disputes, were 
better prepared to recover from the crisis. 
Another piece of work highlighting the importance of political factors for 
performance is Hiskey’s analysis of the effectiveness of the Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad (PRONASOL), the principal poverty alleviation program launched in the 
early 1990s by the Salinas administration in Mexico, in increasing the provision of basic 
services in Mexican municipalities (Hiskey, 2000).  Specifically, he evaluates whether 
the competitiveness of local elections was an important ingredient to make the policy 
succeed.  “Given the increasing focus on the demand-based approach in developing 
countries with decidedly uneven democratic landscapes, the need is clear for extensive 
analysis of the relationship between the local political environment and antipoverty 
programs based on citizen empowerment.” (Hiskey, 2000, 3).  Hiskey looks at the 
development impact of PRONASOL across the 237 municipalities in the states of Jalisco 
and Michoacán in Mexico.  He finds that PRONASOL was three times more effective in 
increasing electrification coverage rates in municipalities with high levels of electoral 
competition, than in less competitive municipalities. He does not find, on the other hand, 
any significant consequence on the provision of water and sewer systems.  Another study 
addressing the same issue is the work by Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003).  Contrary 
to Hiskey, the authors do not include electoral competition as a variable that mediates the 
effectiveness of the program; instead, they consider that differences in levels of electoral 
competition only affect the amounts of PRONASOL spending.  Another difference is that 
their sample includes all Mexican municipalities.  They find that the program in fact 
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contributed to improve welfare conditions in municipalities, but that its effects were very 
limited.  Indeed, Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni claim that if the program had not existed at 
all, municipalities would have nevertheless improved their access to services as a result 
of a “natural” process of convergence.  The failure of the program to achieve better 
developmental outputs was, in the authors’ view, a result of its inadequate targeting to the 
poorest regions of the country, which in turn can be attributed to the political motivations 
of the program: the disbursement of PRONASOL funds was adjusted according to the 
calendar of federal elections; municipalities won by the PRI (or those where the PRI 
historically enjoyed higher electoral support) were rewarded with more funds; a 
disproportionate amount of funds were targeted to municipalities where the PRI obtained 
tighter margins of victory; finally, transfers of a more private nature were used from a 
clientelistic logic.  Their findings overall support the results obtained by Molinar and 
Weldon (1994), who conclude that PRONASOL expenditures were related to the 
Mexican government’s electoral responsiveness.  They claim that, despite its decades-
long history of non-competitive elections, by 1991 the regime was willing to compete for 
votes with methods common to all electoral democracies. 
Another interesting work that constitutes a good example of the bottom-up 
approaches to understand the issue of decentralization in Mexico is the book by Beer 
(2003).  She highlights the importance of the structure of incentives facing subnational 
political actors to push for a more decentralized policy setting.  Beer uses Mexican states 
as her units of analysis during the 1990 decade, when state governments became the 
principal arena of electoral competition in the country.  Her central argument is that the 
increase in electoral competition at the state level is an essential condition to enhance the 
fiscal autonomy of state governments (that is, to decrease their financial dependence with 
respect to the federal government).  Beer’s proposition is based on the assumption that 
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the decline in the PRI hegemony in Mexico has permitted local political actors to build 
their basis of support more on local constituencies than on national party bureaucracies, 
since the latter cannot assure them an electoral victory anymore.  Governors elected 
under more competitive conditions have a special incentive to pay attention to the 
demands of their constituents, thus they will demand greater autonomy over fiscal policy.  
Her empirical results seem to confirm her hypothesis by showing that a more contested 
electoral environment increases the state expenditure on public goods, and the state 
locally generated revenue.  In my view, one of the principal problems in her study is that 
she does not isolate the effects of electoral participation from those of electoral 
competition, which are two different aspects of a democracy, but that the author 
combines into a single index. 
A recent study (Cleary, 2004) explicitly addresses the question of the effects of 
electoral competition on the performance of municipal governments.  He claims that the 
consequences of competition are quite limited, compared to the effects of non-electoral 
means of citizen influence.  Using evidence from fieldwork and case studies, the author 
suggests that traditional forms of participation such as lobbying, protesting, and direct 
contact with government officials have increased in recent years in Mexico, and also 
identifies new forms of participation that have been effective in improving the 
responsiveness of local officials.49 
 
2.5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE FOR THIS RESEARCH 
 
The existing literature on governance and decentralization provides valuable 
insights for this dissertation.  The first, coming from the classical works on 
                                                 
49 My own research has benefited very much from the discussions and exchange of data with Matthew 
Cleary, although we do not necessarily coincide in the interpretation of some results.  
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decentralization, is related to the ability of the local environment to provide policymakers 
with the necessary incentives to improve the provision of locally provided public goods.  
As I have already discussed, competition was envisaged by classical theorists as the 
principal driving force that would produce efficient outcomes under a decentralized 
system of service provision.  Without this key incentive, the prospects of local 
governments to effectively match the preferences of the electorate would virtually 
disappear.  However, contrary to Tiebout’s model, my focus will not be on the capacity 
of local voters to threat incumbent officials by migrating to alternative jurisdictions, but 
on their ability to remove them from office through the use of suffrage.  In other words, 
part of this dissertation will explicitly test the hypothesis that electoral competition in 
Mexico is an effective mechanism to hold public officials accountable to citizens (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). 
Although this dissertation draws on the basic premise proposed by classical 
decentralization theorists that competition encourages performance, it diverges from their 
approach in several ways.  For example, I do not take for granted that the only devolution 
of policy responsibilities to local governments will inevitably generate improvements in 
the efficiency of pubic service provision, even under a context of high electoral 
competition.  On the contrary, I believe that it is fundamental to take into account the 
policy and institutional setting under which decentralization occurs, and be aware of the 
potential risks that decentralization entails.  In this regard my research is more in 
agreement with the critical theories of decentralization, at least in some respects.  First, I 
believe that municipalities in Mexico still suffer from several institutional weaknesses, 
resulting from a long period of political centralization in the country, that has precluded 
many of them to effectively undertake the responsibilities that decentralization policies 
have transferred to them.  As a consequence, the potential for an efficient provision of 
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services is limited from the fact that many municipalities in Mexico continue being 
highly dependent on the resources from higher government levels.  Another aspect in 
which my research agrees with the critical literature is its reservation about the capacity 
and willingness of local politicians and bureaucracies to be accountable both to the 
federal government and to local citizens. In the Mexican case, although municipal 
governments have acquired more spending responsibilities and additional 
intergovernmental resources to carry out new tasks, it is still unclear whether they are 
now more accountable than they used to be in the past.  Even though they currently 
operate under a much more competitive electoral environment, problems in the design of 
the decentralization policy may still be preventing them to be more responsive to their 
citizens.  For example, the creation of a federal fund for basic municipal infrastructure in 
1998 might have diminished the incentives of local officials to effectively enforce the 
collection of own-source revenues, which would confirm the hypothesis that, under a 
decentralized system, local and sub-national governments tend to shift their spending 
choices to national taxpayers, rather than bear that cost locally.  In Chapter 4, I further 
investigate this issue.  Another example, also related to the creation of the transfer fund 
for municipal infrastructure development, is the common belief that the compensatory 
objectives of decentralization get distorted as soon as the implementation of policy 
reaches the municipal level.  This adverse outcome would be likely to occur under a 
context characterized by weak intergovernmental mechanisms for policy oversight, by 
the propensity of local mayors to centralize decision-making without the real 
participation of citizens, and by a widespread use of political considerations in the 
allocation of resources at the very micro level.   These issues are explored in Chapter 5, 
using one Mexican state as a case study. 
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A recurrent theme that many authors have embraced is the role that party 
alternation has played in transforming the traditional approaches to local governance.  In 
the earliest years of opposition governments in Mexico, the new administrations were 
eager to convince the electorate that they represented a genuine departure from the 
traditional PRI governments, thus they had big incentives to adopt innovative managerial 
and policy styles.  Now that electoral competition and party alternation have become a 
normal fact in Mexican local politics, it is relevant to know whether those incentives for 
good governance still persist, and if they have also permeated the PRI local 
administrations.  This dissertation examines this question in several chapters. 
A topic that the literature has considerably overlooked are the policy 
consequences of vertically divided (or juxtaposed) governments.  Although some 
research has emphasized that electoral competition has broaden the autonomy of local 
and sub-national politicians with respect to higher political levels, less attention has been 
placed in understanding the performance of local governments whose party banner 
diverges from the party membership of state or federal authorities.50  Although some 
works have shown that higher levels of government might punish disloyal voters by 
withdrawing funds from the lower political levels, they have not sufficiently stressed that 
opposition party governments are particularly motivated to improve their performance in 
order to respond to the demands of their constituencies.  This dissertation will explicitly 
address the issue of governmental juxtaposition in explaining performance. 
Finally, given the widespread interest in the role that social participation plays in 
local governance, this research includes it as a potential explanatory factor of local 
performance.  For the classical decentralization literature, social participation was not 
considered as an important condition for an effective governance.  However, it might be 
                                                 
50 A notable exception is the recent study by Flamand (2004) on the influence of vertically divided 
governments on promoting an effective federal arrangement in Mexico. 
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the case that local voters do not only make use of the available “exit” mechanisms to 
compel authorities to improve their responsibilities, but they can also use their “voice” 
for that purpose.  In other words, we can think of government performance as responding 
both to “supply” and “demand” stimulus.  The supply side of the argument hypothesizes 
that incumbent policymakers will positively react to a competitive environment that puts 
their political survival at risk, by closely matching their decisions to the preferences of 
the electorate.  On the other hand, the demand side accentuates the ability of citizens to 
affect policy outcomes, either by exerting pressure over their authorities (i.e. by 
mobilizing, lobbying and protesting), or by facilitating the formulation, implementation 
and monitoring of local policies (i.e. conveying better information for the definition of 
priorities, contributing to the funding of projects, inducing the cooperation of their 
communities, etc.).  The basic assumption behind demand-side arguments is that the 
existence of social norms of trust and reciprocity are key elements in promoting the 
cooperation of people, and consequently the effective operation of governance 
institutions, as social capital theorists, such as Robert Putnam, have claimed.  Thus, 
besides looking at the potential influence of local competitive elections to improve the 
performance of municipal governments, my analysis also investigates whether 
performance is responsive to a more participatory environment where people are highly 









Electoral Competition, Public Service Provision, and the Institutional 
Capacity of Mexican Municipalities 
 
This chapter investigates whether the changing political environment at the 
municipal level in Mexico is driving improvements in the provision of basic public 
services and in the processes through which local governments develop their institutional 
capacities.  If the vote of local constituents is regarded as an effective mechanism to 
punish ineffective leaders, we might expect that local policymakers would find it in their 
best interests to improve the provision of public goods.  At the same time, the increase in 
the competitiveness of local elections has enabled the alternation of parties in municipal 
governments, an outcome that was uncommon during the many decades in which a single 
party, the PRI, practically monopolized all elected positions in the country.  It has been 
pointed out that the arrival of opposition parties to power introduced considerable 
changes in the styles of local governance, gradually replacing the usual “machine 
politics” approach (characterized by strong party-government relationships and a low 
degree of technical rationality in decision-making) for alternative styles in which local 
governments put a greater emphasis on technical criteria for their policymaking, 
combined with a more intensive use of public consultation mechanisms for agenda-
setting (Ward, 1998).  This chapter explores whether the alternation of parties, beyond 
having changed the policy and managerial styles in local governance, has improved the 
outcomes of publicly provided services.  Finally, the local electoral environment in 
Mexico has become also more participative, as levels of voter turnout have increased 
over the past two decades.  If voter turnout is regarded as a sign of political awareness 
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and interest among citizens, it is important to explore whether this factor has also had any 
impact on the performance of local governments. 
The analysis focuses, first, on a set of services that Mexican municipalities were 
constitutionally required to provide since the 1983 reform to article 115 of the national 
constitution.  In addition to these performance outcomes, the chapter addresses the 
processes of institutional capacity building, that is the development of managerial and 
organizational capacities enabling local governments to deal with the day-to-day tasks.  
Using data from nearly all municipalities in the country, I test the hypothesis that 
improvements in public service coverage and institutional development can be explained 
by increases in electoral competition, party alternation, and voter turnout in municipal 
elections.  Before presenting the two statistical analyses, the chapter describes the 
evolution of the electoral environment of Mexican municipalities over the past decade, 
highlighting the increasing levels of electoral competitiveness and voter participation, 
and showing the substantial variations in competition that exist across the country.  Also, 
the chapter provides an explanation of the strategies employed to measure the concepts of 
electoral competition and local government performance. 
 
 
3.1. ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN MEXICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the political environment of local governments started to 
undergo remarkable transformations.  One of the most important features of this change 
was the gradual erosion of the hegemony of the PRI in municipal elections.  Figure 3.1 
shows the evolution in the electoral strength of the three most important parties in the 
country: the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD.  In 1990 the levels of electoral support for the 
PRI in municipal elections were close to 70 percent, while each of the other two parties 
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received less than 20 percent of the total vote.  However, this situation has been changing 
throughout the last decade, in parallel with the progressive decline in electoral support for 
the dominant party.  The fall in support was particularly striking in 1995.  From 1998 to 
2001, the PRI’s share of the vote in municipal elections stabilized at around 43 percent.  
In the meantime, the PAN has progressively increased its own share of the vote in local 
elections, making it the second most important electoral force in Mexican municipalities.  
The third most important party at the municipal level is the PRD, although the evolution 
of its electoral strength has not been steady. 
The increase in electoral competition across the country has often given rise to the 
alternation of parties in municipal governments.51  For example, while in 1990 the PRI 
controlled 96 percent of all the municipalities in the country, in 2001 it governed 70 
percent.52 Although at first glance this change does not seem to be very drastic, consider 
Figure 3.2, which displays the evolution of the percentage of the Mexican population (not 
including the DF) who lives in municipalities not governed by the PRI.  Whereas in 1990 
almost 90 percent of the population of Mexico was governed by the PRI in the municipal 
level, in 2001 more than half of the total residents in the country were governed by a 
municipal government controlled by a party other than the PRI.  The alternation of parties 
has become a normal feature of local politics, although most of this alternation has taken 
place between the three most important national parties.  During the 1990-2001 period, 
22 percent of all municipalities in the country had experienced the alternation of parties 
in local government at least on one occasion. 
                                                 
51 The first experiences of opposition government in the country took place at the municipal levels, 
especially in cities located in the northern region of Mexico, where the PAN was the first to defeat the 
dominant party.  For an appraisal of these experiences at the state and municipal levels in northern Mexico 
see Guillén-López (1993), and Rodríguez and Ward (1992, 1994, and 1995). 
52 Appendix A reports the distribution of municipal presidencies across parties in each Mexican state, from 
1989 to 2001. 
 67










Source: Author’s elaboration based on the database on municipal elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org.mx) 
 
FIGURE 3.2. Percentage of the Mexican population living in a municipality governed by 
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In order to evaluate to what extent the increase in the competitiveness of the 
electoral environment at the local level has translated into better governmental outcomes, 
we first need to have a good measure of electoral competition.  In the political science 
literature, there are several indicators regarding the effective number of parties in a 
political system, such as those developed by Herfindahl (1950), Laakso-Taagepera 
(1979), or Molinar (1991b), the latter of which has been extensively used in studies of the 
party system in Mexico.  For the purposes of this analysis, a measure of electoral 
competition should stress the risk faced by incumbent parties to lose power, since this is 
precisely what might motivate elected officials to improve their performance.  One useful 
indicator is the margin of victory between the two principal contenders. Specifically, an 
electoral competition index can be defined as the difference in the share of votes obtained 
by the two strongest parties in a local election (i.e., the difference in the number of votes 
obtained by each, divided by the sum of votes for all parties that participated in the 
election).  Therefore, the highest value the index can take is 1, indicating that the level of 
competition was the lowest, since a single party obtained the totality of votes in an 
election (i.e., the party was actually uncontested).  Conversely, a value close to 0 would 
imply that the election was extremely competitive.53 
In order to illustrate why the margin of victory index is a better indicator of the 
degree of competition in an election, compared to the number of effective number of 
parties, consider the following example. Assume that the PRI obtained 50 percent of the 
vote, the PAN 45 percent, and the PRD only 5 percent.  In this case, the margin of victory 
index would be equal to 0.05, describing a rather competitive environment, and the 
                                                 
53 Strictly speaking, the margin of victory is an index of the non-competitiveness of elections because 
increases in its value implies a reduction in electoral competition.  I thank Chandler Stolp for this remark. 
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number of parties derived through the Laakso-Taagepera index would be equal to 2.2.54  
If we slightly modify this scenario by assuming that the PAN received 40 percent of the 
vote, and the PRD ten percent (with no changes in the share of vote for the PRI), the 
margin of victory index would increase to 0.1, thus describing a less competitive 
environment, since the distance between the two strongest parties has increased.  
However, the number of parties estimated via the Laakso-Taagepera method would 
increase to 2.38.  That is, although the first scenario is clearly more competitive than the 
second, the number of parties is smaller under the first.  In sum, relying on the Laakso-
Taagepera index as a measure of competition may create problems, since it better 
describes the fragmentation of a party system, rather than the actual level of 
competitiveness.  Therefore, in all subsequent analyses the margin of victory will be used 
to measure electoral competition. 
Table 3.1 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients of four alternative measures 
of electoral competition.  Except for party alternation, all the rest are highly (although not 
perfectly) correlated.  The margin of electoral victory has its stronger correlation with the 
proportion of votes for the PRI, the reason for which in Mexico is obvious: increases in 
the levels of political contestation have implied the deterioration of the electoral strength 
of the dominant party, especially in the first years of the decade.  Also worth mentioning 
is the lower level of statistical association between party alternation and the other four 
measures of competitiveness, which implies that alternation and electoral competition are 
not measuring the same phenomena: although alternation implies the existence of a 
competitive electoral system, the reverse is not necessarily true. 
 
                                                 








2/1 , where n stands for the number of parties contending in an election, and  pi is the proportion 
of  votes of the ith party (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979). 
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TABLE 3.1. Pearson Correlations between Alternative Measures of Electoral 
Competition in Mexican Municipal Elections, 1990-2001 
 Margin of victory Laakso-Taagapera 
index 
% of PRI vote 
Laakso-Taagepera 
index 
-0.81   
% of PRI vote 0.91 -0.86  
Alternation -0.38 0.35 -0.49 
All coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of CIDAC database on municipal elections (www.cidac.org.mx) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of the electoral competition index between 1990 
and 2001.  The change has been remarkable, since the relative margins of victory have 
consistently declined throughout time.  While in 1990 the average margin of victory was 
close to 0.6, in 2001 it was under 0.2.  The same figure also displays the evolution of the 
voter turnout rate, which has been rising during the whole period, reaching almost 70 
percent in 2001.55  In other words, not only has the local electoral environment in Mexico 





                                                 
55 Incidentally, the turnout rate in local elections is only moderately correlated with the turnout rate in 
national elections (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.35), which strongly suggests that municipal 
elections in Mexico have acquired its own independent character. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on the database on municipal elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org.mx) 
 
Evidently, the evolution of electoral competition and voter turnout has not been 
the same across all municipalities in the country, particularly if we consider that 
differences in socioeconomic well-being can be associated to different electoral 
conditions.  Specifically, elections in municipalities characterized by higher incomes, 
superior educational levels, and better access to services, will tend to be more contested, 
as compared to poorer municipalities (particularly in rural areas), where local bosses or 
caciques still monopolize political power using traditional mechanisms of control, 
including patronage practices and even violence.  This proposition can be confirmed by 
looking at Figure 3.4, which displays the evolution of local electoral competition 













































(Mexico’s Population Council).56  Although the margins of victory have significantly 
declined throughout the decade for all municipalities, regardless of their level of 
socioeconomic well-being, there have been always marked differences in the levels of 
electoral competition between the three categories, but especially between the two 
extreme cases of socioeconomic deprivation.  Therefore, any attempt to analyze the 
effects of electoral competition on the performance of local governments should always 
control for socioeconomic conditions, in order to avoid biases caused by the omission of 
a fundamental variable. 























Source: Author’s elaboration based on the database on municipal elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org.mx) and on 
CONAPO (2001). 
                                                 
56 The CONAPO index of social deprivation is a combined measure of several forms of social exclusion 
(i.e. the lack of access of households to basic services such as education, water, electrification, monetary 
income, etc.), thus it can be regarded as a good summary of social well-being at the municipal level (see 
CONAPO, 2000).  Although the index is commonly broken into five social deprivation categories, ranging 
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Is voter turnout also affected by socioeconomic factors?  The answer is not as 
obvious as in the case of competition, as it can be clearly observed in Figure 3.5, which 
again displays the evolution of the local turnout rate in terms of the same three 
socioeconomic categories.  In the first three years of the decade, differences in turnout 
rates were more visible across the three type of municipalities, being the most 
disadvantaged the ones whose turnout levels where the highest.  In my view, this reflects 
that voter turnout was heavily induced by the dominant PRI through its traditional means 
of political mobilization, since poorer municipalities were more susceptible to be 
manipulated by means of clientelistic practices.  However, for the rest of the decade these 
differences became less obvious, and they practically disappeared in municipalities that 
had elections in 2001. The diminishing in turnout differences across socioeconomic 
levels might possibly suggest that, as the other parties became stronger in the electoral 
arena, the mechanisms of political mobilization in the country had to be diversified, not 


























Source: Author’s elaboration based on the database on municipal elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org.mx) and on 
CONAPO (2000). 
 
 What consequences has the rise in electoral competition and voter participation 
had in terms of the performance of local governments?  Has electoral competition 
changed the incentives of local politicians in such a way that they have become more 
accountable to their constituents?  Has the participation of voters improved the 
responsiveness of municipal governments?  I will try to provide an answer to these 































3.2. MEASURING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Two different dimensions of government performance are commonly used in 
studies of democratic governance and public management. 57  The first dimension stresses 
its policy efficacy component: the capacity of governments to generate socially desirable 
outcomes.  The second emphasizes its procedural component: the ability of governmental 
organizations to effectively carry out their day-to-day tasks.  To measure the policy 
efficacy component of government performance, I will utilize rates of public service 
coverage, since the provision of basic services constitutes, in my view, what the average 
citizen can expect as a minimum from their local authorities, regardless of any 
ideological or party concerns.  Furthermore, the provision of public services in Mexico is 
a constitutional mandate, and the local levels are assigned very specific areas of 
responsibility.  To measure the procedural component of performance, I use indicators 
reflecting the willingness of municipal governments to create impersonal rules to control 
their internal organization and their propensity to base their appointment decisions more 
on the basis of competence and skill, rather than on personal favoritism or political 
patronage.  Section 3.6 in this chapter provides further details on this second performance 
dimension and its operationalization. 
According to article 115 of the national constitution, municipal governments are 
responsible for the provision of the following services: a) potable water, drainage and 
sewage systems; b) public lighting; c) trash collection; d) public markets; e) cemeteries; 
f) slaughterhouses; g) streets and public parks; and h) public and road safety. Ideally, a 
measure of local government performance should include the totality of services under 
                                                 
57 Within the public management tradition see, for example, the collection of essays in Heinrich and. Lynn 
(2000).  Performance indicators developed from the perspective of democratic governance theory can be 
found in Putnam (1993). 
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municipal control, however there are data limitations that prevent us to adopt such a 
comprehensive approach.  Information on coverage levels are only available for water, 
drainage, and electrification (although the latter is not an expenditure area under the 
responsibility of municipal governments) through the Mexican population censuses 
conducted by INEGI (the Mexican Census Bureau) in 1990 and 2000.  For the remaining 
services, the only sources available are two municipal development surveys (Encuesta 
sobre Desarrollo Municipal) conducted by INEGI in 1995 and by INEGI and INDESOL 
(Institute for Social Development, a decentralized agency ascribed to the Social 
Development Ministry in Mexico) in 2000.58  However, it should be noted that, in 
contrast to the population censuses, the respondents of these surveys were municipal 
presidents rather than private households, and the figures they report (in percentage 
terms) constitute only their perception of service coverage within their municipalities, but 
not a rigorous measurement.  Furthermore, it is likely that the service coverage figures 
conveyed by municipal presidents are upwardly biased, especially in the cases of 
municipalities undergoing high levels of electoral competition, since local mayors in 
those towns would have a special incentive to overstate service coverage.59  Given that 
the survey data do not have the same level of reliability compared to data from the 
population census, the analysis and discussion will concentrate on coverage levels of 
water, drainage, and electrification.  In addition, water and drainage are the services 
municipal authorities regard as their two principal priorities, thus we should expect that 
they would put more effort in improving coverage for these two areas.60  
                                                 
58 These surveys are actually censuses, since the totality of Mexican municipalities were included in the 
study. 
59 I thank Raul Madrid for this observation. 
60 According to the Survey on Municipal Development carried out in 2000, the provision of potable water 
was regarded as being the main priority by 79 percent of all local mayors in the country.  The second place 
was mainly distributed between drainage (42 percent), public lighting (19 percent), and public safety (17 
percent).   The survey did not address electrification. 
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In the cases of water, drainage, and electrification, coverage is defined as the 
proportion of households in a municipality that report having access to each of these three 
services.  However, getting access to services can take different forms.  In the case of 
water, the Mexican census reports five types: 1) water inside the dwelling, 2) water 
outside the dwelling but at least within the terrain where the dwelling is settled, 3) water 
carried from the street, 4) water carried from other dwellings, 5) water carried from 
standpipes, rivers, wells, etc.  For the purposes of this work, I will focus only on the first 
four categories, since they all imply the existence of some sort of public system for water 
provision.  In other words, my measurement of water coverage is the proportion of 
households with access to water, except those that have to carry it from standpipes, 
rivers, wells, and other watercourses.  With respect to drainage coverage, I will 
concentrate only on households whose sewer is connected either to the street or to a 
septic tank, thus excluding those cases for which drainage means basically the use local 
watercourses.61  Again, the logic behind this choice is to focus only in sewerage systems 
that imply some form of public involvement.  The census does not distinguish among the 
types of access to electric energy. 
One potential problem with measuring performance through the levels of service 
coverage is that we might encounter a problem of path-dependency: municipalities 
exhibiting high coverage levels any point in time are very likely to display high coverage 
rates at any other moment.  Since people tend to concentrate on areas already populated, 
service coverage in these areas will have to be higher than for smaller cities.  As a 
consequence, governments in metropolitan areas would always be rated as “high 
performers”, while those of smaller municipalities would be identified as ineffective.  
Therefore, it is crucial to control for the coverage levels that municipalities had at the 
                                                 
61 These are the only three types of access to drainage reported by the Mexican census. 
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beginning of the period analyzed.  In other words, if our aim is to analyze the effect of 
electoral competition (and other possible influences) on the coverage that municipal 
services reached in year 2000, we should introduce the level of household coverage in 
1990 as an independent variable that will serve as a baseline.  A likely objection to my 
measure of government performance is that it does not track down the performance of 
specific local governments: municipal administrations last no more than three years, 
while my measurement of service coverage is based on data for year 2000, controlling for 
the coverage levels that municipalities had in 1990.  Thus, the performance indicators 
cannot attach individual responsibility to each of the administrations that took place over 
the course of the last decade.  Also, the ten-year gap might mask time variations in the 
institutional, political and economic environment of local governments that might have 
taken place during the years in-between.  This limitation is due to the fact that the 
Mexican census is only conducted every ten years, and it constitutes the only available 
data source on coverage for these three services.  Nevertheless, this limitation does not 
invalidate the analysis for a number of reasons.  First, coverage levels do not change very 
much from one year to another, thus a ten-year interval adequately reflects how 
municipalities improved the access of people to services.  In other words, the indicator 
provides us with a long-term picture of government performance.  Second, even though 
we cannot observe how municipal administrations react to the electoral environment at 
specific points in time, we can still appreciate the cumulative effect of competition and 
voter participation on service coverage throughout an entire decade.  Third, the ten-year 




3.3. THE COVERAGE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES: A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW 
 
Like in most other Latin American countries, public service coverage in Mexico 
has improved over the past decade.62  Nevertheless, there are still persistent problems of 
inequality of access to basic services across municipalities.  Table 3.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the coverage levels for water, drainage, and electricity in 1990 
and 2000.  The table displays the information according to the form households get 
access to each service (excluding electrification, since the census does not make any 
distinction), and in terms of the population size of municipalities.  Considerable 
variations in coverage are observed, depending on the how the service is made available 
to private households.  For example, in the case of water, only 30 percent of households 
had access to the service inside their dwellings at the beginning of the decade; ten years 
later, water coverage had increased only five percent within this category.  In contrast, 
when water is accessed by households through other forms (that is when they have to 
carry it from outside their dwellings), their coverage is always higher.  Something similar 
occurs in the case of drainage, since coverage is lower when its provision implies that the 
service is connected only to the public sewage system (23 percent of households were 
covered in this form in 1990 and 35 percent in 2000), but it increases when drainage 
access includes connections to septic tanks and watercourses.  In short, for any year 
coverage is always higher in cases where access to the service implies an “inferior” kind 
of supply or, in other words, when services are made available to the people without the 
existence of a public system of provision. 
 
 
                                                 
62 For an updated report on service coverage in Latin America see Fiszbein (2005). 
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TABLE 3.2 Water, drainage, and electrification coverage in Mexican municipalities, 
1990 and 2000 (proportion of households covered per municipality) 
By population size Service Form of access to 
the service 
Year Whole 






















































































Connected to the 
street or a septic 

















Connected to the 



























Source: Elaborated on the basis of INEGI, Censos de Población y Vivienda 1990 and 2000 (www.inegi.gob.mx) 
 
 
Given the huge heterogeneity that characterizes the municipalities of Mexico 
(principally in terms of population size), it is important to look at the differences in 
service provision across population categories.63  The same table displays the descriptive 
                                                 
63 More than 80 percent of the 2427 municipalities in the country have less than 50 thousand people. 
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statistics of service coverage according to three population ranges.  As expected, the 
levels of coverage for the three services at any point in time are lower for smaller 
municipalities, while larger cities present coverage rates close to 100 percent, particularly 
in year 2000.  This is explained by the fact that very small municipalities tend to be 
poorer, rural, and of a more agricultural economic structure.  Their welfare needs 
generally consist of meeting the minimum living standards, since they lack the most basic 
services.  At the same time, residents in smaller localities tend in general to be more 
dispersed across the territory, and thus economies of scale in the provision of basic 
services cannot be fully exploited.  Drainage coverage levels remain particularly low 
within this group of municipalities: only 31 percent of households living in municipalities 
of less than 50 thousand people had access to drainage connected to the street in year 
2000, and no more than 48 percent of families had a drainage connected either to the 
street or to a septic tank.  This figure is critical, given that sanitation services are essential 
for improving the welfare conditions of people.  In the case of water things are not very 
different.  The majority of Mexican municipalities attained 32 percent water coverage 
inside dwellings in year 2000, compared to more populated municipalities for which this 
type of coverage reached 48 percent (in medium-size municipalities) and 71 percent (in 
the most populous cities).  Yet again, water coverage is higher for any group when it is 
accessed from outside the dwelling, though coverage differences persist across 
population categories.  Electrification is the service whose coverage rates are higher, 
since even the less populated municipalities presented a reasonable indicator (89 percent 
of coverage in 2000).  In summary, despite the fact that the average levels of service 
coverage have improved for water, drainage, and electricity throughout the ten-year 
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period analyzed, smaller municipalities still lack a reasonable level of access to those 
services, particularly in the case of drainage. 
Table 3.3 displays the average coverage levels of the other public services that 
Mexican municipalities are legally responsible to provide, according to the survey data 
reported by municipal presidents in 1995 and 2000.  Once more, figures are presented 
according  to municipal population sizes, but this time the table makes a distinction 
between the municipal seat (cabecera municipal) and the rest of the localities that 
integrate the municipal territory.  Despite the problems previously noted regarding these 
data, it nevertheless provides a reasonable description of the evolution of service 
coverage.64  Three clear patterns can be observed.  First, as in the cases of water, 
drainage, and electrification, coverage in all these other services increased from 1995 to 
2000.65  Rates of growth were higher in smaller municipalities and in localities outside 
county seats.  Second, less populated municipalities exhibit, yet again, lower coverage 
levels at any point in time, thus reflecting their low general welfare conditions and their 
rural nature.  This also explains that service coverage grew faster in smaller 
municipalities, given that their initial coverage levels were lower.  Third, the table reveals 
that municipal seats are invariably better endowed with municipal services vis-à-vis the 
remaining localities, which might possibly result from the fact that population tends to be 
more concentrated on county seats, thus requiring more services.  However, it might also 
be the case that municipal authorities tend to give preferentiality to county seats as a 
result of their higher electoral importance. 
 
                                                 
64 Also bear in mind that respondents were not the same in 1995 than in 2000, given that municipal 
presidents last no more than three years in office. 
65 Cemeteries constitute the only exception, since their coverage remained around 86 percent for the whole 
sample of municipalities.  However, differences in coverage persist across the three population size 




TABLE 3.3. Coverage of other municipal services in 1995 and 2000 (in percentages) 
 
 Whole sample By population size 
 
 




More than 200 
thousand 
























1995 40 16 35 13 63 28 74 48 Road safety 
(tránsito y 
vialidad) 
2000 63 44 61 43 71 47 69 52 
1995 63 42 61 39 78 58 83 63 Public 
transportation 2000 73 56 71 54 83 65 81 69 
1995 78 51 78 50 76 52 82 64 
Public safety 2000 82 63 82 63 80 61 79 69 
1995 40 8 35 5 67 18 69 36 
Slaughterhouses 2000 62 29 58 26 75 37 82 59 
1995 87 61 87 60 86 65 81 72 
Cemeteries 2000 86 70 86 70 85 72 85 75 
1995 58 23 56 21 69 33 75 51 
Parks 2000 72 49 70 47 77 54 82 68 
1995 51 17 48 15 64 25 70 42 Road 
maintenance 
(pavimentación) 
2000 62 36 61 35 68 40 75 48 
1995 22 4 17 3 39 11 66 31 
Public markets 2000 56 29 52 24 72 44 83 60 
1995 69 29 67 27 77 37 85 58 
Trash collection 2000 78 53 77 53 81 51 85 63 
1995 81 55 81 55 83 58 88 69 
Street lighting 2000 85 67 85 67 83 64 88 69 
 
Source: Author's elaboration based on data from Censuses of Municipal Development (Censo de 
Desarrollo Municipal) conducted by INEGI in 1995 and INEGI and INDESOL in 2000 
 
It should be noted that municipal governments do not necessarily provide public 
services by themselves: they can sign cooperation agreements with other government 
levels (i.e. state and federal), form partnerships with other municipalities, or they can 
even contract out the operation of services with private firms.  However, the majority of 
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municipalities in the country have opted to provide most of these services directly, as the 
2000 Survey of Municipal Development shows.  In the case of potable water, for 
example, 62 percent of municipalities provide the service directly, while 20 percent 
supplied the service through state agencies, 12 percent in collaboration with the 
communities, and less than one percent (17 municipalities) had outsourced its provision 
with private companies.  Something similar occurs in the case of drainage, where 65 
percent of all municipalities directly provide the service, while the rest rely on other 
governmental levels (10.4 percent), on their communities (under 7 percent), and there is a 
significant proportion reporting that this service is simply nonexistent (13 percent).  For 
the remaining services, we observe once more that most municipalities have opted for 
their direct provision, except for public transportation, where 65 percent have contracted 
out its operation with private businesses. 
 
3.4. AN EMPIRICAL PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION MODEL 
 
This section presents a statistical analysis of the influence of electoral 
competition, party alternation, and voter participation on the rates of coverage for water, 
drainage, and electrification. Data come from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses. 
The number of households with access to the service was divided by the total number of 
households in the municipality, in order to obtain the rates of service coverage for each 
service (and for each year, being service coverage in 2000 the dependent variable, and the 
coverage in 1990 the control variable). 
The key independent variables of the analysis are electoral competition, party 
alternation, and voter turnout.  Competition is measured as the difference in the 
proportion of votes obtained by the two strongest parties in a local election.  The data 
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source for this variable is the electoral database compiled by the Mexican think-tank 
CIDAC (Research Center for Development), which contains the distribution of votes 
across all parties contending in local elections from 1980 to 2001.  Given that the 
dependent variables can be measured only at two points in time, it is not possible to 
perform an analysis based on variations taking place year-by-year. Instead, electoral 
competition is expressed in terms of its annual average all over the 1990-2000 period.  
This implies that the analysis reflects the long-term effect of electoral competition on 
service coverage.  The same measurement approach is utilized for the other two 
independent electoral variables: party alternation, and voter turnout.  In the case of 
alternation, it indicates whether a municipality had been governed by a party different 
than the hegemonic PRI at least once during the 1990-2000 period.  Another factor 
included in the analysis is the level of voter turnout.  This variable is introduced as a 
proxy for the level of civic engagement in public life.  The expectation of many authors 
supporting the “participatory approach” to local governance is that the involvement of 
citizens in public affairs would foster the quality of governmental institutions.  However, 
we should be careful with the interpretation of voter turnout, since it might well reflect 
the capacity of parties to mobilize people in electoral times, rather than the level of 
“social capital” in a society.  Once more, this variable is measured as the turnout rate 
annual average (i.e. the total number of votes divided by the potential number of voters) 
during 1990-2000. 
The control variables in the model regard the fiscal capacity of local governments 
and the sociodemographic characteristics of the population.  Under the first category I 
include the total budget constraint of municipal governments.  This concept encompasses 
all fiscal revenues collected by municipal authorities (property taxes, user fees, and other 
surcharges), as well as the unconditional transfers from other governmental levels, 
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particularly revenue-sharing grants from the federal government.  This variable controls 
for the fiscal capacity of each municipality in contributing to the provision of basic 
services. The budget constraint is expressed in real per capita terms.66 The data come 
from a dataset compiled by INEGI on municipal revenues and expenditures from 1989 to 
2000.67  The set of socioeconomic variables in the model are the following.  First, the 
geographic dispersion of people across the municipal territory is included to control for 
the fact that basic services are more costly to provide in isolated areas  than in more 
concentrated zones.  It is measured as the proportion of localities with less than 1000 
residents.  The population size of the municipality and the rate of population growth 
between 1990 and 2000 are also included in order to control for the levels of public 
service need at the local level.  Literacy rates (the proportion of people between ages 6 to 
14 who know how to read) are introduced as a proxy for the level of education in 
municipalities, under the expectation that better educated people will be more effective in 
lobbying their government authorities to obtain more services.  As I have pointed out in 
the section describing the evolution of electoral competition, controlling for the level of 
socioeconomic development of municipalities is required to avoid a problem of omitted 
variable bias in the estimation.  Thus, the model introduces the proportion of people 
                                                 
66 It is important to point out that the other two levels of government (state and federal) are also involved 
in the financing of services, either through their own regional infrastructure projects, or by transferring 
money to help communities building up small-scale project for social development.  No systematic data on 
these other spending categories exist in Mexico, thus it was impossible to include it in the regression 
analysis.  The estimation also excludes the earmarked transfers for basic infrastructure introduced by the 
national government in Mexico in 1998 (the Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal, belonging to the 
federal budgetary item Ramo 33) for two reasons.  One is that the fund started to operate until the last three 
years of the decade analyzed, thus it is very unlikely that it could have had a real impact on service 
coverage.  But the most important reason for not including it is that the fund is distributed across 
municipalities, at least in part, according to their levels of need for services such as water, drainage, and 
electrification.  In consequence, the variable would introduce a problem of simultaneous causality. 
67 The data can be accessed on-line through INEGI’s Sistema Municipal de Bases de Datos (SIMBAD) at 
www.inegi.gob.mx 
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earning less than the official minimum wage as a measure of municipal poverty.68  State 
dummies were incorporated as well (taking Aguascalientes as the comparative case), 
given that states might have an unobservable effect on coverage performances.  All the 
models include as an independent variable the level of service coverage at the beginning 
of the period (i.e. the level of coverage in 1990).  Municipalities are the units of 




Yi,2000=  B0 + B1EMARGINi + B2ALTERNi + B3TURNOUTi + B4BUDGETi + B5DISPERi + B6POPi + 





Yi,2000 is the proportion of households with access to the service in 2000. 
 
EMARGINi is the ten-year average of the difference in the proportion of votes obtained 
by the two strongest parties in municipal elections. 
 
ALTERNi is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i underwent a party 
change in its government at least once during the 1990-2000 period, and zero otherwise. 
 
TURNOUTi is the ten-year average of voter turnout (i.e. the total number of votes in a 
local election, divided by the number of potential voters, specifically those who where at 
least 18 years old). 
 
BUDGETi is the ten-year average of the real per capita amount of municipal budget 
resources (including local taxes and fees, and federal revenue-sharing transfers). 
 
DISPERi is the proportion of localities in the municipality with a population less than 
1000 inhabitants. 
 
POPi is the population size of the municipality. 
 
DEMGROWTHi is the rate of population growth between 1990 and 2000. 
                                                 
68 The CONAPO index of social deprivation is not included because the proportion of people who do not 
have access to basic services constitutes one of its components, creating a problem of reciprocal causation. 
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POVERTYi is the proportion of people receiving less than the official minimum wage. 
 
LITERACYi is proportion of people between ages 6 to 14 who know how to read. 
 
STATEji is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i belongs to state j (for 
j=1,…,30) and zero otherwise (one of the 31 states in the country is excluded to avoid 
perfect collinearity). 
 
Yi,1990 is the proportion of households with access to the service in 1990. 
 
εi is the disturbance. 
 
Note that the previous model assumes that there is a linear relationship between 
service coverage and the remaining independent variables: for example, that for every 
additional increase in population, the proportion of households having access to local 
services will increase at a constant rate.  This assumption might be unrealistic, especially 
if we take into account that coverage might increase in a non-linear way: the scope for 
furthering coverage is much more limited when a large proportion of households are 
already covered (i.e. coverage is close to 100 percent), compared to cases where the 
initial level of service coverage is relatively low.  Also, since the dependent variables are 
all expressed in proportional terms, the predicted values may well fall outside the 0-1 
range.  In order to cope with these potential drawbacks, the model was estimated using 
the logarithmic transformation of the “odds ratio” of service coverage in 2000 as the 
dependent variable.69  Figure 3.6 illustrates how the functional relationship between 
coverage and any other (continuous) independent  variable would operate under this 
approach.  First, the predicted values would never fall outside the 0-1 range.  Second, the 
marginal effect of the independent variable on service coverage will vary depending at 
which point the function is evaluated, thus describing a more realistic situation.  For 
                                                 
69 The log-odds ratio is equal to the natural log of p/(1-p), where p stands for the proportion of households 
covered by the service. 
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example, increases in budgetary availability would have their biggest effect on coverage 
before the budget reaches a certain level.  Beyond that point, the capacity of the local 
budget to achieve further improvements on service coverage is much more reduced. 
 














My initial expectations about the signs of the coefficients of the three key political 
variables are as follows.  B1 is expected to be negative (recall that a lower margin of 
victory indicates that electoral competition is stronger), given the proposition that 
municipal governments are more likely to improve their performance when facing a real 
threat of being thrown out of power.  In the case of party alternation, the theoretical 































an extreme case of electoral competition, where incumbent authorities are not only 
threatened by other political competitors, but are actually removed from office. If this 
were the case, we might expect B2 to be positive, again supporting the proposition that 
competition improves performance.  However, there are reasons to believe that the effect 
of party alternation on local performance could be negative, particularly if alternation 
worsens the typical policy and administrative instability that characterizes municipal 
governments in the country.   B3 is expected to be positive, if high turnout rates actually 
act as an effective mechanism to foster governmental accountability.  The model was 
estimated using ordinary least squares.  Since the assumption of constant variance in the 
error term (εi) is often violated in cross-sectional analyses (particularly when dealing with 
very heterogeneous units, such as Mexican municipalities), heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported. 
The regression results for water, drainage, and electrification are displayed in 
Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, respectively.  Every table presents three columns, each of which 
represents an alternative model specification. Model 1 includes the initial rate of 
coverage as the only independent variable.  This serves as a baseline to assess the 
explanatory power of subsequent specifications.  Model 2 includes the three key electoral 
variables, excluding all sociodemographic controls as well as the budget constraint.  
Model 3 presents the full specification.  Bear in mind that the regression coefficients 
reported do not have a straightforward interpretation, since they represent the marginal 
effect of an independent variable on the log-odds ratio of coverage, rather than on 
coverage simply.70  In order to facilitate the exposition, results will be discussed in terms 
                                                 
70 Finding out the effect of the independent variables on coverage requires some algebraic manipulations. 
Recall that the model specification when the dependent variable is expressed in terms of the log-odds ratio 
is the following: y=ln[p/(1-p)]=Bo+B1X1+…+BkXk+ei, where p represents the proportion of households 
with access to the service.  In order to express this equation in terms of p (which is more intuitive for our 
purposes), we need to work out the value of p, using the following expression: p=exp(y)/(1+exp(y)), and 
 91
of the effect of each relevant variable on the proportion of households covered, holding 
all other variables constant at their median value.71 
 
 
TABLE 3.4. OLS Regressions on the Log-odds Ratio of the Drainage Coverage Rate 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 
 Only baseline included Socioeconomic  and 
















Margin of victory  -0.446*** (0.133) 
-0.103 
(0.115) 
Alternation  -0.066 (0.096) 
-0.057 
(0.083) 
Voter turnout rate  0.099 (0.156) 
0.321* 
(0.167) 
Total municipal budget (per 
capita)   
0.001 
(0.001) 
Population dispersion    -0.503***
 
(0.125) 
Population   0.001
 
(0.002) 
Population growth   0.157
 
(0.091) 
Poverty rate   -1.243***
 
(0.182) 
Literacy rate   3.98***
 
(0.419) 
N 1968 1953 1953 
R-squared 0.772 0.797 0.840 
 
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  N-1 (30) state dummy variables were included in all 
estimations except the first (the omitted unit is Aguascalientes), but their coefficients are not reported for 
ease of exposition. 




                                                                                                                                                 
evaluate it keeping the value of the remaining independent variables constant (for convenience, I  chose  to 
keep them at their median values). 
71 The model was also estimated assuming a linear relationship between the variables, but the direction and 
statistical significance of the coefficients obtained did not change.  I will not report those results here for 




TABLE 3.5. OLS Regressions on the Log-odds Ratio of the Water Coverage Rate 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 
 Only baseline 
included 






























Total municipal budget (per 
capita) 
  0.001 
(0.001) 
Population dispersion   -0.729*** 
(0.141) 
Population   0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Population growth   0.094 
(0.096) 
Poverty rate   -0.136 
(0.2) 
Literacy rate   1.062*** 
(0.353) 
N 1968 1953 1953 
R-Squared 0.690 0.736 0.748 
 
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  N-1 (30) state dummy variables were included in all 
estimations except the first (the omitted unit is Aguascalientes), but their coefficients are not reported for 
ease of exposition. 











TABLE 3.6. OLS Regressions on the Log-odds Ratio of the Electrification Coverage 
Rate 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 
 Only baseline 
included 
Socioeconomic  and 
budgetary controls excluded



























Total municipal budget 
(per capita) 
  0.001* 
(0.001) 
Population dispersion   -0.688*** 
(0.114) 
Population   0.013*** 
(0.002) 
Population growth   0.217** 
(0.078) 
Poverty rate   -0.134 
(0.123) 
Literacy rate   1.852*** 
(0.315) 
N 1968 1953 1953 
R-Squared 0.747 0.795 0.822 
 
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  N-1 (30) state dummy variables were included in all 
estimations except the first (the omitted unit is Aguascalientes), but their coefficients are not reported for 
ease of exposition. 














3.5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
In all the analyses the initial rates of service coverage happen to be extremely 
relevant factors in predicting coverage in year 2000, no matter what model specification 
we look at.  The positive and strong relationship between the two variables is not 
surprising at all, given the path-dependent nature of service coverage discussed before.  
Also, it is important to note that the initial rates of coverage explain the largest share of 
the variation in all the analyses, as readers can verify by looking at the high values of the 
R-squared statistic displayed in Model 1, where initial coverage rates constitute the only 
independent variable.  However, there are variations in the magnitude of the coefficient 
of initial coverage rates across the three services analyzed.  The relationship is the 
strongest in the case of drainage, for which every additional percentage point in coverage 
in 1990 predicts an increase in year 2000 of almost 74 percent when the function is 
evaluated at initial levels close to zero, whereas the effect is around 20 percent when the 
function is evaluated at initial levels close to one (i.e. when virtually all households in a 
municipality have access to drainage), holding all other variables constant at their median 
value.  Overall, these results reveal that, regardless of any other fiscal, political or 
sociodemographic factor, the distribution of service coverage across municipalities 
continued being influenced by the relative levels of coverage municipalities had ten years 
before, probably reflecting the effect of many forces driving the process of modernization 
in the country. 
If we just look at model 2 in any of the three tables, we might conclude that either 
electoral competition or party alternation have a positive and significant effect on the 
relative levels of service coverage.  For example, in the second column of Table 3.4, the 
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coefficient of the margin of electoral victory has a negative sign (recall that such a 
negative sign indicates that the relationship between competition and coverage is 
positive) and it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  Likewise, in Tables 3.5 and 
3.6 the alternation of parties appears as having a positive and significant influence on the 
rates of coverage of water and electrification, respectively.  However, those specifications 
exclude all sociodemographic controls as well as the municipal budget constraint, 
implying that the (spurious) effect of competition and alternation on coverage was due to 
the omission of relevant variables.  For example, in Table 3.4, model 3, the coefficient of 
electoral competition lost its statistical significance and its magnitude fell down 
dramatically.  In order to verify whether this outcome was due to the way electoral 
competition was measured, I used other surrogate measures of competition (whose results 
I do not report here), such as the Laakso-Taagapera index of the effective number of 
political parties, and the share of the vote for the PRI.  However, these alternative 
measures of competition did not change the results.  Therefore, by and large, there is no 
evidence supporting the proposition that electoral competition improves the relative 
levels of service coverage in Mexican municipalities. 
The effect of party alternation was significant only in the case of electrification, 
but not in the cases of drainage and water.  For the case of water, model 3 in Table 3.5 
shows that the coefficient corresponding to the alternation of parties is positive, although 
it marginally fails to meet the conventional level of significance.  However, the size of its 
effect on coverage is extremely low: municipalities that underwent alternation of parties 
at least once during the 1990-2000 period had water coverage levels only .05 percent 
higher than those who never experienced alternation (holding all other variables constant 
at their median values).  For the case of electrification, the effect of alternation is even 
lower, since the difference in coverage between the two types of municipalities (i.e. those 
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with and without party alternation) is of only 0.02 percent.  Thus, despite its statistical 
significance, the effect of party alternation is practically inconsequential. 
An interesting finding is that voter turnout appears as a factor that contributes to 
the growth in coverage for the three services analyzed.  In most specifications, its 
coefficient is not only statistically significant, but also substantively large, particularly in 
the case of water.  Drawing on the results displayed in Table 3.5, model 3, I estimated 
that for every additional percentage point of increase in voter turnout, the provision of 
water increases at a rate of 6 percent when the function is evaluated at turnout rate levels 
close to zero, holding the remaining variables constant at their median values.  However, 
the marginal effect of voter turnout on water coverage increases dramatically if the 
function is evaluated holding the initial rate of water coverage (i.e. the 1990 baseline) at 
much lower levels.72  This implies that the ability of voter participation to affect the 
coverage of water is considerably increased in municipalities whose earlier water 
endowments were relatively low.  In the cases of drainage and electrification, turnout is 
also influential, though its marginal effect is slightly smaller.  In any case, the analysis 
reveals that the participation of voters in local elections plays a much more relevant role 
in improving the provision of basic services, possibly implying that local policymaking is 
more responsive to a highly mobilized electorate than to a very contested electoral 
environment.  I will return to this discussion later. 
Another important result concerns the positive impact of literacy rates on service 
provision.  In the case of drainage, literacy rates have a very strong effect on coverage: 
municipalities with literacy rates approaching one hundred percent have, on average, 80 
percent more households with access to sewage systems, compared to municipalities with 
                                                 
72 For example, when the 1990 water coverage baseline is set at 20 percent, the marginal effect of the 
turnout rate is between 14 and 19 percent, depending at which level of turnout the function is evaluated, 
holding all other variables (except for the 1990 baseline) constant at their median values. 
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literacy rates close to zero.  In the case of electrification, the marginal effect of literacy 
rates on coverage is between 5 and 22 percent (depending at which level of literacy the 
function is evaluated), and in the case of water provision, the coefficient does not meet 
the conventional standard of statistical significance, but nevertheless its magnitude is still 
substantial.  This result seems to be in line with the proposition outlined in the previous 
paragraph: that the capacity of citizens to mobilize pushing for better local services is an 
effective mechanism to foster the responsiveness of governmental authorities.  The 
substantial effect of literacy rates on service coverage might indicate that better educated 
constituencies are more likely to exert a greater influence on government authorities to 
improve the provision of basic services. 
Also, consistent with that view is the negative effect that poverty levels (measured 
as the proportion of employed workers earning less than the official minimum wage) 
have on service coverage, at least in the case of drainage.  Once more, we could interpret 
this outcome as suggesting that poor people as less likely to influence the policy priorities 
of local officials. 
In summary, the evidence reveals that municipal government performance is more 
responsive to demand influences than to supply factors.  Neither competition nor 
alternation affect service coverage, while both voter turnout and literacy rates have a 
substantial influence.  This finding implies that electoral democracy might not be a 
sufficient condition for better local governance.  On the other hand, factors measuring 
citizen involvement and awareness seem to be more effective in fostering the 
performance of governments, though we do not know exactly how these mechanisms 







3.6. DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
The previous analysis revealed that the provision of municipal services in Mexico 
has been virtually unaffected by increases in the levels of electoral competition at the 
local levels of government.  This result by itself might lead us to conclude that the 
process of local democratization (at least its electoral dimension) has produced very 
modest consequences over the outcomes of local governments.  However, before arriving 
at such a conclusion, we should take a closer look at some important aspects of local 
governance that generally tend to be overlooked.  Specifically, it is important to evaluate 
if municipal governments in the country are taking the necessary steps to improve their 
managerial and organizational capacities to deal with the day-to-day tasks, and whether 
such an improvement is to some extent explained by a more contested electoral 
environment.  In other words, besides looking at their policy outputs, it is also relevant to 
analyze the processes by which local governments develop an effective institutional 
capacity.  By institutional capacities I basically mean two things: 1) the willingness of 
governments to create impersonal rules for their internal organization; 2) the propensity 
of political leaders to base their appointment decisions on the meritocratic basis of 
competence and skill rather than on personal favoritism or political patronage.  
Developing these capacities is not an easy endeavor, especially in the context of Mexican 
municipalities where the lack of consecutive reelection, the short duration of the mandate, 
and the strong political centralization, have precluded local governments from improving 
their levels of administrative professionalization. Although building up institutional 
capacity evidently promotes socially desirable outcomes (for example furthering the 
quality of public policy implementation), it also implies that local politicians would have 
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to give up a number of privileges, such as being able to reward their political loyalists 
with jobs in the bureaucracy, granting contracts to their friends for carrying out public 
works in the municipality, etc.  In other words, we can think of administrative 
professionalization as a collective good: it provides benefits to a broad range of 
constituents, but its costs should be born by individual politicians that would have to put 
a stop to (or at least reduce) traditional patronage as a means to assure their political 
survival. 
Unfortunately, there are not many reliable indicators to measure the institutional 
development of municipal governments in Mexico.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
three indicators were constructed, based on the surveys of municipal development (Censo 
de Desarrollo Municipal) carried out by INEGI in 1995 and by INEGI and INDESOL in 
2000.  The first, called “regulatory capacity”, is an index derived from the responses of 
municipal presidents to a question listing a number of regulation codes. For each of the 
codes listed, respondents simply provided a “yes/no” answer, depending on whether the 
code was available or not in the municipality (see Appendix E).  Thus, the two indices 
(one for each year) were obtained by dividing the number of affirmative responses by the 
maximum number of codes listed in each of the surveys.  In 1995, the mean value of this 
variable across all municipalities in the country was 0.35, with a standard deviation of 
0.22, while in 2000 the mean increased to 0.4, with a standard deviation of 0.24.  
Although small, this improvement in the regulatory capacity of municipalities is 
statistically significant.73  I admit that the only existence of a regulation code does not 
necessarily implies its actual enforcement, but at least provides us with a starting point 
for evaluation. 
                                                 
73 The comparison of means between the two years produces a t statistic equal to 6.5, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the regulatory capacity did not change from 1995 to 2000. 
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The second indicator constructed for this study is called “civil service 
professionalization”, which is derived from another survey item asking municipal 
presidents to indicate whether the municipal government had a personnel management 
division, and in case it did, how many assignments (out of four) such an area performs.74 
In consequence, the index ranges from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates that the government does 
not even have such an administrative division; a value of 1 implies that, although the 
government reports having a personnel management department, it does not provide 
information about the specific tasks such a department carries out. A value of 5 implies 
that the area carries out the four tasks listed.  In 1995, the mean value of this variable was 
0.23, with a standard deviation of 0.33, while in 2000 the mean increased to 0.28, with a 
standard deviation of 0.37. Once more, the change in the level of civil service 
professionalization between the two years was statistically significant.75  
The third indicator of institutional capacity developed for this study is an index 
measuring the average level of formal instruction among top municipal officials.  This 
indicator was derived using data from the 2000 survey, which asked municipal presidents 
to report the highest grade of schooling attained by each of the top-level bureaucrats 
serving in their administration.76  For each bureaucratic position, a maximum of seven 
levels of formal instruction were given as response options, ranging from “none” to 
“graduate level”.  Respondents were also asked to report whether each level of schooling 
was completed or not by each public servant, thus producing 12 possible ranks, ranging 
from “no formal education”, to “incomplete primary school”, to “complete primary 
school”, and the rest.  Therefore, the “public official schooling” index was obtained by 
                                                 
74 For the personnel management division, the surveys listed the following assignments: 1) recruitment, 
selection, and hiring, 2) job induction, 3) training and development, 4) incentives for performance. 
75  The t-statistic derived from the comparison of means between the two years is equal to 5.37. 
76 A maximum of 13 posts were listed in the questionnaire.  Table E.2 in Appendix E describes specifically 
what bureaucratic positions were listed. 
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averaging up the levels of schooling across all public servants for which data was 
reported. The national mean of this variable in year 2000 was 7.25 (a schooling level 
below incomplete high-school), with a standard deviation of 2.14.  Unfortunately, the 
1995 survey did not include this question. 
A fourth composite indicator called “aggregate institutional capacity” was derived 
from the other three using the technique of principal components factor analysis, but only 
for year 2000, since the 1995 survey did not include the item related to the schooling 
levels of public officials.  It is used in the analysis in order to simplify the discussion of 
results, although the other three are individually employed also. 
The following multivariate analysis will use the values of these three institutional 
capacity indicators in year 2000 as dependent variables (plus the composite index), after 
controlling for the levels of institutional development that municipalities had in 1995.77  
That is, we will be looking at how municipalities improved their institutional capacity in 
the course of the years from 1995 to 2000, and analyze whether such changes can be 
explained, once more, by increases in their levels of electoral competition, governmental 
juxtaposition, and voter participation.78  For this reason, the values of these three key 
independent variables were calculated using their annual averages for the 1995-2000 
period only, thus considerably reducing the time gap that the previous analyses suffered.   
The modeling is very similar to the previous one, except for the fact that this time the 
variable measuring the geographical dispersion of the population is excluded, since it is 
not considered to be relevant in explaining variations in institutional development.  The 
municipal budget constraint is maintained in the model, but this time it is broken up in 
terms of its three principal components: 1) the revenues that municipal governments 
                                                 
77 Only in the case of the formal schooling indicator will such a baseline be absent, given lack of data for 
1995. 
78 For this analysis I disregard party alternation, since this variable is highly correlated with governmental 
juxtaposition (the correlation coefficient is 0.7), which would create a problem of multicollinearity.   
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generate locally from their own taxing sources (i.e. the sum of property taxes, user fees, 
and other surcharges); 2) the revenue-share transfers municipalities receive from the 
federal government, and which can be freely spent; 3) the earmarked transfers 
municipalities started to receive from the federal government in 1998, which must be 
spent on basic infrastructure assignments.  The purpose of breaking up the local budget is 
to analyze whether the nature of each revenue source has a different consequence on the 
institutional capacity of municipal governments.  The remaining elements of the model 
are basically the same as in the previous analysis. 
Given that not all the dependent variables are continuous, different estimation 
methodologies were employed.  In the cases of “regulatory capacity”, “public official 
schooling”, and the overall index of institutional capacity, OLS regression is utilized, 
since both dependent variables are continuous.  In the case of “civil service 
professionalization”, a maximum likelihood ordered logit methodology is employed, 
given that the variable has only five categories, each of them representing a higher 






































































































































































































N 1849 1849 1953 1953 1953 1953 1953 1953 






Log-likelihood     -2171.8 -2165.2   
 
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  30 state dummy variables were included in all estimations (the omitted 
unit is Aguascalientes), but their coefficients are not reported for ease of exposition.  When the models of regulatory 
capacity and civil service professionalization are run as a function of the 1995 baseline only, the value of the R-squared 
statistic is equal to .04 in the first case, and the value of the log-likelihood is equal to –2439.7 in the second. 
***p<.001  **p<.01 *p<.05 
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Overall, the results suggest that increasing levels of electoral competition and the 
existence of governmental juxtaposition during the period analyzed promote 
improvements in the institutional capacity of municipal governments, before controlling 
for budgetary constraints.  This result holds not only in the case of the aggregate index of 
institutional capacity, but also for each individual indicator, excepting civil service 
professionalization.  Nevertheless, although statistically significant, the effects are not 
substantively strong.  For example, for every one percent decrease in the margin of 
electoral victory, the composite institutional capacity index increases by 0.67, which 
constitutes half of one standard deviation of its distribution.  Even smaller is the effect of 
juxtaposition: municipalities that had undergone juxtaposition at least on one occasion 
during the period analyzed exhibit an improvement in the institutional capacity index of 
no more than 0.148, compared to municipalities that have been always controlled by the 
same party as the state governor’s.  If we analyze the effects of competition and 
juxtaposition separately on each of the three individual indicators, we can clearly observe 
that they are not very high as well.  Furthermore, it may be that the positive effects of 
competition are due to the response bias suggested in a previous section: since survey 
respondents are municipal presidents, they might have incentives to overstate the 
institutional capacity of their administrations, particularly those acting under a context of 
high electoral competition.  Thus, given the small effects of their regression coefficients 
and acknowledging the possibility of response biases in the data, we cannot ascertain that 
competition and juxtaposition are strong determinants for the institutional performance of 
local governments in the country. 
Incidentally, the statistical significance of the electoral competition coefficient 
practically disappears when the model incorporates the three variables measuring the 
municipal budget constraint (the size of the government juxtaposition coefficient is 
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reduced as well).  This might be due to the fact that both juxtaposition and competition 
are somewhat related to the per capita amount of transfers made by higher levels of 
government, which produces a reduction in the magnitude of the two coefficients, as well 
as an increase in their standard errors.79  Interestingly, we can observe that each source of 
local revenue has a different effect on the overall index of institutional capacity (and on 
each individual indicator). First, the revenues that municipalities raise from local sources 
appear to stimulate local governments to strengthen their institutional capacity, although 
we should always bear in mind that the relationship between revenue collection and 
institutional capacity might operate in the opposite direction.  In contrast, both the 
conditional and the unconditional transfers from the federal government have a negative 
effect on local institutionalization, which strongly suggests that municipalities whose 
public finances are highly dependent on intergovernmental aid are less likely to 
modernize their administrative apparatuses.  The policy implication of this result is that 
the current system for the distribution of intergovernmental funds does not seem to 
reward municipalities that invest in improving their organizational capacities.  Quite the 
contrary, the system seems to encourage them to become even more dependent on the 
federal aid.  I will revisit this issue in the next chapter, when discussing why the 
enforcement of local taxes is an important factor for developing institutional capacity. 
The influence of the remaining control variables on institutional capacity is in the 
expected direction, but we should emphasize again the importance of literacy rates, the 
effect of which accounts for almost two standard deviations of the distribution of the 
                                                 
79 The coefficients of correlation between the margin of victory and the remaining variables of the budget 
constraint are the following: with federal earmarked transfers the coefficient is 0.27, with revenue-sharing 
grants it is 0.22, and with locally generated revenues the coefficient is -.15 (the three are significant at the 
0.05 level).  This implies that more competitive municipalities tend to receive less federal transfers (both 
conditional and unrestricted), but they tend to collect more revenues from local sources.  
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aggregate index.  Once more, this is a strong indication that a more educated society is a 
fundamental ingredient to produce better governmental outcomes and processes. 
On the other hand, higher voter turnout rates appear to discourage municipal 
governments to build up their institutional capacity.  The negative effect of the turnout 
rate is not only statistically significant, but its magnitude is very substantial and 
consistent across the four dependent variables.  This result appears to contradict the claim 
that more participatory societies are more likely to produce better governmental 
outcomes, as we found out in the analysis of public service provision.  What might 
explain this paradox?  In my view, this result could be an indication that a highly 
mobilized electorate might preclude local governments to give up their ability to use 
public resources for political patronage.80  As I discussed before, developing institutional 
capacity necessarily implies that incumbent politicians should adhere to impersonal rules 
governing the processes by which they make decisions, thus reducing their ability to 
employ personalistic styles of government.  However, this situation is very unlikely to 
take place when policy decision-making is strongly tied to political parties.  If political 
parties have a substantial leverage on the day-to-day decisions of municipal governments, 
they have very few incentives to get the local administration modernized in terms of  
more meritocratic procedures for personnel recruitment, more transparent rules for 
granting public works contracts, and the like, because such institutional setting would 
prevent parties to make a political use of resources in favor of their adherents.81 In 
summary, if high turnout rates are interpreted as signs of party mobilization rather than of 
                                                 
80 Recent studies on political clientelism support the proposition that the provision of private goods to 
specific clienteles is a strategy through which rational politicians maximize their political survival, even 
under competitive electoral conditions.  For example, Magaloni, et al. (2002) argue that, in order to 
diversify electoral risk, politicians in Mexico not only invest on universalistic goods, but also spend 
resources to provide private benefits to political loyalists. 
81 This type of governing style is one of the elements Ward (1998) identifies as the “machine politics” 
approach to local governance in Mexico, in which parties have substantial influence on the decision-
making of municipal governments. 
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civic awareness and commitment, then it is not surprising to observe declining rates of 
government institutionalization in municipalities where parties are more powerful, even 
after controlling for socioeconomic conditions.  In Chapter 4 I will return to this issue 
when analyzing the problems of tax enforcement in Mexican municipalities. 
 
 
3.7. COMPETITION VERSUS PARTICIPATION: FINAL REMARKS 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the influence of electoral 
competition on the performance of municipal governments in Mexico is very limited.  
Coverage rates of water, drainage, and electrification are virtually unaffected by changes 
in the municipal electoral environment, no matter how we measure competition and how 
we model its relationship with service coverage.82  I find, on the other hand, a very 
modest positive influence of competition and alternation on the development of 
institutional capacity among municipal governments.  Response bias problems in the 
survey data may explain this outcome.  The main implication of this analysis is that local 
electoral democracy has been an insufficient condition to improve the accountability of 
local officials in the country, which might be due to the constitutional ban to the 
consecutive reelection of local mayors.  Without the reelection incentive, local politicians 
might be less likely to be accountable to the electorate, since their careers depend more 
on their loyalty to party leaders. 
On the other hand, it seems that the principal forces driving better governance 
outcomes and processes come from “demand” factors, such as increases in literacy rates, 
reductions in poverty levels, and increases in voter participation rates.  However, we 
should be cautious in the interpretation of the turnout rate.  Although higher rates of 
                                                 
82 My results are in line with the finding obtained by Cleary (2004) for these three services.  The author, 
however, did not analyze the issue of institutional capacity. 
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electoral participation were found to stimulate the provision of basic services, they seem 
to discourage the modernization of the organizational apparatuses of local governments.  
This result might indicate that a highly mobilized electorate, strongly influenced by party 
activism, precludes incumbent politicians to give up their capacity to use public resources 
for patronage.  Although developing the institutional capacity of local governments is 
desirable to the extent that it improves the quality of policy implementation and the 
transparency of the policymaking process, it seems that local authorities have not very 
big incentives to carry out these type of investments, especially when political parties 
have a strong capacity to mobilize the electorate, influence the government agenda, and 
give preferentiality to political criteria in the allocation of public resources, rather than 
adhering to more technical and impersonal rules for local governance.   
As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, this first round of empirical 
analyses was aimed at understanding the influence of the electoral environment on the 
performance of municipal governments from a long-term perspective, given that the 
available data prevent to investigate that relationship taking into account variations 
occurring throughout time.  This limitation prevents us to better observe the influence of 
the electoral environment on the decision-making of local authorities from one year to 
another.  The next chapter attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the budgetary choices of 
municipal governments in the course of the 1990-2001 period, which allows to 
investigate the same set of electoral hypotheses, as well as some additional propositions 




Local Democracy and Fiscal Decentralization in Mexico: Municipal 
Budgetary Choices and Tax Performance 
 
The previous chapter revealed mixed results regarding the ability of competitive 
elections to improve the performance of municipal governments in Mexico, while at the 
same time it suggested that a better educated and well-organized citizenry positively 
affects local government performance.  However, the previous analysis was limited by 
the nature of the available data on public service provision, mainly by our inability to 
track down changes in performance between shorter that ten year time intervals.  At the 
same time, it could be argued that, despite the fact that municipal authorities are 
constitutionally responsible for the provision of water and drainage, they are still 
dependent on higher governmental funding levels, especially poorer and rural 
municipalities that lack adequate technical and financial capacity to provide these 
services by themselves.  In order to fill these potential shortcomings, this chapter makes 
use of a panel of data that focuses on the taxing and budgetary choices of local 
governments in the country throughout the years between 1990 and 2001.  The dataset 
consists of a combination of cross-sectional units (most municipalities in the country) 
observed throughout 12 years, and it provides us with the opportunity to analyze a 
different set of dependent variables over which municipal governments in Mexico have 
considerably more decision-making autonomy: the allocation of local budgets, and the 
enforcement of local taxes.  The budgetary choices of municipal governments constitute 
an alternative way to observe whether a more contested and participatory electoral 
environment provides incumbent authorities with the incentive to invest in areas of high 
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social priority, thereby supporting the proposition that elections are effective mechanisms 
to hold policymakers responsive to the demands of the electorate.  The enforcement of 
local taxes is another important dimension of the performance of municipal governments 
in the country since it constitutes the best alternative for municipalities to reduce their 
financial dependency with respect to other levels of government (i.e. federal and state), 
and use these unconstrained resources to finance local policy initiatives, rather than 
centrally designed programs. 
This chapter attempts to make an empirical contribution to the decentralization 
debate, looking at the budgetary allocations and taxing effort of local governments in 
Mexico.  The objective is to analyze to what extent the spending and tax choices of 
Mexican municipalities have been responsive to the increase in electoral competition, the 
alternation of parties, and the proliferation of political juxtaposition experiences across 
the country.  In addition, it explores whether the interface between local democratization 
and policy decentralization has provided local authorities with better incentives to invest 
on basic infrastructure projects that are necessary to improve the social development of 
the country.  Given the advantages that this panel provides, now it will be possible to 
analyze additional hypotheses regarding phenomena taking place through time: this 
chapter will incorporate the role of electoral years over the taxing and spending decisions 
of municipal governments.  Specifically, it will be assessed whether local spending is 









4.1. DECENTRALIZATION OF LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN MEXICO 
 
Despite several decentralization attempts, Mexico remains one of the most 
centralized countries in the world, as the federal government continues to control most of 
the spending and taxing instruments.  For example, Goodspeed (2001) compares a 
number of federations belonging to the OECD, in terms of different decentralization 
indicators.  One is the revenues that states and local governments collect from their own 
sources as a percentage of their total budgets.  Mexico ranks the lowest in this indicator, 
since its sub-national governments collect 10.5 percent of their total revenues from their 
own sources in 1998. The second most centralized country is Australia (collecting 33.5 
percent), and the least centralized is Belgium, where local authorities collect 100 percent 
of the revenues. Mexico’s level of fiscal centralization is currently higher than it used to 
be in 1980, where the same indicator took a value of 30.6 percent.83  With respect to the 
area of basic infrastructure, probably the first serious effort to make an explicit 
distribution of spending roles across government levels was the reform to article 115 of 
the national constitution in 1983.  As it was pointed out in Chapter 3, the reform assigned 
municipal governments with the responsibility to provide basic local services, however 
funding remained heavily under centralized control, and most small municipalities 
continued lacking the financial and technical capacity to provide by themselves many of 
those services. 
During the years of the Salinas administration (1988-1994), a new federal 
program for poverty alleviation (the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad or PRONASOL) 
was created, which comprised special funds for the development of basic infrastructure 
projects like water, sewerage systems, electrification, etc.  However, PRONASOL 
                                                 
83 For a review of the historical forces that lead the strong centralization in Mexico’s fiscal system see 
Giugale and Webb (2000). 
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projects were decided by the federal bureaucracy in conjunction with local community 
organizations.  In other words, local governments were mostly ignored, since they did not 
have any relevant role in the allocation of funds, and these never became part of their 
budgets.  PRONASOL was ended by president Zedillo in 1995 as a result of several 
criticisms that maintained that the program had been used for political ends.84  Since one 
of the goals of the new government was to make the distribution of intergovernmental 
funds more transparent, the resources that formerly belonged to PRONASOL were 
shifted to a new fund called Municipal Social Development Fund (Fondo de Desarrollo 
Social Municipal, or FDSM), which by 1996 started to be distributed to the states 
according to a formula that took into account their relative levels of social deprivation.  
Despite the fact that the states were required to distribute the funds of the FDSM to their 
municipalities based on formulas comparable to the federal one, states were mainly free 
to define their own methods of distribution, but not all of those formulas were consistent 
with the objective to compensate municipalities where poverty levels were more severe 
(Scott, 2004).  Furthermore, the FDSM remained under the regulation and supervision of 
the federal government.85 
Possibly, the most drastic step toward the decentralization of basic infrastructure 
in Mexico was the creation in 1997 of a new federal budgetary item called the Ramo 33, 
launched by the national chamber of deputies, which for the first time in history did not 
have the absolute majority of the PRI (the hegemonic party in the country).  In the past, 
federal funds for health, education, social infrastructure and other sectors were mainly 
decided by central agencies in Mexico City.  With the new reform that was actually put 
                                                 
84 Molinar and Weldon (1994) suggest that by 1991 the Mexican government used PRONASOL resources 
to compete for votes. 
85 Peredo (2003) presents a good description of the earmarked funds transferred to states and local 
governments in Mexico during the nineties, arguing that the decentralization policies of the Zedillo 
administration did not provide more autonomy to sub-national governments.  For the operation of the 
FDSM at the municipal level see Vega-Godínez (1998). 
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into effect in 1998, many of these resources started being transferred to state and 
municipal governments.  One of the most important elements within the Ramo 33 was a 
municipal social infrastructure fund (Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal or 
FISM), whose goal was to stimulate the development of basic infrastructure projects 
across the country, particularly in areas with high levels of social deprivation.  This 
budgetary item originated from the former FDSM (described in the previous paragraph), 
but it contained important innovations.  As in the case of the FDSM, the FISM was 
distributed to the states according to a federal formula, but this time states were required, 
for the distribution of funds to the municipalities, to use either the same formula utilized 
by the federal government, or an alternative method based on less information 
requirements.  But in the two cases, the formulas were explicitly stated in the national 
law of fiscal coordination, in order to reduce the discretionary power of state 
governments to use political considerations in the distribution of funds.  Another 
innovation of the FISM is that its resources comprise 2.5 percent of the total revenues 
that the federal government is required by law to share with all states and municipalities 
(Recaudación Federal Participable).  In other words, FISM funds are not subject to the 
budget battles that take place every year between the national executive and legislative 
branches, which considerably reduces the uncertainty faced by local governments 
regarding their budget availability.86  An additional characteristic is that FISM resources 
have become part of the municipal budget, although they must be spent exclusively on 
the following social infrastructure areas: potable water, drainage and sewerage systems, 
municipal urbanization, rural electrification, basic infrastructure for health and education, 
improvements for housing services, roads and infrastructure for productive projects in 
rural areas.  The federal law also requires municipal governments to promote the 
                                                 
86 Evidently, the amount of funds can vary depending on the situation of the national economy. 
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participation of communities in the formulation, implementation, and supervision of the 
projects carried out with FISM resources, which somehow resembles the approach 
adopted by PRONASOL for the allocation of resources.  But it should be noted that, in 
contrast to previous decentralization policies, the regulation of the FISM is not anymore 
under the control of federal agencies, since now state governments are responsible to 
supervise its operation.  Actually, the federal government lost substantial influence over 
the operation of these resources, since municipal governments are only accountable to 
state legislatures. 
In summary, the decentralization policy of 1998 has considerably broaden the 
autonomy of subnational and local governments to use federal resources for the 
development of basic infrastructure projects.  However, the policy has had a number of 
drawbacks.  A study by Rodríguez-Gómez (1999), for example, points out that the 
regulations established by some state governments for the operation of FISM funds have 
considerably reduced the capacity of municipalities to participate in the definition of 
spending priorities.  Even though the federal agencies had significant influence over the 
allocation of intergovernmental funds before 1998, municipalities and community 
organizations had nevertheless an important role in policy formulation.  Now that the 
control of the funds is under the responsibility of state governments, the scope for 
municipal participation might have diminished, at least in some states.  Another problem 
identified by the author is the capacity and willingness of municipal authorities to 
actually organize the participation of citizens in the definition of spending priorities.  For 
example, some municipalities lack the necessary expertise to inform the public about the 
norms that should be fulfilled in order to use the funds.  There are also cases in which 
spending decisions in fact are made by the municipal president, while local authorities 
only simulate the existence of a participatory process.  Another potential problem of the 
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FISM policy is its negative effect on the fiscal effort of Mexican municipalities.  Some 
studies (Moreno-Jaimes, 2003; Raich 2003, Sour, 2004) have suggested that the transfer 
funds created since 1998 have reduced the incentives of local governments to enforce the 
collection of the property tax (the most important tax revenue at the municipal level): 
given the choice, a local policymaker prefers to rely on federal transfers to finance public 
goods, instead of increasing local taxes, especially if this entails a political cost.  Finally, 
it is unclear whether state executives and legislatures are effectively supervising the use 
of funds by local authorities.87  All these are problems that should be carefully taken into 
account in a comprehensive evaluation of the decentralization policy in the area of basic 
infrastructure in Mexico.  Chapter 5 will revisit these issues, focusing on the operation of 
social infrastructure funds in a Mexican state. 
Given the large deficiencies that still exist in service coverage across the country 
(as pointed out in Chapter 3), it is imperative to know whether the spending choices of 
local governments tend to favor investments in the sector of basic infrastructure, 
particularly now that they have acquired more decision-making autonomy since 1998.  
Also, it is important to investigate whether the process of local democratization has 
induced municipalities to give preference to spending areas of high significance for social 
development.  The following section investigates this issue in more detail. 
 
4.2. THE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL BUDGETARY CHOICES 
 
This section presents an econometric analysis of the budgetary allocations of 
municipal governments in Mexico.  It focuses on the two most important budget 
                                                 
87 From interviews with several state officials at  the finance and planning department of the Estado de 
México (one of the wealthiest and most populous states in the country), it is apparent that municipalities 
have never been scrutinized in their use of FISM resources by the state legislature.  See Chapter 5 for more 
details. 
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categories of local spending in Mexico, current administrative expenses and public 
infrastructure investments.  The aim of the analysis is to explain the extent to which the 
allocation of local budgets responds to different pressures arising in the electoral arena.  
It will test whether increases in electoral competition, party alternation, and voter turnout 
rates encourage local authorities to invest resources in public works.  Furthermore, the 
analysis will address the consequences of the decentralization of local infrastructure in 
Mexico on the budgetary choices of municipal governments, and whether the interaction 
between decentralization and political competition modifies their spending behavior. 
 
4.2.1 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the problem of budgetary allocations is framed 
not merely as a technical matter, but as a highly political issue in which local 
policymakers try to maximize their political survival, using public resources with that 
aim.  In the Mexican case, where reelection for public office is constitutionally forbidden, 
the problem of political survival consists of assuring the victory of the incumbent’s party 
in the next electoral contest.88  Thus, under a context of high political competition (as it is 
now the case in Mexico), we can expect that local politicians will invest more on areas 
that provide them with a higher political reward, improving the chances of their parties to 
remain in power.  This key hypothesis will be tested using data from virtually all 
municipalities in the country for the years 1990 to 2001, the period in which the electoral 
landscape of Mexican municipalities became highly competitive. 
                                                 
88 Although the goal of some municipal presidents governing important municipalities (especially capital 
cities) is to run for the gubernatorial position in their states, it can still be assumed that they seek to assure 
the victory of their parties in the next election for two reasons.  First, the possibility of being nominated by 
their party to compete for the state governorship might strongly depend on the efforts they made to bolster 
their party’s popularity in the municipality.  Second, if they get to be elected as state governors, they will 
prefer to have a political ally in the municipal government, rather than a party rival. 
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Analytically, we can think of a local policymaker as a rational actor who, lacking 
the possibility of reelection, attempts to maximize the chances of her party to remain in 
power in the subsequent election.  This actor uses public resources as a means to achieve 
her political goals (Ames, 1987).  The key question here is whether, given the local 
electoral environment, the local politician will be more inclined to spend on public 
infrastructure projects that generate broad benefits to the population, or whether she will 
prefer to allocate available resources to expand the administrative apparatus of the local 
government.  The budgetary allocation problem evidently lies on a continuum: not all 
resources will be spent exclusively either on the administration or on public works 
projects.  But the specific weight a policymaker assigns to each budget item might 
depend on local electoral conditions.  That is, their chances of political survival depend 
on how benefits are distributed among local constituents. We can hypothesize that as the 
electoral arena becomes more competitive and participatory, local authorities will tend to 
invest more on local infrastructure than on current expenditures.  The rationale behind 
this proposition is that, under a context of low citizen participation and small electoral 
competition, incumbent authorities have relatively few incentives to provide benefits to a 
broad range of constituencies, since the basis of their power can be more easily expanded 
by rewarding only their political supporters through jobs in the bureaucracy and other 
selective transfers that entail an increase in administrative expenditures.  In other words, 
with low competition and voter participation, the political survival of politicians is 
maximized through the use of traditional patronage that provides private benefits to 
political loyalists.  On the other hand, a highly competitive and participatory electoral 
environment compels local politicians to provide benefits to a broader range of potential 
voters.  Consequently, investing on public works projects that spread out benefits to 
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broader constituencies would be the preferred spending strategy of a politician acting 
under a competitive and participatory environment. 
An additional element that should be considered in analyzing the budgetary 
behavior of local governments is the institutional setting through which local public 
policies operate.  Specifically, it is important to take into account the role that a more 
decentralized policy environment plays in shaping local budgetary choices.  As it was 
argued in the previous section, the reforms launched by the federal government to the 
fiscal intergovernmental system in 1998 have increased the scope for municipal decision-
making.  Therefore, a relevant question is whether the authority acquired by municipal 
governments since the creation of the Ramo 33 has had any relevant impact on how local 
authorities allocate resources for local infrastructure projects.  Furthermore, it is 
interesting to explore if electoral competition has a stronger effect on social infrastructure 
investments under a more decentralized policy setting. 
There are additional issues that will be investigated in the analysis, given the 
methodological advantages that the dataset provides.  One regards the budgetary behavior 
of local governments during electoral years.  Political business cycles predict that 
governments will tend to spend more in years in which elections take place since 
incumbent authorities use public expenditures to “buy” votes (Nordhaus, 1975).  The 
analysis will address whether this widespread idea holds for the case of Mexican local 
governments, and whether there is any difference between administrative and public 
works spending.  Another issue is whether “juxtaposed governments” (i.e. municipalities 
where the party membership of the mayor and the state governors diverges) tend to favor 
public infrastructure investments.  The reason for investigating the role of this variable is 
the assumption that, under a context of government juxtaposition, local politicians have a 
particular incentive to invest more on public works than on administrative activities, 
 119
since local infrastructure projects are more visible to the population at large, thus 
providing them with the opportunity to claim credit for their creation.  In other words, 
“opposition mayors” seek to be recognized by local constituents as the real originators of 
the public goods provided locally. 
 
4.2.2. An empirical budgetary allocation model 
 
In order to test the previous hypotheses, this chapter exploits a panel dataset 
consisting of a combination of 1969 cross-sectional units (most municipalities in the 
country) and 12 years of observations, from 1990 to 2001, comprising a total of 23,628 
observations. 89  Panel datasets have several advantages over conventional cross-sectional 
or time-series data.  Not only do they increase the number of observations in the sample 
(which reduces potential collinearity problems), but they also provide a means to 
ameliorate omitted variable bias.  In other words, “by utilizing information on both the 
intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated, one is 
better able to control in a more natural way for the effects of missing or unobserved 
variables” (Hsiao, 2003, 5).  In the context of the present research, the panel dataset 
enables us to analyze the budgetary behavior of local governments by incorporating the 
variations occurring throughout time, as well as the differences taking place across 
municipalities.  In addition, by tracking down changes in performance from one year to 
another, responsibility for policy outcomes to different municipal administrations can 
more easily be attached. 
One of the issues that introduces considerable complexity to this data structure is 
the fact that local elections take place at different moments, according to the electoral 
                                                 
89 I exclude the 412 municipalities of Oaxaca state that are governed by “usos y costumbres” (i.e. 
indigenous communities that use traditional mechanisms to select their authorities, in place of modern party 
systems).  I also leave out recently created municipalities for which data are not yet available. 
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calendars of Mexican states (see appendices A and B).  Therefore, all electoral variables 
in the models that follow take the same values throughout the three years of municipal 
government.  For example, if Aguascalientes had local elections in 1989, the values of 
the electoral competition variable remain the same for 1989, 1990, and 1991, until a new 
election takes place.90  The 12-year interval of the dataset matches an average of four 
government periods per municipality, except for the few occasional cases in which the 
local government period was of higher duration.91  
The dataset draws information from a variety of sources.  Municipal finance data 
comes from a dataset by INEGI that contains yearly information (from 1989 to 2001) on 
different types of municipal revenues and expenditures.92  Data on local elections comes 
from a dataset compiled by CIDAC, which contains information on the distribution of 
votes across parties in all municipal elections that have taken place since 1980.  
Socioeconomic and demographic indicators are based on the population censuses carried 
out by INEGI in 1990 and 2000, as well as on the population count conducted by the 
same agency in 1995.  A potential problem with socioeconomic indicators is that we lack 
data for the years in-between 1990, 1995, and 2000. Thus, I had to estimate them with the 
use of an average annual geometric rate.93 
                                                 
90 An alternative structuring of the data would take into consideration that parties forecast the 
competitiveness of upcoming elections.  In order to cope with this possibility, the electoral data could be 
organized by imputing the outcome of the most nearby election, instead of keeping the previous electoral 
result constant over three years.  This alternative strategy, however might create a problem of endogeneity 
if the most nearby election happens to be the forthcoming one (i.e., the electoral outcome of the next 
election could have been the consequence, rather than the cause, of the budgetary allocations of the 
incumbent government).  I am grateful to Kenneth Greene for his observations on this issue. 
91 For example, the term of municipal governments in the Estado de México lasted four years in one 
occasion, from 1996 to 2000, when the electoral calendar of that state was modified to match it with the 
timing of federal elections. 
92 Available on-line through the Sistema Municipal de Bases de Datos at www.inegi.gob.mx. 






= , where X represents the value of the 
socioeconomic variable, t is the year at which the data are reported  (i.e. t=1990, 1995, 2000), and n is the 
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Two models were estimated for which the dependent variables are, respectively, 
administrative and public works expenditures, both expressed in real per capita terms.94  
The first set of independent variables in both models is the budget constraint of municipal 
governments. In the Mexican case, the local budget constraint is constituted by revenue-
share transfers from the federal government that account more than 70 percent of the total 
resources available.  The second largest revenue source is the income that municipalities 
generate locally (the sum of local taxes, user fees, fines and other sources).  It represents 
no more than 20 percent of the total.  Municipal debt is another component of the budget 
constraint, though it only comprises around 3 percent of total available resources.  
Finally, the earmarked transfer fund created in 1998 by the federal government, the 
FISM, has become a very important element of the municipal budget, representing 
something around 30 percent of the total amount of resources.95  
In order to control for sociodemographic conditions, I use the deprivation index 
elaborated by CONAPO (Mexico’s Population Council), which, as pointed out in Chapter 
3, is a combined measure of several forms of social exclusion.  The deprivation index can 
helps us to distinguish patterns in budgetary allocations across different local 
socioeconomic conditions. 
The key explanatory variables in the models are both political and institutional.  
The first political variable is the degree of electoral competition, measured by the margin 
of electoral victory in a local election (i.e. the difference in the proportion of votes 
obtained by the two strongest parties).  Once more, bear in mind that a decrease in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of years in-between.  The resulting annual rate of growth, r, is used to estimate the values of the 
socioeconomic variables for the years in-between. 
94 All monetary variables are divided by population size and expressed in constant pesos of 2001. 
95 It should be noted that state and federal agencies in Mexico still manage their own spending programs 
(for example on highways, health, education, agriculture, etc.), which operate locally. However, since these 




margin of victory should be regarded as an increase in competition.  The second political 
variable is the existence of party alternation, which indicates whether the party governing 
a municipality is different to the party that controlled the local government in the 
previous administration.  Another political variable is the relative level of voter turnout, 
which is measured as the number of effective votes divided by the number of potential 
voters in a municipality. 
Other variables that can give us a better picture on how local budgets are formed 
in Mexico are the timing of elections and the existence of government juxtaposition.  I 
include a dummy variable to indicate whether a local election took place in a particular 
municipality at a specific point in time (recall that local electoral calendars vary by state).  
This variable allows us to directly analyze whether local public spending increases during 
an electoral year, and whether this effect is the same for current expenditures and public 
work investments.  Another dummy variable incorporated in the model is “government 
juxtaposition”, which indicates whether a municipal president belongs to a different party 
than the state governor. 
An important element in the model is a variable characterizing the institutional 
setting in which local spending operates.  I call this variable “decentralization”, which 
indicates that, as of 1998, the federal government started to effectively transfer local 
governments the responsibility of providing basic infrastructure, together with grants 
earmarked for that purpose.  Therefore, the decentralization variable takes a value of zero 
for all the years from 1990 to 1997, and a value of one for the years from 1998 to 2001.  
The decentralization variable is only included in the model in which the dependent 
variable is public works expenditure per capita, because the federal policy never had the 
explicit goal of modifying local administrative spending.  Evidently, this variable allows 
evaluating whether public infrastructure investments increased as a result of the 
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decentralization policy.  But it also gives us the opportunity to answer a more interesting 
question: namely, is the competitive electoral environment more effective in promoting 
local infrastructure investments under a decentralized policy setting?  In other words, are 
local authorities more likely to invest on public goods under a context of electoral 
competition and policy decentralization?  In order to analyze this question, the model 
incorporates the interactions between decentralization and the three key variables of my 
study: electoral competition, party alternation, and voter turnout. 
The first model (the one with public works investments as dependent variable) is 





Yit represents the real per capita spending on public works carried out by municipality i at 
time t. 
 
BUDGETit is the budget constraint of municipality i at time t. 
 
EMARGINit is the difference in the proportion of votes obtained by the two strongest 
parties in municipality i at time t. 
 
ALTERit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the party governing municipality i at 
time t was different than the party of the previous administration, and zero otherwise. 
 
TURNOUTit is the total number of votes in the local election of municipality i at time t, 
divided by the number of potential voters. 
 
DECENTit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the years from 1998 to 2001 (i.e. 
when federal funds earmarked for local infrastructure were decentralized), and zero for 































































PRIit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i at time t was governed by 
the PRI, and zero otherwise. 
 
PANit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i at time t was governed by 
the PAN, and zero otherwise. 
 
ELECYEARit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i had a local 
election at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 
JUXTAit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there was a divergence in party 
memberships between the president of municipality i at time t and the state governor, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
POVERTYit is the deprivation index measuring the lack of access of households to basic 
services such as education, water, electrification, monetary income, etc. 
 
υi is a time-invariant, unit-specific component. 
 
εit is the residual, which in this model is assumed to be first-order autoregressive. 
 
The second model is identical to the previous one, except for Yit, which in this 
case represents the real per capita spending on administrative activities carried out by 
municipality i at time t.  The model also excludes the decentralization variable and all its 
interactions. 
The estimations were performed using both fixed and random effects GLS 
methodologies.  These two estimation techniques are based on different assumptions.96  A 
fixed-effects framework allows the unit-specific, time-invariant component (υi) to be 
correlated with the observable explanatory variables, which constitutes a reasonable 
assumption for the purposes of this research.  For example, some municipalities might be 
more inclined than others to develop competitive political environments for reasons that 
we cannot directly observe in the available data.  If we assume that those unobservable 
characteristics are largely stable across the period analyzed, then a fixed-effects 
                                                 
96 A discussion on these estimation methodologies can be found in Wooldrige (2002), Hsiao (2003), and 
Greene (1997). 
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estimation would be appropriate.  A disadvantage of using a fixed-effect estimation is 
that it does not allow us to include variables that remain unchanging over time or whose 
intertemporal variation is very small (for example, all electoral variables in the models 
remain fixed over the three years of the municipal mandate, as it was pointed out before).  
A random-effects estimation, on the other hand, imposes the assumption that the 
unobservable effects (i.e. the latent attributes of each municipality in the sample) are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is evidently a very strong one, but it 
constitutes a useful method when a model includes a time-constant variable.  The reason 
for utilizing both estimation techniques is simply to show that results do not vary 
radically across the two models. 
Also note that a total of 30 dummy variables for state effects are included in the 
random effects model (taking Aguascalientes as the baseline), but they are not included in 
the fixed-effects one, since they are time-invariant.  Eleven dummy variables to identify 
each year of the 1990-2001 period are included in both models (1990 is taken as the 
baseline).  Given that spending choices are highly correlated from one year to another, I 
allow for first-order autocorrelation in the error. 
A potential concern with the former model involves the recurrent problem of 
endogeneity in social science research.  Endogeneity could derive from two principal 
sources.  The first is that the relationship between our key independent variables and the 
budget allocation might possibly be mediated by a latent or unobservable attribute of the 
units of analysis (i.e. the municipalities).  For instance, it could be argued that 
municipalities where competition is high are those where the population is also more 
“progressive” or politically active, and, consequently, more likely to demand more public 
works investments from their governments.  If this was the case, the positive relationship 
between competition and public works expenditures would be explained by those 
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unobserved characteristics of the population, rather than by the more contested electoral 
environment.  However, if we are willing to assume that the unobservable attributes (i.e. 
the υi component of the model) are mostly stable over time, then the fixed effects 
estimation would considerably reduce the problem, as it has been discussed in previous 
paragraphs.  The second potential source of endogeneity may derive from an issue of 
reciprocal causation: namely, that the electoral support for other parties might be the 
consequence (rather than the cause) of the budgetary allocations of local governments.  
For example, a municipal government that is perceived by the people to allocate too few 
funds in developing basic infrastructure might possibly be punished in the next election.  
The estimation tries to cope with this issue by measuring the electoral variables with data 
from the previous election.  In other words, there is no way that the budget allocation in 
time t could have affected the electoral outcome in time t-1. 
Regression results are reported in Table 4.1, which displays them according to the 
estimation method utilized (fixed effects and random effects).  The two dependent 
variables (public works expenditures and administrative expenditures) are analyzed 
separately under each estimation method.  Note that, although the hypotheses are tested 
simultaneously, for ease of exposition I will proceed to discuss the results in stages, 
addressing the effect of each independent variable on the allocation of each budget 
category. The following section discusses the results in more detail. 
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TABLE 4.1.  GLS Fixed-Effects and Random-Effects Regressions on Public Works and 
Administrative Expenditure per capita, 1990-2001 



































Earmarked transfers for infrastructure (FISM) 0.444*** (0.019)  
0.489*** 
(0.018)  
Municipal deprivation (CONAPO index) Excluded Excluded 15.962*** (3.147) 
-27.161*** 
(2.63) 
Decentralization 61.808 (160.296)  
116.762*** 
(18.554)  







Margin * Decentralization -93.602*** (17.561)  
-84.302*** 
(16.498)  







Alternation * Decentralization 24.454** (9.141)  
26.179** 
(8.539)  







Turnout * Decentralization -107.586*** (24.721)  
-126.663*** 
(23.393)  



































Number of groups 1954 1954 1953 1953 
Maximum number of observations per group 11 11 12 12 
Total N 20836 20836 22778 22778 
Overall R-squared 0.433 0.871 0.536 0.896 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All models include year dummies (excluding 1990).  Only random-effects models 
include state dummies (excluding Aguascalientes).  Their coefficients are not reported.  In all cases the disturbance term 
is assumed to be first-order autoregressive. 
***p<.001 **p<.01  *p<.05 
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4.2.3. Discussion of results: the virtuous interaction of decentralization with 
competition 
 
Starting with the local budget constraint, we can clearly observe that all variables 
measuring the available financial resources of municipal governments are extremely 
important, both for current administrative expenditures and for public works investment.  
However, there are very interesting differences in how available resources are spent on 
each budget category.  As Table 4.1 shows in its first row, administrative expenses are 
mainly financed through unconditional federal transfers (i.e. revenue-sharing grants or 
participaciones): for every peso obtained in the form of participaciones, municipal 
governments spend, on average, 67 cents in their operating costs, no matter if this figure 
was obtained through a fixed-effect or a random-effect methodology (the coefficients are 
practically the same).  On the other hand, only 22 to 25 cents of every peso from federal 
participaciones are spent on public works investments, which might imply that if 
Mexican local governments received only unconditional transfers, they would spend most 
of those resources on administrative activities, leaving social infrastructure projects 
considerably unattended.  Something similar occurs in the case of locally generated 
revenue (i.e. money from local taxes, user fees, etc.).  These resources can also be freely 
spent by local governments, and the results displayed in the second row of Table 4.1 
reveal that for every peso collected from their own-sources, local governments spend no 
less than 46 cents to cover administrative expenses and 35 cents to pay for public works 
projects (the rest is spent on other minor budgetary items, such as personal subsidies and 
local debt payments).  Although more weight is given to administrative activities, locally 
generated revenues finance a larger proportion of public works, compared to 
participaciones.  In contrast, local debt (the third row in Table 4.1) is mainly used to 
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finance infrastructure projects: for every additional peso obtained through debt, local 
governments spend 57 cents on public works, and only 20 cents are used to finance 
operating expenditures.  The explanation for this is that municipal debt is in general 
conditioned to pay for local infrastructure. Regarding the fund created by the federal 
government in 1998, which is completely transferred to municipal governments to 
finance the development of local infrastructure (the FISM), we can see its positive and 
significant impact on public works spending.  Nevertheless, we should be cautious when 
interpreting the magnitude of its coefficient (44 cents per peso received in FISM funds), 
since prior to 1998 this transfer fund was absent from local budgets (the variable takes a 
value of zero for all the years before 1998).  That is, given that the estimations are 
conducted for the entire 1990-2001 period, but the FISM actually started in 1998, its 
effect on public works expenditures is understated.97    The influence of this earmarked 
fund on administrative expenses is not incorporated to the analysis, but some estimations 
(not reported) reveal that its impact is negligible. 
In summary, there are strong differences in the way public resources are spent by 
Mexican local governments, but it is interesting to note the substantial importance 
administrative activities have among their budgetary priorities, at least as compared to 
                                                 
97 When the analysis is performed only for the years in which the new fund was in operation, its coefficient 
is over 0.7, which implies that for every peso obtained in the form of an earmarked transfer, municipalities 
spend more than 70 cents on public works.  Yet, we should be concerned with the fact that the remaining 
30 cents are not spent on public works projects, despite the fact that the transfer fund has been earmarked 
for that purpose.  A potential explanation is that the mechanisms for overseeing the use of those funds (a 
role that is officially under the responsibility of state legislatures) are relatively ineffective, enabling some 
local governments to spend them on activities that are not formally permitted by the federal law.  An 
alternative explanation is that many local governments still lack the adequate institutional capacity to 
manage those earmarked funds.  Recall that the Mexican fiscal coordination law (as well as the specific 
rules established by state governments to regulate the operation of the FISM) requires local governments to 
prioritize their social infrastructure needs with the participation of communities, and to follow technical 
procedures in order to be eligible to receive the funds.  It is quite possible that local governments that lack 
the technical and managerial expertise to meet these criteria (presumably governments of very poor 
municipalities) will not be able to use the full amount of resources available to them.  Since my data on the 
earmarked funds reflect only the maximum amounts that municipal governments are authorized to spend, 
but not the resources actually used by them, the remaining 30 cents that are missing could be an indication 
of the impossibility of some local governments to use them. 
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social infrastructure investments.  The main policy implication of this first analysis is that 
there is a broad rationale supporting the existence of earmarked transfers from higher 
levels of government.  Given the high social deprivation levels that exist across the 
country and the severe deficiencies in social infrastructure that characterize many 
Mexican municipalities, expecting that local governments will solve by themselves those 
problems is totally unrealistic.  Not only do they lack the necessary resources to meet the 
most basic social needs, but when they have additional funds they tend to spend them on 
administrative activities instead of investing them in infrastructure projects that 
presumably have higher social returns.   This justifies the existence of conditional transfer 
funds, such as the Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM) launched by the 
Mexican congress in 1998, whose aim is to force local governments to invest on social 
infrastructure. 
The next question is whether there are different patterns in the budgetary 
allocations of local governments that result from differences in socioeconomic 
conditions.98 The results clearly show that each budget category has a divergent 
relationship with the CONAPO index of municipal deprivation: as shown in the fifth row 
of Table 4.1, administrative expenditures are inversely related to levels of social 
deprivation, while public works investments are positively related to the index.  These 
differences can be explained by the fact that wealthier municipalities already met most of 
their basic infrastructure needs, thus requiring less investments in that area.  At the same 
time, wealthier municipalities require modernizing their administrative apparatuses in 
order to deal with the more sophisticated policy issues they face, thus they tend to invest 
more on their bureaucracies.  Poorer municipalities, on the other hand, require large 
                                                 
98 Note that it is only possible to assess the role of social deprivation levels in the models estimated through 
random effects regressions.  The reason is that the deprivation index is mostly time-invariant, thus it is not 
feasible to use it within a fixed-effects framework. 
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investments on infrastructure to meet their most basic social needs (i.e. they need to 
introduce water supply, sewer systems, electrification, roads and schools), while their 
public administration is much less complex, given that they do not have to face the 
problems more developed cities do. 
The last part of the analysis addresses the role that political and institutional 
factors play in shaping the budgetary allocations of local governments.  Once we have 
controlled for local budgetary restrictions and socioeconomic levels, the next question is 
whether a more competitive and participatory electoral environment stimulates public 
spending in a particular way, and whether such an effect is increased (or even modified) 
under a more decentralized policy setting.  Once more, the results suggest that electoral 
competition, party alternation, and voter turnout have very different consequences on 
how local governments spend their available resources.  The first result is that all those 
three variables have a positive effect over administrative expenditures, as can be clearly 
observed in the coefficients associated to the margin of electoral victory, party 
alternation, and voter turnout (recall that the negative sign of the margin of victory’s 
coefficient indicates that electoral competition and administrative spending are positively 
related, since larger margins of victory imply less competition).   However, the effect of 
electoral competition on administrative expenditures is only statistically significant in the 
random effects model (its magnitude is equal to -17.47).  That is, declining margins of 
electoral victory, alternation of parties in municipal governments, and high levels of voter 
participation seem to stimulate local governments to expand their administrative 
apparatuses. 
On the other hand, the consequences of electoral competition and party alternation 
on infrastructure investments depend on whether they operate under a centralized or a 
decentralized policy environment.  In order to better appreciate this result, we should 
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compare the coefficient of the margin of electoral victory (row 7) with the coefficient of 
the margin of victory interacted (multiplicatively) with the “decentralization” variable 
(row 8), and do the same for the case of party alternation (rows 9 and 10).  For the period 
before decentralization, electoral competition (row 7) and party alternation (row 9) seem 
to have discouraged local governments from investing on public infrastructure projects, 
an outcome that challenges the usual claim that party competition should promote the 
accountability of government officials.  However, for the years in which decentralization 
was operational, the effect of the two variables on public works spending (as shown in 
rows 8 and 10) changed radically: both competition and alternation started to stimulate 
local authorities to increase their investments on basic infrastructure.  That is, the 
interaction between decentralization and the other two political variables (competition 
and alternation) significantly modifies the budgetary choices of local officials: before 
decentralization, for every one percent decrease in the margin of electoral victory, local 
governments reduced their spending on infrastructure by 23 pesos on average (according 
to the random effects estimations).  After decentralization, the net effect of competition 
on infrastructure spending is reversed in such a way that the same one percent decrease in 
the margin of victory stimulates local governments to spend 61 pesos per capita on 
infrastructure (i.e. the difference between the coefficient corresponding to the margin of 
electoral victory and the coefficient corresponding to the interaction of that variable with 
decentralization).  The same outcome occurs for the case of party alternation, since the 
net effect of this variable on infrastructure spending (i.e. the difference of the effect with 
and without decentralization) appears to be around 5 pesos per capita.  An alternative 
way to interpret these results is from the perspective of the decentralization policy itself.  
The random effects model suggests that, after the decentralization, local governments 
spent, on average, 116 pesos per capita more than what they used to spend before the 
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decentralization took place.  But the effect of the decentralization policy is even larger in 
municipalities characterized by low margins of electoral victory (i.e. municipalities where 
competition is high) and where alternation of parties occurs. 
An unexpected result is that the voter turnout rate does not appear to stimulate the 
levels of investment on basic infrastructure, neither before, nor after decentralization.  
Quite the opposite, the results displayed in row 12 strongly suggest that, after 
decentralization, higher rates of voter participation discouraged municipal governments 
to invest on basic infrastructure.  At the same time, turnout rates appear as fostering the 
levels of administrative expenditures.  Further research is needed to elucidate this result.99 
The main conclusion of this analysis is that municipal authorities are more willing 
to invest on basic infrastructure when they face an institutional setting characterized by 
both competition (or alternation) and decentralization.  This result is qualitatively 
consistent across the random and fixed effects models, although the magnitude of the 
coefficients changes from one model to the other. 
Let us now discuss the results obtained from the remaining political variables.  
The analysis suggests that there is a tendency among local governments to substitute 
administrative spending for infrastructure investment in years where local elections take 
place.  In years when local elections are held (as shown in row 13), current expenditures 
                                                 
99 The estimation was also performed controlling for the concurrence of municipal with federal and state 
gubernatorial elections. Two dummy variables were created, one indicating whether the municipal election 
was held on the same day of the state gubernatorial election, and the second indicating whether the 
municipal election was held on the same day of a federal election (either the presidential or the mid-term 
congressional).  The reason for doing this was not only to observe if the spending behavior of municipal 
governments changes with concurrency, but also to investigate if the coefficient associated with the local 
turnout rate (presumably affected by the overlap of municipal with state and federal elections) varies.  The 
results (not reported in Table 4.1 for the sake of simplicity) reveal that public works expenditures increase 
by 13.70 pesos per capita (significant at the 0.05 level) when municipal elections coincide with state 
gubernatorial elections, but decrease by 26.80 pesos per capita (significant at the 0.05 level too) when they 
overlap with federal elections.  This might possibly imply that, during a year when both municipal and 
gubernatorial elections will take place, local mayors have an extra incentive to invest in infrastructure 
projects, probably to help the candidate from their own parties to obtain more votes.  Worth noting is the 
fact that the effect of the turnout rate on spending does not get changed after we control for concurrency. 
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decrease by 11 pesos per capita, while spending on public works increases by 9.5 pesos. 
It implies that elections provide municipal governments with the best occasion to make 
their actions more visible to the population at large, and the most manifest expenditure 
categories are public works (roads, schools, hospitals, etc.), rather than administrative 
spending.  Another piece of evidence supporting this view is that, under a context of 
government juxtaposition (i.e. when the party of a municipal president is different than 
the party of the state governor), municipal governments tend to increase their spending on 
local infrastructure projects: juxtaposed local governments spend, on average, between 15 
and 22 pesos per capita more than local governments that are not juxtaposed.  The 
phenomenon of “juxtaposition”, on the other hand, does not have any significant 
consequence on current administrative expenditures.  With party divergence between 
municipal and state governments, we assume that local mayors seek to be differentiated 
by their constituents from state authorities; as a result we should expect them to favor 
policy sectors for which they can more easily claim credit.  In other words, the 
phenomenon of party juxtaposition provides local governments with a special incentive 
to invest in areas that are more visible to the population, making it clear that they, and not 
any other authority, are responsible for those policies.  For that reason we observe that 
government juxtaposition stimulates spending on local infrastructure (a very visible 
expenditure category), but does not have any effect on administrative expenditures.  This 
also confirms the proposition that juxtaposed municipal governments are more likely to 
develop more autonomous policymaking strategies in order to respond to the demands of 
their constituencies. 
Does party membership matter for local budgetary allocations?  It appears that it 
does not in the case of administrative expenditures, since neither municipalities governed 
by the PRI nor those governed by the PAN spend more on their administrative 
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apparatuses than the PRD or the other smaller parties.  Local infrastructure investments, 
on the other hand, reveal marked party differences; according to the fixed-effects model, 
both PRI and PAN governments tend to spend more on public works than the remaining 
parties in the country.  However, the results are inconclusive regarding whether PANista 
governments spend more on infrastructure than the governments of the PRI, since their 
coefficients vary between the fixed-effect and the random-effects models (i.e. the 
coefficients presented in the first column, rows 15 and 16, suggest that the PAN invests 
more on infrastructure than the PRI, while the coefficients displayed in the second 
column indicate just the opposite). 
 
 
4.3. THE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL TAX PERFORMANCE 
 
Local own-source revenues constitute another important dimension of the 
performance of local governments in Mexico.100  As in the case of basic local services, 
the collection of property taxes is a constitutional responsibility of municipal 
governments since 1983.  However, not all municipalities in the country fully enforce 
their taxing authority.  Evidently, variations in tax performance are largely explained by 
differences in municipal economic conditions, but they are also due to variations in the 
effort levels that local authorities put to collect local taxes.  There is a widespread 
consensus in Mexico that municipal administrations are generally reluctant to fully 
exercise their taxing authority because they fear incurring severe political costs.  
Furthermore, since municipal governments are heavily dependent on grants from other 
levels (mainly the federal government), they have few incentives to tax local residents. 
                                                 
100 Local own-source revenues are mainly comprised by the proceeds from the local property tax (impuesto 
predial), user fees (derechos), revenues from sale or lease of municipal assets (productos), and fines and 
other sources (aprovechamientos). 
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Given the choice, a local politician will prefer to finance her spending decisions through 
the use of conditional and unconditional transfers from the federal government, at 
virtually no cost, rather than increase the collection of local taxes. Unfortunately, in the 
long run this will hinder the institutional and fiscal capacity of local governments, 
making them even more dependent of intergovernmental aid than they already are.  For 
the purposes of this study, increases in tax revenues are regarded as improvements in 
local fiscal performance, since larger own-source revenues constitute for municipalities 
their only alternative to enhance their financial autonomy.101 
One of the motivations for bringing in the analysis of local revenues is precisely 
to evaluate the alleged negative effect of the decentralization policy on the taxing effort 
of Mexican municipalities.  If the conventional claim that municipal authorities do not 
fully enforce the collection of local taxes because they refuse to pay a political cost were 
true, electoral competition would have a negative influence on the taxing performance of 
municipal governments.  In other words, a more contested electoral environment would 
impel incumbent politicians to reduce their tax effort, since they nevertheless have access 
to conditional and unconditional transfers from the federal government, without bearing a 
large political burden.  Thus, this chapter not only analyzes the effect of competition on 
local revenues, but also whether the interface between competition and the 
decentralization of grants has been detrimental for local taxing effort. 
As in previous analyses, voter turnout and literacy rates are incorporated as 
proxies for civic engagement.  Recall from Chapter 3 that the provision of public services 
was found to be positively affected by higher rates of voter participation and literacy, 
which suggested that the performance of local governments was responsive to better 
educated citizens and to a highly mobilized electorate.  However, the analysis of local 
                                                 
101 Other authors, for example Cabrero-Mendoza and Orihuela (2000), Cleary (2004), and Rodríguez 
(1997),  have used local tax revenues as indicators of municipal performance in Mexico. 
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budgets revealed that voter turnout stimulates current expenditures instead of public 
works investments, thus challenging that interpretation.  For the civic engagement 
hypothesis to hold in the case of local taxation, we should observe that taxes are easier to 
enforce in highly participative municipalities, since people are more willing to contribute 
financially to improve the provision of public goods and services.  In other words, that 
high levels of civic engagement would effectively promote the cooperation of people to 
provide themselves with public goods, at the same time that they hold their public 
officials accountable. 
 
4.3.1. Consequences of decentralization on tax performance: an empirical 
framework 
 
Two estimation strategies will be performed in the analysis.  The first will consist 
in estimating the effects of competition, voter participation, fund decentralization, and the 
local electoral calendar on the per capita levels of revenues coming 1) from property 
taxes, and 2) from user fees.  These two categories constitute 65 percent of the total 
revenue that municipalities generate locally (that is, total municipal revenues excluding 
federal grants).   If the claim that local politicians do not fully enforce local taxation as a 
result of the electoral costs they would incur, then we should anticipate a negative 
relationship between competition and revenues, and between these and electoral years.  
Also, if the creation in 1998 of the new federal earmarked funds to finance local 
infrastructure projects has discouraged municipal governments to enforce their taxing 
authority, as many of its critics have pointed out, then we should observe any, or both, of 
the following two outcomes: 1) that for all the years in which decentralization was in 
effect (from 1998 forward), municipal tax revenues were lower than for all the remaining 
years of the period analyzed, even after controlling for the specific effect of each year of 
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the 1990-2001 period; 2) that municipalities that receive larger amounts of the transfer 
funds decentralized in 1998 will present a lower taxing performance, as compared to 
others receiving less federal money, after controlling for differences in socioeconomic 
conditions that are part of the criteria for the distribution of the federal intergovernmental 
aid to states and municipalities. 
The second estimation strategy attempts to assess whether the alleged negative 
consequences of decentralization are particularly worse when the party of incumbent 
authorities faces a credible threat of being thrown out of power.  That is, whether the 
disincentive to enforce taxation is exacerbated under conditions of high electoral 
competition and availability of federal funds.  If this was the case, then we should 
observe any of these two possible outcomes (or both): 1) that the negative effect of the 
“decentralization years” on local revenues is aggravated when incumbent authorities face 
high rates of electoral competition; 2) that municipalities receiving more federal grants 
will decrease their tax performance more when their politicians face high competition. 
The empirical analysis of local tax revenues faces additional complexities than 
does the analysis of local budgets.  One of the most important is, in my view, the lack of 
annual data on the level of economic activity in Mexican municipalities, which is an 
essential variable to control for the revenue-generating capacity of local governments.102  
The closest indicator for such a concept are poverty levels (measured as the proportion of 
workers who earn less than the official minimum wage), but this indicator is only 
available from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses.  Given the panel structure of the 
data (a combination of cross-sectional units and time series), this data limitation 
forecloses adopting a fixed-effect estimation methodology, since the cited indicator is 
mostly invariant across the 12 years covered in the dataset.  Therefore, I decided to adopt 
                                                 
102 Annual GDP at the state level in Mexico started to be reported in 1993, but this information does not 
exist for municipalities. 
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a random-effects approach for the estimation.103  Another difficulty in this analysis is 
that, in order to rigorously test the hypothesis that the enforcement of local taxes declines 
when the availability of federal grants is coupled with electoral competition, we need to 
create an interaction term between the competition indicator (the margin of electoral 
victory) and the amount of federal transfers in the model.  Unfortunately, following this 
procedure introduces a big collinearity problem between the competition variable and its 
interaction.104  In order to sort out this problem, I split the dataset in two parts: one 
sample consists only on municipalities for which the margin of victory in a particular 
election was no more than 0.2 (the highly competitive cases), and the other sample 
includes municipalities that underwent lower levels of competition (margins of victory 
larger than 0.2) at some point in time during the period analyzed.105  Although we cannot 
strictly test whether the regression coefficients are different across the two models, the 
results seem to be at least qualitatively different in each specification (see the discussion 
of results below).  Thus, the specification of the first estimation model is written as 
follows: 
                                                 
103 In order to control for the part of the unobservable effect on the explanatory variables, the model 
includes 30 dummy variables that identify all the states (excluding one) in which municipalities are 
grouped.  As Jeffrey Wooldridge suggests when dealing with time-constant variables in panel data, 
“including dummy variables for groups controls for a certain amount of heterogeneity that might be 
correlated with the (time-constant) elements of xit.  By using random effects, we can efficiently account for 
any remaining serial correlation due to unobserved time-constant factors” (Wooldridge, 2002, 288).  
Another reason for not using a fixed-effect model is that the number of cross-sectional units in the sample 
is close to 2000 observations, while the number of time units is only 12.  The cited author points out that 
this generally wipes-out the significance of important theoretical variables. 
104 For example, the correlation between the margin of victory and its multiplicative interaction with the 
per capita amount of transfers for municipal infrastructure is close to 0.7.  This evidently is problematic for 
hypothesis testing. 
105 This implies that some municipalities might be included in both samples if, for example, they faced low 







Yit represents the local revenues (taxes or fees) per capita raised by municipality i at time 
t in real terms. 
 
DECENTit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the years from 1998 to 2001 (i.e. 
when the decentralization of federal funds started to operate), and zero for the years from 
1990 to 1997. 
 
TRANSFERSit is the per capita amount (in real terms) of federal transfers received by 
municipality i at time t.  In order to analyze the specific effects of the two funds 
decentralized in 1998, I include both the FISM (earmarked for social infrastructure) and 
the FORTAMUN (earmarked for public safety and debt payments).  Note that for all the 
years before 1998, the two variables  take a value of zero, since they were just 
nonexistent. 
 
EMARGINit is the difference in the proportion of votes obtained by the two strongest 
parties in municipality i at time t. 
 
ELECYEARit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i had a local 
election at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 
TURNOUTit is the total number of votes in the local election of municipality i at time t, 
divided by the number of potential voters. 
 
LITERACYit is the proportion of people age 6 to 14 who knows how to read. 
 
JUXTAit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there was a divergence in party 
memberships between the president of municipality i at time t and the state governor, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
POVERTYit is the proportion of workers earning less than the official minimum wage. 
 
υi is a time-invariant, unit-specific component. 
 





































The second estimation model (i.e. the one that “interacts” competition with the 
remaining variables) is exactly the same as the previous one, except for the fact that the 
regression is run on the basis of two different sub-samples, and that the competition 
variable evidently has to be excluded from the right-hand side of the equation.  Results 
are reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
TABLE 4.2. GLS Random-Effects Regressions on Locally-Generated Revenues Per 
Capita, 1990-2001 
 Property tax revenues 
per capita 
















































Number of groups 1954 1954 
Maximum number of observations per 
group 
12 12 
Total N 22785 22785 
Overall R-squared 0.195 0.183 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  11 year dummy variables are included (the omitted time period is 
1990).  30 state dummy variables also included (the omitted state is Aguascalientes)  Coefficients are not 
reported for ease of exposition.  In all cases the disturbance term is assumed to be first-order 
autoregressive. 
***p<.001  **p<.01  *p<.05 
 
 142
TABLE 4.3. GLS Random-Effects Regressions on Locally-Generated Revenues Per 
Capita by Levels of Electoral Competition, 1990-2001 
 Property tax revenues 
per capita 




High levels of 
electoral 
competition 
Low levels of 
electoral 
competition 
High levels of 
electoral 
competition 
Low levels of 
electoral 
competition 
     


















































































Number of groups 1628 1799 1628 1799 
Maximum number of observations 
per group 
12 12 12 12 
Total N 9602 13183 9602 13188 
Overall R-squared 0.196 0.215 0.219 0.207 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  11 year dummy variables are included (the omitted time period is 
1990).  30 state dummy variables also included (the omitted state is Aguascalientes)  Coefficients are not 
reported for ease of exposition.  In all cases the disturbance term is assumed to be first-order 
autoregressive. 




4.3.2. Discussion of results: does decentralization hurt taxation? 
 
Supporting the conventional view, per capita revenues from property taxes 
decreased during the years under which the decentralization of social funds for 
municipalities has been in operation, even after controlling for the specific effects of each 
year of the 1990-2001 period, as Table 4.2 reveals in its first row.  However, the 
reduction has not been extremely large: on average, municipalities reduced their tax 
collection by no more than $8.9 pesos per capita as a result of the decentralization.  On 
the other hand, the proceeds from local fees do not seem to have decreased as a result of 
the decentralization.  Quite the contrary, they increased by $6 pesos on average.  In short, 
only in the case of property tax revenues do we find a statistically significant (although 
not substantial) negative effect of the decentralization policy.  However, we should also 
investigate whether the “intensity” of the decentralization across municipalities might 
have had a detrimental effect on revenues: that is, whether municipalities receiving more 
federal funds per capita are the ones who collect less tax revenues. This can be observed 
by analyzing the regression coefficients of the FISM and FORTAMUN variables in Table 
4.2.  Once more, in support of the conventional wisdom, we find that the FISM has 
decreased the collection of both property taxes and user fees, but the FORTAMUN has 
not had any meaningful consequence.  Nevertheless, the negative effect of the FISM on 
tax revenues is still not very large: for every additional peso that municipalities receive 
from the social infrastructure fund, they decrease their collection of property taxes in only 
one cent (and in two cents in the case of user fees).  Therefore, the evidence does not 
confirm that the consequences of the decentralization of social funds had been as severe 
as it has been claimed. 
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On the other hand, electoral competition seems to have encouraged, rather than 
discouraged, the collection of property taxes and user fees, although the magnitude of the 
effect is not substantially large: the difference in revenues between the two extreme cases 
of competition (i.e., between municipalities where the margin of victory is close to zero 
and those where the margin is equal to one) is over 6 pesos per capita in the case of 
property taxes, and almost 5 pesos per capita in the case of user fees, as it can be 
observed in the fifth row of Table 4.2. 
Something similar occurs in the case of juxtaposed municipal governments, since 
they seem to improve the collection of revenues from both sources, although, once more, 
the effect is not very large. These findings agree, to a certain extent, with the earlier 
assertion that differences in party memberships between local mayors and state governors 
provide incentives to the former to expand their fiscal autonomy.  This result also 
supports the hypothesis defended by some authors (Beer, 2004) that increasing levels of 
competition at the subnational levels encourage locally elected leaders to seek fiscal 
autonomy from the central government.  The underlying logic of this proposition is that 
“politicians selected in competitive elections face incentives to extend their influence 
over greater policy domains in order to meet the demands of their constituents” (Beer, 
2004, 181).  Thus, higher levels of local revenue indicate that municipal governments 
enjoy greater fiscal autonomy, and this autonomy seems to result from the fact that 
electoral competition is more intense and that local politicians from opposition parties are 
more responsive to their electoral constituencies than to state authorities.  
A variable that clearly is detrimental for the collection of local taxes is the turnout 
rate, which once more contradicts the claim that more participative municipalities 
facilitate tax enforcement.  I strongly believe that this result reflects the fact that, in a 
context of high electoral mobilization (most likely induced by political parties), the 
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enforcement of unpopular policies (such as broadening the financial capacity of local 
governments) is problematical, since voters might press their formal authorities, even 
through informal means like protesting and other types of political mobilization, to break 
the formal rules required for an effective governance.  The paradox here is that 
municipalities would be better-off by complying with their tax obligations, since this 
would allow every citizen to improve the provision of collective goods.  However, 
modernizing the local tax system is a public good itself, since every citizen, on an 
individual level, is unwilling to contribute to improve the local public finances since 
everyone expects other taxpayers to bear the burden (the “free-rider” problem). 
One surprising finding is that the collection of taxes does not fall in electoral 
years for any of the two sources of revenue, which somewhat contradicts political 
business cycle arguments.  Yet, there is no evidence that the opposite occurs (i.e. that 
taxation increases during elections).  Therefore, it seems that the influence of the 
electoral calendar on local public finances operates only through expenditures, but not 
through taxation: elections stimulate public works spending, reduce administrative 
expenses, and have not effect on taxation.  However, transfers received by municipalities 
from the federal and the state governments could possibly be increased in electoral years, 
depending on a number of factors, such as the party membership of local mayors, state 
governors, and state legislatures. 
Consistent with the results obtained in the analysis of public service provision, 
literacy rates have a considerable positive effect on local revenues: for every one 
percentage point increase in the rate of literacy in a municipality, property tax revenues 
increase by $78.5 pesos per capita, on average, and user fees by $35 pesos.  We cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that literacy rates might be indirectly capturing the 
effect of other variables measuring local economic conditions.  Nevertheless, the model 
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already controls for poverty levels and yet the effects of literacy remain.  This is another 
indication of the importance of an educated citizenry on the performance of local 
governments in the country.  On the other hand, as it was expected, increases in the rates 
of poverty predict a reduction of property tax revenues in the order of $47 pesos per 
capita, and around $33 pesos in the case of user fees. 
The next question is whether the adverse effects of decentralization on local 
revenues are aggravated under a context of high electoral competition, given that 
incumbent authorities might be unwilling to undergo the potential political costs that 
taxation entails.  The results reported in Table 4.3 seem to support this proposition, 
although not with great force.  If we compare the magnitude of the effects of our 
variables of interest on local revenues between the two groups of municipalities (i.e. 
those with high and low levels of competition), we can clearly observe that the highly 
competitive cases (those whose margin of electoral victory is less than 0.2) perform 
worse.  First, for the group with high electoral competition, Table 4.3 shows in its first 
row that property tax revenues decreased by $20 pesos per capita during the years of the 
decentralization, whereas for the low competition group the reduction was of only $12 
pesos.  On the other hand, revenues from user fees do not seem to have decreased during 
decentralization for any of the two groups.  The effect of FISM resources on property tax 
revenues (second row of Table 4.3) is negative only for the highly competitive cases 
(three cents per peso received from FISM funds), while the second group was virtually 
unaffected by that federal fund.  Likewise, the negative effect of the FISM on the 
revenues from user fees has been more intense within the highly competitive group (more 
than three cents) than for the low competition group (less than two cents).  The other 
fund, the FORTAMUN (third row of Table 4.3), has not reduced tax revenues nor user 
fees revenues under any type of electoral context.   
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Political juxtaposition turns out being favorable for tax collection under nearly 
any electoral environment (except for property taxes in the low competitive cases, where 
its effect is not significant), which again corroborates the argument that “opposition” 
mayors seek policy autonomy from higher levels of government. 
An interesting result is that of electoral years.  Even though election years were 
found not to reduce local revenues within the whole sample of municipalities, when the 
sample is broken up in terms of electoral competition a differential effect comes into 
view: only for the highly competitive municipalities electoral years reduce local 
revenues, although the effect is only statistically significant in the case of user fees.  
Finally, the negative effect of the voter turnout rate is magnified when municipalities 
undergo high levels of competition. The differential effect of the turnout rate is 
substantial, in fact a more important one than the influence of the other variables that are 
claimed to reduce the tax performance of Mexican municipalities. 
In summary, although the empirical evidence supports the assertion that local 
governments in Mexico have reduced their tax effort as a result of the combined 
influence of competition and the current decentralization policy, the magnitude of the 
effects is not particularly large.  In contrast, the consequences of a highly mobilized 
electorate seem to be more harmful for the enforcement of local taxes, especially when 
party mobilization operates under a highly competitive environment.  
 
 
4.4. DECENTRALIZATION, COMPETITION, AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE: FINAL 
REMARKS 
 
This chapter has shown that the changing political landscape of Mexican local 
governments affects the allocation of local budgets and their taxing performance, but that 
their effects can best be evaluated in light of the policy setting under which municipalities 
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operate.  The proposition that a more competitive, politically diverse, and participatory 
electoral environment improves the fiscal performance of local governments clearly 
depends on several factors not fully explored by previous research.  Before the federal 
government decentralized the provision of local infrastructure in 1998, electoral 
competition and party alternation had only a stimulating effect over the levels of 
administrative expenditures, but not on infrastructure investments, an outcome that 
evidently disagrees with the mainstream expectation that electoral democracy serves as 
an effective mechanism to promote the accountability of incumbent politicians.  
However, once the decentralization policy was in effect, the consequences of competition 
and alternation were reversed, inducing local authorities to support the social 
infrastructure sector.  This is, in my view, a strong indication that only under a more 
decentralized policy setting will the openness and competitiveness of the electoral arena 
have a positive influence on the provision of locally provided public goods.  The main 
implication of this is that local democracy per se is not a sufficient condition to motivate 
local policymakers to invest on basic infrastructure projects: local governments require 
decision-making autonomy over resources to better take advantage of the opportunities 
that a more competitive environment presents.  This proposition does not necessarily 
imply that local governments should be completely autonomous in their use of 
intergovernmental resources.  As the analysis revealed, local authorities have a strong 
propensity to increase their administrative expenses when they get additional 
unconstrained resources, and it is unclear whether increasing current expenditures is the 
optimal strategy to improve their performance.  Thus, some form of earmarking by higher 
governmental levels is still needed to stimulate the development of local infrastructure, 
especially if we take into account the significant deficiencies in basic service coverage 
that exist across the country.  The earmarking of intergovernmental funds should not be 
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too rigid, as it was before the 1998 reform to the fiscal federalist system in Mexico, when 
many spending choices were carried out by federal agencies without the participation of 
local governments.  For policy decentralization to succeed, some broad guidelines might 
be required to compel local authorities to allocate resources on basic infrastructure 
projects, and to involve citizens in defining spending priorities. 
Another main conclusion from this analysis is that the nature of infrastructure 
spending in Mexico is highly political: it not only increases significantly during electoral 
years, but it is a useful means by which local authorities try to make themselves visible to 
the population, particularly when state governors have divergent party affiliations.  The 
political character of infrastructure spending should not be necessarily regarded as a 
negative attribute since it might provide local politicians with a special incentive to invest 
on projects that are socially beneficial.  However, it is also possible that, in order to 
obtain immediate political recognition, local politicians might choose projects that 
provide only short-term benefits to the population, thus preventing the development of 
infrastructure investments that require a longer period of maturation.  Unfortunately, the 
available data do not allow us to evaluate with more precision the quality of infrastructure 
projects chosen by local governments. 
Another important implication concerns local tax performance.  The evidence 
presented in this chapter tends to support the hypothesis that the decentralization of 
federal funds to municipalities has damaged their tax enforcement, and that such a 
negative effect is worsened when incumbent authorities face a real threat of being 
removed from office. Although the magnitude of the effect of decentralization on tax 
performance was not found to be very large, we should probably take it as an indication 
that there are still problems in policy design.  An intense debate is taking place in 
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Mexico, calling for a redesign of fiscal federalism.106  One stance within that debate is 
that the federal government should increase the share of funds transferred to states and 
municipalities.  However, in view of the empirical evidence discussed in this chapter, it is 
clear that any further devolution of resources should be tied to a clear definition of 
responsibilities, in such a way that sub-national and local governments can still be held 
accountable for their fiscal performance. In particular, the design of earmarked transfers 
should prevent municipalities to substitute locally generated revenue with funds from 
other levels of government. 
Also on the tax performance issue, the strong negative effect of voter turnout on 
local revenues is a strong indication, in my view, that the enforcement of local taxes 
suffers when the local environment is highly mobilized by political parties.  This 
constitutes another piece of evidence about the poor level of institutionalization of 
Mexican municipalities, where the strict implementation of public policies still depends 
on the capacity of parties to mobilize people against it.   
There are a number of issues that remain unanswered and require further research.  
One of the most imperative is a more detailed analysis of how local governments make 
their spending choices at the very micro level.  Although federal policy requires 
municipalities to incorporate citizen participation in the formulation of spending 
priorities, it could be the case that local authorities comply with  this obligation only “on 
the surface” while actually practicing traditional clientelism (for example by allocating 
resources only to localities where their parties enjoy substantial political support).  If this 
were the case, the goals of the decentralization policy might be distorted, since a 
budgetary process guided exclusively by party considerations could have very negative 
                                                 
106 The First National Tax Convention (Primera Convención Fiscal Hacendaria) was initiated in 2004 to 
discuss policy alternatives to reform the current fiscal system in Mexico. The concluding chapter addresses 
some of their principal proposals. 
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consequences on the reduction of poverty levels.  The next chapter will explore this issue, 
focusing on a set of municipalities in one of the most important states in the country, the 
Estado de México. 
 152
Chapter 5 
Decentralization and Municipal Performance in a Mexican State: the 
Case of Estado de México. 
 
The recent process of social fund decentralization to municipalities in Mexico has 
raised considerable concerns on the ability of local governments to generate socially 
desirable outcomes, mainly their willingness and capacity to prioritize resources to the 
poorest areas.  Informational asymmetries characterizing the relationship between 
different levels of government, problems in the design of accountability mechanisms, and 
the proclivity of local political leaders to centralize policy decision-making and use 
partisan considerations in the allocation of resources, are all factors that might create the 
conditions for a poor decentralization performance. 
In this chapter I use the Estado de México as a case study to illustrate how the 
decentralization of funds for basic infrastructure operates at the local levels of 
government, under a context of increasing electoral competition and governmental 
juxtaposition.  The Estado de México provides interesting municipal case studies that can 
help us fleshing out some of the findings obtained through statistical analyses and 
unraveling some of the mechanisms that characterize the local policymaking process in 
the area of social infrastructure investments.  The research approach adopted in this 
chapter is of a more qualitative nature, since the aim is to generate insights about the 
perception of key participants in the local policymaking process regarding the 
decentralization of social funds at the local levels, and contrast those insights with some 
of the major findings obtained in previous chapters.  Still, an additional statistical test is 
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performed in the final section in order to corroborate some of the propositions derived 
from the qualitative analyses. 
The Estado de México was chosen as a case study for the following reasons.  
First, municipal elections in the state have become extremely competitive, particularly 
since 1995, giving rise to numerous cases of party alternation and political juxtaposition.  
Second, despite this general increase in competition, there are municipalities where the 
PRI still enjoys reasonable margins of victory and which have never experienced the 
arrival of opposition parties to power, which allows contrasting cases in terms of their 
levels of electoral competitiveness.  Third, the state has several municipalities that, given 
their relatively high levels of socioeconomic deprivation, have been entitled to receive a 
substantial share of federal funds to develop basic infrastructure projects since 1998, 
which has considerably increased the policy role that municipal authorities play in the 
allocation of local budgets. 
The qualitative evidence was collected using semi-structured interviews and a 
focus group exercise.  The interviews were conducted with state and municipal officials 
in the executive branch, particularly those who are regularly involved in making 
budgetary decisions.  In the Estado de México government I interviewed two 
undersecretaries (subsecretarios), two general directors, and one unit officer, all 
belonging to the state Planning and Finance Ministry (Secretaría de Planeación y 
Finanzas).  Four municipalities in the Estado de México were used for the study, which 
include Toluca (the capital of the state), Jilotepec, Soyaniquilpan, and Villa del Carbón.  
A total of 17 municipal level officials of the executive branch, including three municipal 
presidents, were interviewed. Only in Jilotepec it was possible to interview some local 
council representatives (regidores) from different parties, which was useful to contrast 
the view of the municipal president.  A focus group exercise with community leaders was 
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also conducted there with the aim of getting their perceptions regarding the agenda-
setting process.  Some interviews were also conducted in the municipality of Zapopan, 
state of Jalisco, in order to have at least one case from a different state for comparison.  
All interviews were carried out between June 1st and August 20th of 2004. 
With the aim of testing some of the propositions derived from the qualitative 
analyses, a new dataset was assembled based on locality-level data from a small sample 
of municipalities.  The data were obtained from different governmental and non-
governmental sources in the Estado de México, regarding municipal spending in 
localities, electoral results, and sociodemographic indicators.107  
For this case study, I concentrate on the following issues.  The first matter regards 
the constraints, formal and informal, that municipal governments face in their 
management of federal funds earmarked for basic infrastructure projects, especially 
taking into account that state governments have acquired considerable authority over the 
regulation and supervision of federal funds since 1998.  I investigate the principal 
interactions taking place between the state and the municipal levels regarding the 
allocation of intergovernmental funds, in order to find out whether the political and 
bureaucratic actors involved in the policymaking process perceive that issue as a potential 
source of conflict.  The second issue relates to the process through which the local public 
works agenda is defined and put into practice.  I explore to what extent municipal 
governments involve the participation of communities in the formulation of their 
budgetary priorities, and whether local mayors tend to centralize decisions.  The third 
issue has to do with the way federal funds are distributed by municipal governments 
within its territory.  I investigate whether the allocation of funds is responsive to the 
                                                 
107 The final section provides more details on the dataset and the information sources. 
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compensatory goals of the decentralization policy, and whether party considerations 
might be playing a significant role on the distribution of local budgets. 
 
5.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STATE 
 
The Estado de México (also know in English as State of Mexico) is located in the 
center of the country, bounded by the states of Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Morelos, 
Guerrero, Michoacán, and the Federal District. The state is the most populated in the 
country (13,096,686 inhabitants in 2000, according to the last census), comprising more 
than 13 percent of Mexico’s total population.  The Estado de México is also the richest 
after the Federal District, contributing more than 10 percent to the national GDP, 
according to state economic indicators from INEGI.  These characteristics imply that the 
Estado de México has a tremendous political importance, particularly for national 
elections.  In 2002, the state had 124 municipalities, eight of which concentrate fifty 
percent of its total population.  Another important fact is that 28 municipalities of the 
state border on the metropolitan area of the Federal District. 
In the last ten years, the Estado de México has undergone remarkable changes in 
its electoral environment, since political competition has increased significantly, 
particularly at the municipal level.  Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of electoral 
competition in the state throughout the last five municipal elections.  The average margin 
of victory has been shrinking progressively since 1990, but its reduction was especially 
drastic in the 1996 election.  As Table 5.1 illustrates, while at the start of the last decade 
the PRI controlled practically all municipalities in the state, now it governs only 68 out of 
the 124 existing within its territory.  Since the PAN and the PRD have acquired a very 
strong presence in metropolitan municipalities bordering the Federal District, such as 
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Naucalpan, Tlanepantla and Nezahualcoyotl, these parties are currently governing the 
majority of people within the state.108  Despite this widespread increase in political 
competition, the PRI still controls the state government, which evidently has given rise to 
numerous cases of governmental juxtaposition. 
 
 













Source: Author’s elaboration based on the database on municipal elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org) and from the 
Instituto Electoral del Estado de México, IEEM (www.ieem.org.mx) 
 
                                                 
108 The fact that the proportion of people residing in municipalities governed by the PRI increased in 2003, 
as Table 5.1 shows, was only due to the fact that the PRI recovered Ecatepec, where more than 1.6 million 





























TABLE 5.1.  Distribution of Municipal Presidencies across Parties in the Estado de 
México, 1990-2003 
Municipal term PRI PAN PRD Others Share of the state population 
governed by a PRI mayor 
1990-1993 117 2 2 0 99 
1993-1996 109 6 3 3 97 
1996-2000 71 23 26 2 48 
2000-2003 67 30 23 2 27 
2003-2006 68 24 23 9 40 
 
Note: Throughout the 1990-2003 period the following three municipalities were created in the Estado de México:  Valle de Chalco 
Solidaridad (1994), San José del Rincón (2002) and Luvianos (2002). 
 
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on the database on local elections compiled by CIDAC (www.cidac.org.mx), for all the years 




5.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
The decentralization of federal funds for social infrastructure in Mexico since 
1998 has transferred considerable regulatory authority to state governments.  The 
Mexican fiscal coordination law has granted them the responsibility to establish 
normative procedures to guide the process by which municipal governments gain access 
to earmarked funds for basic infrastructure.  In addition, state governments define the 
minimum standards that municipal authorities should meet in order to formulate their 
policy priorities, taking into account the preferences of local constituents.  State 
governments and legislatures have acquired –at least officially- significant oversight 
authority over the use of financial resources by municipal governments.  Evidently, the 
actual way in which policy decentralization works at the state and municipal levels does 
not necessarily follow the formal route, since there are always information asymmetries 
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between governmental levels, the key players face dissimilar incentives, and the political 
imperatives that each actor faces can vary to a great extent.   
The basic legal document that regulates the operation of the federal funds for 
basic infrastructure across the country is the Fiscal Coordination Law.  This law was first 
established in 1978 to organize the fiscal intergovernmental relations in Mexico, in which 
most taxing instruments were centralized by the federal government, and the state and 
municipal levels started to receive revenue-sharing grants in exchange for giving up their 
authority over taxation.  The law has undergone different changes since its creation, but 
one of the latest reforms was launched in 1997 during the Zedillo presidency.   The 
reform created a new federal budgetary item called the Ramo 33 (Item 33), which 
comprised several funds, earmarked for different policy sectors, that the federal 
government started to transfer to state and municipal governments.  State governments 
were entitled to receive funds for the provision of primary education, technical education, 
health services, public safety, and social infrastructure.  However, states were assigned 
only with the proceeds of 12 percent of this latter fund: the remaining 88 percent (which 
is called Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal (Municipal 
Social Infrastructure Fund or FISM) was completely assigned to municipalities, via the 
states.  In other words, the federal government distributes social infrastructure funds to 
state governments, but they have to transfer 88 percent of those resources to their 
municipalities.109  The distribution of infrastructure funds to the states is carried out 
through a formula that explicitly takes into account the relative poverty levels of each 
state.  Likewise, states are required, for the distribution of funds to the municipalities, to 
use either the same formula utilized by the federal government, or an alternative method 
based on less information requirements.  In any of the two cases, the formulae are 
                                                 
109 The remaining 12 percent of the fund must be spent on state projects that have regional or inter-
municipal impacts. 
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explicitly stated in the fiscal coordination law, in order to reduce the discretionary power 
of state governments to use political considerations in the distribution of funds.  
Municipalities can use the resources of the FISM only into the following spending 
categories: potable water, drainage and sewerage systems, municipal urbanization, rural 
electrification, basic infrastructure for health and education, improvements for housing 
services, roads and infrastructure for productive projects in rural areas.  Local 
communities can supplement FISM resources with their own contributions, which are 
typically made  through the labor force of beneficiaries, but the people can also 
contribute with their own funds.  Municipalities can use up to two percent of their 
available FISM funds to finance institutional development activities, such as training 
courses, consulting services, acquisition of computing equipment, etc. 
Besides the FISM, municipalities (and the administrative regions of the Federal 
District) started to receive another fund for municipal strengthening called Fondo de 
Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios y de las Demarcaciones 
Territoriales del Distrito Federal or FORTAMUN.  The only criterion for the 
distribution of this fund is the population size of municipalities.  Its earmarking is less 
restrictive than in the case of the FISM, since FORTAMUN resources can be used to 
cover the financial liabilities of municipal governments and public safety tasks (including 
the police payroll).  FISM funds are very important sources of revenue for poor 
municipalities (due to its distributive criteria), whereas FORTAMUN funds are more 
relevant for cities whose poverty levels are not very high.  According the Cuenta Pública 
Federal (Federal Public Accounting Report), in 2003 the FISM accounted for nine 
percent of the total amount of resources decentralized by the federal government to states 
and municipalities (the transfers that states receive to finance their public systems of 
education and health account for the other 77 percent). 
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The federal law requires municipal governments to promote the participation of 
communities in the formulation, implementation, and supervision of the projects carried 
out with FISM resources, which somehow resembles the approach adopted by 
PRONASOL (the principal poverty alleviation program launched during the Salinas 
administration, 1988-1994) for the allocation of resources.  But it should be noted that, 
contrary to the previous decentralization policies, the regulation of the FISM is not 
anymore under the control of federal agencies, since now state governments are 
responsible to supervise its operation.  Actually, the federal government lost substantial 
influence over the operation of these resources, since municipal governments are mainly 
accountable to state legislatures, and the law is vague regarding the federal control and 
supervision mechanisms. 
The specific methods for the operation of FISM and FORTAMUN at the local 
levels are no longer formulated by the federal government.  In its place, state 
governments have acquired this important role.  In the case of the Estado de México, the 
basic regulatory instrument for the functioning of the two funds are the state operational 
guidelines (Manual de operación), compulsory for all municipalities of that state.  For the 
2003-2006 period, these guidelines were designed by officials at the planning and finance 
department of the Estado de México, with the participation of all municipal treasurers.   
The process for the operation of FISM and FORTAMUN resources can be summarized 
as follows.  In January of every year, the state government has to publish the distribution 
of the two funds among its 125 municipalities.  For their distribution, the state applies the 
federal formula, giving more FISM funds to municipalities where poverty levels are more 
intense.110  Once municipal authorities know the maximum amount of available resources 
                                                 
110 At an interview for this study, a state official at the planning and finance department declared that in 
order to assure an accurate application of the federal formula, they have constant interaction with federal 
officials.  That is, despite the fact that federal authorities have lost decision-making power in the operation 
of the FISM, they nevertheless continue giving advice to state bureaucracies. 
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from the two funds, they have to initiate a participatory process to define the principal 
priorities in the municipality regarding social infrastructure projects.111  The process of 
priority definition must involve the participation of community representatives, who are 
designated by each locality via an open election.  It should be noted that municipalities 
have two options to organize the participation of the community in the formulation of 
policy priorities: one is the CODEMUN (Municipal Development Council), a 
deliberative and decision-making commission integrated by all community 
representatives, the municipal president, and all the members of the cabildo.  Under the 
CODEMUN, the vote of every member has the same weight, except for the municipal 
president, whose vote can be used in cases of deadlock. The second option is called 
COPACI (Citizen Participation Council), a committee involving only community 
representatives, but without the participation of municipal authorities.  In any case, every 
community elaborates a list of infrastructure priorities, and that list is submitted either to 
the CODEMUN or the COPACI, which elaborates the ultimate proposal.  Once the 
proposal is voted, it is then submitted to the finance and planning department of the state 
government, which should verify that each of the projects contained in the proposal are 
consistent with legal standards.  In other words, this is the stage in which state authorities 
enforce the earmarking of FISM resources.  As soon as the proposals are approved by the 
state government, municipalities can initiate the implementation of the projects, but new 
community organizations should be created in every locality in order to oversee the 
completion of the works and the correct application of funds. 
The scrutiny of FISM and FORTAMUN resources is performed by several 
institutions.  The first are the oversight committees already mentioned, but they do not 
have any sanctioning authority, since they have to report any misuse of funds to the 
                                                 
111 It should be noted that FORTAMUN resources are not subject to such a participatory method, since 
they only require the approval of the local council or cabildo. 
 162
internal controlling area of the municipal government.  State governments have also their 
own controlling departments, and these are as well authorized to inspect the use of 
federal funds by municipalities.  But the most important supervisory institution is the 
legislature of the Estado de México, whose general accounting office (the Contaduría 
General de Glosa), is in charge of reviewing every year the finances of municipal 
governments.  The Social Development Ministry of the federal government (SEDESOL) 
can also exert a supervisory role over FISM funds, but the law is very unclear about the 
precise mechanisms it can use for that end.  Actually, an official at that federal ministry 
declared in an interview that they have never audited any state or municipality since 
1998.  As it will be pointed out in the next sections, the supervision of federal funds is 
one of the weakest elements in the decentralization of social infrastructure, not only 
because the multiplicity of institutions taking part in the overseeing process makes it an 
extremely confusing task, but also because it does not promote the transparency in the 
use of funds by municipal governments. 
 
5.3. THE PERSPECTIVE OF STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
Given the important role that state governments have acquired for the regulation 
and supervision of FISM and FORTAMUN resources, I conducted personal interviews 
with five state officials at the planning and finance ministry, in order to get their 
perceptions about the performance of municipal governments in the operation of federal 
funds.  These interviews helped me not only to increase my understanding on the formal 
process of budgetary allocations in municipalities of the Estado de México, but also to 
identify the informal mechanisms that emerge in the relationship between state and 
municipal authorities.  My questions focused on three main issues.  First, what results 
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they perceive the decentralization of federal resources has had on the fiscal performance 
of municipal governments.  Specifically, if the devolution of spending authority to 
municipalities has created wrong incentives for their fiscal and budgetary behavior.  
Second, to what extent state officials perceive that the process of agenda-setting in the 
area of social infrastructure actually incorporates the participation of citizens, and 
whether municipal authorities tend to centralize decisions and use party considerations in 
their use of federal funds.  Third, what has the Estado de México government done to 
foster the accountability and quality of municipal spending and taxing choices.  It is 
important to stress that the evidence collected through this first round of interviews 
constitute the viewpoint of appointed, rather than elected, state officials, who do not have 
to face any type of political competition, and are not directly accountable to electoral 
constituencies (as municipal presidents and local representatives are).  Therefore, we 
should always take into consideration the potential biases that these appointed officials 
might have regarding the performance of municipal governments. 
There is a broad consensus among the government officials of the Estado de 
México that the decentralization of federal funds to municipalities has created wrong 
incentives for their fiscal performance.  The first problem that all of them mentioned 
during the interview is that the availability of federal funds has reduced the taxing effort 
of municipal governments, an outcome that the regression results presented in Chapter 4 
corroborate to a certain extent.  They claim that the disincentive is even worse in the case 
of FORTAMUN, since these resources can be entirely used by municipalities to cover 
their financial liabilities and operating expenses.  Even though the fund does not allow 
them to cover all administrative expenditures, municipalities have found ways to skip 
over the FORTAMUN labeling, mainly by categorizing current expenses as debt in order 
to have access to the fund.  However, their perception that the federal funds have had 
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very negative consequences on the fiscal accountability of local governments should take 
into account the evidence presented in Chapter 4, where it was shown that the adverse 
effects of the FISM over local revenues are not as high as these officials imply, while the 
effects of the FORTAMUN are simply inconsequential.112 
In order to discourage municipalities from reducing their taxing effort, in 2003 the 
government of the Estado de México introduced a new program called Convenio de 
Coordinación Hacendaria (Tax Coordination Agreement), which establishes a set of 
performance goals that municipalities have to accomplish in order to receive funding 
from the state government.  The program developed several performance indicators that 
reflect the extent to which municipalities increase their collection of own-source revenues 
every year, and their degree of compliance with the modernization of their tax 
administration systems.  In exchange, they are entitled to receive financial support from 
the state government, but the program does not make clear the precise amount of funding 
available.  In fact, the reward is a discretionary choice of the different spending agencies 
of the Estado de México government, who will decide where to spend their available 
resources depending on their own policy priorities.  That is, the incentive that the 
program gives to municipalities is not based on their own preferences, but on the 
investment areas favored by state bureaucracies and politicians.  Given its high 
                                                 
112 It should be noted that FISM and FORTAMUN resources are not the only transfers that municipalities 
receive from the federal government.  Their principal source of funding are revenue-sharing transfers 
(participaciones), but these funds do not seem to dampen down the local fiscal effort, as Chapter 4 showed.  
According to a very high official at the finance and planning department, this outcome can be explained by 
the fact that participaciones are disbursed to municipal governments on a monthly basis, and the amount 
they receive every month depends on the economic situation of the country at that particular moment.  In 
other words, the fluctuation that the Mexican economy undergoes throughout the fiscal year introduces 
great uncertainty about the precise amount of revenue-sharing transfers that municipalities will receive each 
month.  Given this uncertainty, municipalities cannot completely anticipate their availability of federal 
revenue-sharing grants.  Conversely, FISM and FORTAMUN resources are known in advance by 
municipal governments.  An additional element that explains why federal participaciones do not 
discourage the local taxing effort is that 40 percent of their distribution depends on the amount of local 
taxes collected by municipalities, thus they would be penalized if they reduced their fiscal effort. 
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significance for the intergovernmental relations between municipalities and the state 
government, I will return to this issue in a later section describing the perspective of 
municipal authorities. 
The criticisms of state officials to the performance of municipal governments are 
not restricted to the revenue side, but also to the expenditure decisions of municipalities.  
In their view, municipal presidents make a political use of federal resources, have too 
much influence on the definition of local priorities for basic infrastructure investments, 
commonly hinder the process of community participation in their municipalities, and 
many local authorities lack the necessary expertise to manage the allocation of federal 
funds.  For example, they mentioned that municipal presidents get involved in the 
selection of community representatives, trying to appoint their own political loyalists, 
although in theory only the residents of localities have the right to take part in that 
process.  State officials indicated also that municipal presidents usually try to push their 
favorite projects, even though these might not satisfy the desires of the communities.  
Another fact exemplifying the capacity of municipal authorities to control the budgetary 
process in the area of social infrastructure is the information advantage they have over the 
total amount of available resources.  Before the process of priority definition starts, 
municipal presidents already know the total amounts of FISM and FORTAMUN 
resources they will have for the upcoming fiscal year, but they do not disclose that 
information to the community representatives.  This evidently gives municipal authorities 
more negotiation power vis-à-vis the localities, since presidents can claim that a 
particular project favored by one community is financially unfeasible.  Another example 
that illustrates the alleged political interference of municipal presidents is that the 
majority of municipalities in the Estado de México have chosen to organize the process 
of priority formulation with the use of the CODEMUN institution, rather than the 
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COPACI.  Recall that the former is a committee where both community representatives 
and municipal authorities participate, while the COPACI involves only community 
organizations.  According to one of my informants, the reason for this choice is that, 
under the CODEMUN, municipal presidents assure a centralized control over the use of 
federal resources.  However, I believe that there might be other reasons explaining that 
choice, particularly the reduction of coordination costs that the use of the CODEMUN 
institution entails.  Under the COPACI, the state government must evaluate as many 
investment proposals as communities exist in a municipality, since there is not a central 
agency coordinating the whole process of priority definition within the municipality.  
Under the CODEMUN, the municipal governments act as central coordinators of the 
process, submitting a unified plan to the state government for its evaluation.  Evidently, 
the CODEMUN institution gives municipal authorities the opportunity to centralize 
decisions and possibly to interfere the participatory process.  However, it does not 
necessarily imply a political manipulation by municipal presidents, since the relative 
strength of community organizations also matter for the agenda-setting.  A final remark 
of state authorities is the lack of technical expertise among municipal officials to 
administer federal funds, particularly in the case of rural municipalities, which typically 
fail to comply with the technical standards established by the state government, and these 
failures are to a great extent explained by the poor training of local administrators.  The 
weak professional capacity that characterizes the staff of rural municipalities reinforces 
their propensity to allocate resources according to political (and even personal) 
considerations. 
In summary, the general perception of state officials is that the goals of the federal 
funds get distorted when they arrive at the municipal level, since the political 
manipulation carried out by local authorities and their lack of technical capacity 
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undermine the objective to allocate resources according to the levels of social need across 
communities.  However, as I have pointed out, we should bear in mind that these 
informants are unelected authorities, which might have biased viewpoints regarding the 
performance of municipal governments. 
Some state officials showed skepticism about the capacity of town councils or 
cabildos to act as effective overseers of the decisions of municipal presidents, since the 
latter has a strong control over the former.  There are good reasons justifying their 
standpoint on this issue, since the electoral institutions of the Estado de México give a 
disproportionate share of seats in the cabildo to the party that wins a local election.  That 
is, the distribution of positions in the cabildo does not reflect accurately the relative 
strength of parties in an electoral contest.  Just to give an extreme example, in the case of 
Soyaniquilpan, the PAN won the 2003 election with 33 percent of the vote (the PRI 
obtained 32 percent), and it obtained 80 percent of the seats in the local council, which 
includes the municipal president, one síndico and six out of the eight regidores.   
Therefore, the control of municipal presidents over town councils is invariably assured by 
the current electoral legislation, and by the fact that council representatives from the 
president’s party are very unlikely to vote against the presidential initiatives. 
Many of the respondents pointed out that the problems that have taken place in 
the operation of FISM and FORTAMUN resources have their roots in how they were 
originally designed in the federal legislation.  In other words, that the national fiscal 
coordination law did not contemplate the adverse effects that the new transfer system 
would have on the performance of local governments. A state official asserted that the 
earmarking of FORTAMUN resources by the federal law is too lax, since it allows 
municipalities to categorize many of their current expenditures as debt in order to cover 
them with the use of that fund.  He claimed that the logic of the two funds runs in 
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opposite directions: the goal of FISM resources to promote the development of social 
infrastructure in the most deprived municipalities has been neutralized by the propensity 
of FORTAMUN resources to increase administrative expenditures and discourage the 
local taxing effort.  The state government has tried to mitigate these problems by 
establishing more restrictions on the use of federal funds, but it has faced strong 
opposition from municipal treasurers.  For example, the Estado de México government 
attempted to prevent municipalities from financing their financial liabilities with the use 
of FORTAMUN, but it failed due to the pressure from municipal authorities, who 
declared that the state government was violating the principle of “municipal autonomy”, 
and threatened state authorities with the possibility of taking legal action against that 
infringement.  State officials recognize that the federal legislation is favorable to 
municipal governments, thus they would have good chances to win a court case relating 
to the operation of federal funds.  An additional problem that state officials pointed out is 
that there are frequent delays in the disbursement of federal funds to municipalities.  The 
reason for those delays, in their view, is that the fiscal coordination law requires state 
governments to publish their distribution of resources to their municipalities no later than 
January 31st of each year, but it is exactly on that date when the federal government 
publishes its own distribution of funds to states.  This problem was confirmed during my 
interviews with municipal authorities, as I will show in the next section. 
Another issue I discussed during my interviews with state officials is related to 
the evaluation and oversight of federal resources.  Once more, my informants declared 
that this is another problematic element in the decentralization of funds, since the federal 
legislation is not strict enough in requiring municipal governments to release information 
about their use of funds.  As stated by the fiscal coordination law, states and 
municipalities are supposed to inform the federal government (specifically to the 
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Ministry of Social Development) about the application of funds on a regular basis.  
However, this requirement is seldom fulfilled. In an interview for this study, an official at 
the cited ministry told me that states commonly fail to report that information, since they 
do not face any legal sanction for contravening that obligation.  The other institutions 
with authority to evaluate and oversee the use of funds by municipalities are the 
executive branch of state governments, and the state legislatures. However, at least in the 
case of the Estado de México, the legislature does not reveal that information to the 
public, thus I was not able to obtain the data from that institution.  The Finance and 
Planning Department, on the other hand, receives monthly information of FISM and 
FORTAMUN resources from municipalities, since they have to approve all the proposals 
for local infrastructure projects.  They do not disclose it to the public either, but I was 
able to get some figures from one top-level official at that department.  In summary, there 
are patent problems of transparency in the use of federal funds by municipal 
governments, and these are due mainly to the vagueness of the law on that matter.  Large 
urban cities of the Estado de México are more likely to display information to the public 
(typically through their internet sites), but the remaining municipalities (which are 
commonly rural) do not provide it. 
State officials affirm that differences in party membership between some 
municipal governments and the state governor is not an issue in the relationship between 
the two levels.  This assertion was, however, challenged during my interviews with 
municipal authorities, as I will show in the next section.  Some of my informants asserted 
that the alternation of parties at the municipal level has generated that incumbent local 
authorities blame the previous administrations for their mistakes. 
In sum, I perceived in almost all my interviews with state authorities an 
unfavorable opinion toward municipal authorities, and their belief that only the state 
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executive branch has made an effort to improve the operation of federal funds at the local 
levels.  In the next sections I present the point of view of municipal governments,  
contrast them with the testimonies given by state officials, and outline some basic 
propositions about the performance of local governments in their management of 
decentralized resources. 
 
5.4. THE VIEW OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES 
 
In this section I present the perspective of municipal governments regarding the 
operation of federal funds at the local levels, where their implementation is actually 
carried out.  My objective is to investigate the perception of municipal authorities 
regarding the influence of the state government on the distribution, operation and 
supervision of federal funds, and whether they believe those decisions have any political 
motivation.  Also, I examine how municipal presidents organize the agenda-setting 
process for allocating public works resources, and how other players (for example 
opposition groups) take part in that process.  This section will also help to contrast the 
point of view of state officials with the perspective of municipal authorities, and derive 
some general propositions regarding the performance of municipalities in their 
implementation of federal funds for basic infrastructure. 
The principal research tool used in this section was semi-structured interviews 
with key participants in the local policymaking process, and I also conducted a focus 
group exercise with community delegates.  In all cases I talked to municipal officials with 
responsibilities in the areas of planning and finance, since they are direct participants in 
the process of public work formulation and execution.  Only in two cases I was able to 
interview the municipal president, but there I concentrated mostly on issues related to 
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their political careers, their perception on electoral competition and reelection, and their 
political relationship with state governments. 
I focused on four municipal governments of the Estado de México, plus one 
belonging to state of Jalisco (the municipality of Zapopan).  The reason for including this  
latter case is that it provides us with an additional point of comparison from another state, 
so that the discussion is not only focused on one institutional setting.  In other words, it 
helps to analyze whether the operation of federal funds across the five municipalities 
exhibits shared patterns, regardless of the particularities of the two states.  The Estado de 
México municipalities included in this study are Jilotepec de Molina Enriquez, San 
Francisco Soyaniquilpan, Villa del Carbon, and Toluca.  Table 5.2 summarizes the 
characteristics of the five cases included in the study.  As it can be observed, there are 
marked differences across the five cases in terms of their population size, levels of 
socioeconomic well-being, and economic structure, which makes them representative, at 
least to some extent, of the characteristics of other municipalities in the Estado de 
México.  Zapopan is, by far, the most populated one (one million inhabitants), only 
followed by Toluca, the capital city of the Estado de México, whose population is close 
to seven hundred thousand.  The policy issues that these two municipalities face are, 
evidently, very different from the problems smaller municipalities have to deal with.  
They also exhibit relatively low levels of socioeconomic deprivation (according to the 
Mexican Population Council statistics), which implies, in principle, that their share of 
federal funds for basic infrastructure is not very high.  The other three municipalities, on 
the other hand, are more comparable, since their number of residents does not diverge too 
much, their levels of socioeconomic well-being range from medium to high, and a 
significant proportion of their workforce is employed in agriculture. 
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TABLE 5.2.  Characteristics Summary for the Cases of Study 
Vote distribution in the last 

















Year PRI PAN PRD 
2000 53 41 4 Jilotepec de 
Molina 
Enriquez 
68.3 Medium 24 Never 
2003 58 37 3 
2000 49 47 2 Soyaniquilpan 
de Juárez 
10 Medium 33 2003 
2003 44 54 0.06 
2000 39 46 9 Toluca 667 Very low 2 2000 
2003 39 40 13 
2000 40 41 3 Villa del 
Carbón 
38 High 33 1996 
2003 32 33 8 
2000 35 50 8 Zapopan 
(Jalisco State) 
1000 Very low 2 1995 
2003 44 43 3 
 
Sources: INEGI, Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000; Instituto Electoral del Estado de México (www.ieem.org.mx); Consejo 
Electoral del Estado de Jalisco (www.ceej.org.mx); CONAPO, Indices de marginación a nivel municipal (www.conapo.gob.mx).  
 
Regarding their political environment, there are also differences across the 
municipalities.  Jilotepec constitutes the only case in the sample where the PRI has never 
been defeated, and it still enjoys ample electoral support among voters, which reduces the 
threat of being thrown out of power by the PAN, its principal political opponent. The 
other four cases, on the other hand, have undergone the alternation from the PRI to the 
PAN at least on one occasion, and all of them have exhibited very high levels of electoral 
competition in the two most recent elections.  My sample includes two municipal 
governments currently under the control of the PRI (Jilotepec and Zapopan), and three 
governed by the PAN (Soyaniquilpan, Toluca and Villa del Carbon).  The fact that the 
current governor of the Estado de México belongs to the PRI (as it has always occurred in 
that state until now) and to the PAN in Jalisco, implies that my sample involves three 
cases of “juxtaposition”, where the party affiliation of the municipal president and state 
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governor diverges.  As I demonstrated in previous chapters, government juxtaposition is 
an important independent variable explaining differences across local budgetary 
allocations, thus I pay special attention to it in my case studies. 
It should be noted that my selection of cases was influenced by the willingness of 
people to participate in this study, which might raise some reservations about potential 
selection biases.  Nevertheless, I do not consider that those biases are too strong, as I was 
able to confirm from interviews with academic researchers in Mexico who specialize on 
local policy issues (specifically in the Estado de México).113  
 
5.4.1. Jilotepec de Molina Enriquez 
 
Jilotepec is located to the north of the Estado de México.  According to the city code 
(bando municipal), the municipality is integrated by 51 localities, being the county seat 
the most populated one (10,500 inhabitants).  In 1990, its economic structure was 
predominantly agricultural (43 percent), but ten years after only 24 percent of its 
workforce was employed in that sector.  Up through the last election in 2003, the PRI has 
never been defeated, and it still enjoys a significant electoral margin with respect to its 
next political opponent, the PAN, which in the 2003 election obtained 37 percent of the 
votes.  Jilotepec has always been an important political base of support for the state PRI, 
thus having a privileged relationship with the governors of the Estado de México, all of 
which historically have belonged to that party. 
                                                 
113 I am grateful to Cecilia Cadena and Carlos Quintana from El Colegio Mexiquense, and to Mauricio 
Merino from CIDE, for their opinions and suggestions. 
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According to the current municipal president, the principal problem the 2003-
2006 administration faced at the beginning of its term was the lack of financial resources, 
due to the high debt inherited from the preceding government, also from the PRI.    
Another concern of the current administration when it took office was that it faced the 
resistance of many members of the previous staff, who did not belong to the same 
political group as the new government and were removed from their jobs. 
When asked about the principal innovations or actions introduced by his 
administration, the president mentioned that the staff started to receive training to 
improve the negative perception of citizens regarding their local authorities.  Another 
element launched by his administration was the adoption of a new communication 
strategy with the citizenry characterized by daily visits of the president to the localities, 
where public works projects are negotiated and agreed.  Besides improving the 
information the government needs for its decision-making, this practice also provides him 
with a political benefit, as far as people in the communities get to know their president 
and thus he can claim credit for the public works done in each of them.  Actually, the 
president considers that public works projects constitute his principal political tool. 
The president asserts that the increase in electoral competition has improved the 
accountability of governmental authorities not only to their citizens, but also to their own 
parties.  In the case of the PRI in the Estado de México, the party has established a new 
system to evaluate the performance of their municipal presidents, based on several 
instruments.  For example, the party conducts regular surveys to detect the perception of 
citizens about their governments, it provides training courses to its winning candidates 
before they take office, and presidents are responsible to report to their party the public 
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works they have carried out, and the frequency of their visits to the localities.  All these 
innovative methods are, in his view, a consequence of the rise in electoral competition, 
which has forced political parties to adopt new strategies to make the selection of 
candidates more responsive to the preferences of the electorate.  However, the high 
competitiveness of the electoral arena does not seem to have changed very much the 
opinion of political actors regarding the possibility of consecutive reelection for public 
posts in Mexico.  When asked about his view on this issue, the president declared to be 
against the reelection of municipal presidents, since such a policy would result in “bad 
officials staying in power for too long periods”.  His rationale for opposing reelection 
suggests that democracy is not yet regarded by politicians as an accountability 
mechanism itself, since they have considerable reservations about the capacity of citizens 
to punish deficient leaders through the use of their votes.  In my interviews with other 
municipal officials the same type of argument was used to oppose reelection. 
Regarding the allocation of federal funds for basic infrastructure projects, the 
president claimed that the process of priority definition is entirely under the control of 
local communities, and that his government does not interfere with the way funds are 
decided at the community level.  This idea was supported by municipal officials at the 
finance and planning areas, where respondents basically restated what the regulatory 
framework describes.  However, this notion was challenged by a representative of the 
local council belonging to the principal political competitor of the local PRI in Jilotepec: 
the PAN.  According to the councilor, there is a lack of transparency about the use of 
federal funds in Jilotepec, since the president does not inform the local council about the 
criteria used for their allocation.  Actually, in her view the local council lacks effective 
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access to the information of most policy issues in the municipality (as an example she 
mentions that the high debt acquired by the previous administration has never been 
clarified by the current government), and it is normally excluded from many important 
issues (for example, although she is formally in charge of the tourism commission, she 
was left out from its integration process).   Also, the regidora stated that public works 
projects are heavily “politicized” in the municipality, given that the president tries to 
influence the election of community councilors and delegates, often creating severe 
conflicts (including violence) among the people.  Even though not every attempt to 
manipulate the process has succeeded, the wish to secure the political control of resources 
by the president has damaged the personal relationships between neighbors.  In localities 
where the PAN is stronger, the interviewee claims that the priorities of the community 
are not respected, since the municipal government imposes its own choices. 
Since the views of municipal authorities (both the officials appointed by the 
president and those elected directly by the people) are very likely to have biases due to 
their own political loyalties, I used a focus group methodology to get the perceptions of 
the people who are closer to the infrastructure needs of communities in Jilotepec.  This 
exercise incorporated the participation of ten “municipal delegates”, who are auxiliary 
authorities elected by the neighbors of each locality in an open assembly, and serve as 
intermediaries between the municipal government and the people. Delegates are 
responsible to detect the needs of their communities and inform the municipal 
government about those that are more urgent.  Formally, they are not public employees, 
since they do not receive any remuneration.  Delegates also take part in the process where 
infrastructure priorities financed through the FISM are formulated, but we should be 
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aware of the fact that they are not the same “community representatives” that the FISM 
regulatory framework establishes.  In reality, however, delegates have a stronger 
influence on the process of priority definition compared to the other community 
representatives, since they last in their posts during the three years of the municipal term 
(community representatives are changed every year), and they are better known to the 
people.   
The focus groups exercise attempted to get the views of municipal delegates on 
three basic issues.  First, how they perceive the transparency and fairness of the process 
for the allocation of public resources for infrastructure.  Second, the degree and forms of 
citizen participation during the process.  Third, the extent to which the process is actually 
influenced either by the municipal president, or by other political groups.  All the 
participants agreed in pointing out that the process by which federal funds for basic 
infrastructure are allocated and managed has become more transparent, regular, and less 
susceptible to manipulation, at least as compared to the way public resources were 
allocated in the past.  In their view, the current system operates under a more watchful 
environment, since the oversight committees prevent resources to be wasted, and there 
are better control mechanisms than in the past.  For example, one of the participants 
mentioned that, before the current system started to operate, materials were often 
damaged due to the lack of oversight and control.  Another feature suggesting a more 
rational use of resources is that municipal authorities give priority to projects affecting 
large population segments, rather than isolated areas.  Nevertheless, delegates in the 
focus group identified several problems with the current system.  Everyone had the 
opinion that the most salient problem is related to the task of securing the participation of 
 178
the people in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public works projects.  
In general, citizens fail to attend the regular meetings where most issues about their 
localities are discussed and incorporated into the policy agenda for its solution.  But 
people also refuse to contribute (either with labor of financially) to the execution of 
projects.  Delegates claim that, since people have become familiar with the availability of 
federal funds for municipal infrastructure, they take for granted that those resources are 
sufficient to cover most of their needs, and thus are less willing to make direct 
contributions.  Evidently, some people are more likely to involve themselves in the 
process than others, but in general women tend to participate more than men, given that 
they are closer to the problems occurring in their localities.  Another problem that the 
group of delegates pointed out is that political parties interfere very often during the 
process, misinforming the people and creating tensions between them.  Commonly, when 
political groups (typically people supporting the PAN ) in a given locality become aware 
of the public works carried out by the municipal government in other localities, they 
mobilize the people of their communities to pressure the government.  None of the 
delegates in the focus group mentioned the president as trying to control the process; 
however this might reveal that delegates do not want to harm their relationship with the 
municipal government, since they interact recurrently with it.  Nevertheless, everyone 
agreed that, at the beginning of the process, communities lack information about the 
precise amount of federal funds available for public works, which confirms the 
information asymmetry I suggested in previous paragraphs.  When asked about their 
interactions with other municipal authorities, the respondents declared that their 
relationships are stronger with municipal directors (i.e. appointed officials) than with 
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cabildo members, another piece of evidence suggesting that local councils are not a very 
important institution for local governance in municipalities of the Estado de México. 
 
5.4.2. Soyaniquilpan de Juárez 
Soyaniquilpan is sited in the northwestern region of the state.  It is integrated by 
13 localities, including the county seat, San Francisco Soyaniquilpan, where 3,735 people 
reside.  Since the remaining localities have less that 2,500 residents, it is categorized as a 
rural municipality.  According to the most recent population census, 33 percent of its 
workforce was employed in agriculture in 2000, which to some extent resembles the 
economic structure of Jilotepec.  The levels of electoral support for the PAN have been 
progressively increasing since 1990, but it was until 2003 when the PRI was defeated for 
the first time, by a margin of ten percent of the votes. 
As in the case of Jilotepec, the entering municipal government faced a lot of 
financial problems when it started its term, but in Soyaniquilpan things were probably 
worse, given the non-PRI affiliation of the new administration and the fact that this was 
the first experience of party alternation in the municipality.  Besides acquiring a very 
high debt, the previous PRI administration withheld relevant information from the 
upcoming PANista government, thus forcing it to dedicate most of its time to negotiate 
the inherited debt with its creditors.  The president claims that being his administration a 
PANista government has created problems in their relationship with state authorities, 
particularly regarding financial aid, since the state government has put too many 
restrictions for disbursing funds to the municipality.  However, these problems have not 
occurred in the case of FISM funds, since the state government does not have too much 
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influence over their distribution.  Actually, the president affirms that FISM resources 
constitute the only available revenue source for the municipality to carry out public 
works, given that its taxing base is too small.  Besides negotiating the debt with its 
creditors, the first undertaking of the municipal government was to drastically cut the 
level of current expenditures, since they constituted a very big burden.  The president 
claims that the reason why the level of current expenditures was too high is that the 
previous government used to pay onerous bonuses to its employees, plus other 
unnecessary expenses.  The savings resulting from such reduction has permitted his 
administration to build a new public market and a recreation center. 
In his view, electoral competition is beneficial for the accountability of public 
officials, since the votes of citizens can serve as a punishment instrument.  Once more, 
the president declares to be against the possibility of consecutive reelection of local 
mayors, since he believes that the no-reelection clause prevents bad leaders to stay in 
power for too long periods.  He claims also that opposition parties represented in the 
town council or cabildo (mainly regidores from the PRI) systematically try to block his 
government by creating an environment of confusion and misinformation in the 
municipality.  It should be noted that the president is a former PRIísta, but he agreed to 
compete in the 2003 election as a candidate of the PAN, given the many conflicts taking 
place within the local PRI group. 
Soyaniquilpan represents the typical case of a small municipality with very 
limited resources for service provision, thus requiring the support from higher 
governmental levels.  The fact that its president belongs to a party different from the state 
governor’s has put it in a situation in which municipal authorities have to accept most of 
the conditions imposed by the state government to get access to the intergovernmental 
aid.  However, as I will show below, federal funds are not subject to too much 
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interference by state authorities (at least that is the perception of municipal officials in 
Soyaniquilpan), thus constituting a reliable funding source.  On the other hand, the small 
institutionalization of the local government often means that local officials have to 
improvise their work, without having a clear and consistent strategy of policy formulation 
and implementation. 
My interview with the municipal treasurer of Soyaniquilpan focused on fiscal 
management issues, specially the local operation of the federal FISM fund, and the 
relationship with the state government.  He states that, despite the widespread perception 
among municipal authorities that state officials interfere with the distribution of federal 
funds, the state government has not that much opportunity to manipulate resources, since 
the state legislature exerts a strong oversight over these funds. He confirmed that every 
month municipalities report their application of FISM funds to the legislature, however 
Soyaniquilpan has never been audited by the legislature since the current government 
started its term.  When asked about the criteria for the distribution of federal funds to 
municipalities, the treasurer revealed very little knowledge about such rules, and I suspect 
this lack of knowledge is very widespread across municipalities in the state (see also 
Rodríguez, 1997). 
Soyaniquilpan has already signed the Tax Coordination Agreement (i.e. the 
Convenio de Coordinación Hacendaria) with the Estado de México government because 
authorities perceive that doing this will allow them to continue having access the 
expenditure projects of the state government.  He does not think that these resources have 
a political bias based in party memberships, but that their distribution depends on the 
specific priorities of each bureaucratic agency of the state government.  For example, 
Soyaniquilpan has benefited from several investment projects of the state department of 
education, while it has not received any support from the department of agriculture.  
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Thus, in his view it would be misleading to affirm that state resources are allocated only 
on the basis of political considerations, since the priorities of each state bureaucracy have 
an important influence on how projects are distributed across the municipalities of the 
Estado de México.  The treasurer corroborated the fact that the state government 
attempted to restrict municipalities from using FORTAMUN resources to cover some of 
their financial liabilities, but that this effort failed due to the opposition of most municipal 
treasurers in the state. 
Although the CODEMUN in Soyaniquilpan already had completed the process of 
priority formulation for basic infrastructure by the time I interviewed the president and 
the treasurer, they had not started executing any project.  The reason for such delay was 
that the municipal government had not yet fulfilled all the technical and procedural 
requirements established by the regulation of FISM resources, due to their lack of 
personnel with expertise on these matters.  Again, this fact confirms that the low 
institutional capacity characterizing most municipalities in the country is one of the 
principal problems for the local operation of federal resources. 
Finally, the treasurer mentioned that municipal delegates play a central role 
during the process of priority definition for public works, even a more important one 
compared to the role community representatives play.  Delegates are the principal 
intermediaries between the municipal government and the local citizens.  Indeed, local 
authorities usually refuse to process any request from the citizens, unless it has been 






5.4.3. Villa del Carbon 
Villa del Carbon represents another case of party alternation at the municipal level 
in the Estado de México.  Alternation occurred for the first time in 1997, being the PAN 
the winning party.  Since that year to the present, the PAN has continued governing this 
municipality, but with very low margins of electoral victory.  In the 2003 election, there 
was only a one percent difference in the proportion of votes between the PAN and the 
PRI.  The fact of being ruled by the PAN uninterruptedly for the last six years has 
implied that the transitions from one administration to another has taken place very 
smoothly, allowing  a good deal of stability within the municipal staff.  For example, the 
current administration (2003-2006) incorporated many of the employees working during 
the previous one, including the municipal president himself, who used to work as director 
of public works.  In order to preserve the stability in the municipal staff, some local 
officials have been considering the creation of a civil service system, an idea that is 
highly innovative, especially if we take into account that municipalities in the country 
generally use informal procedures to recruit their governmental staff. 
My interviewees pointed out that one of the principal innovations introduced by 
the current administration was the creation of an administrative area in charge of 
coordinating all the information processes within the municipal government.  The 
modernization of the internal information system, which was one of the president’s 
campaign promises, has already rendered positive results, for example it facilitated the 
elaboration of the first annual government report, since the information provided by all 
administrative areas was easily brought together for that end. 
When asked about their views on removing the constitutional ban to the reelection 
of local mayors, my respondents declared to be in favor of that idea.  According to them, 
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allowing mayors to be reelected for consecutive periods would improve the continuity of 
programs, and it would also reduce the problem of administrative inexperience among the 
municipal staff.  This was the only case where I found a favorable opinion towards 
reelection. 
Regarding the relationship between Villa del Carbon and the Estado de México 
government, my interviewees pointed out several aspects that are problematic.  One are 
the frequent delays in the delivery of federal funds by state authorities.  They claim that, 
even though the state government does not have any influence on the distribution of 
federal funds, they indeed are responsible for those delays.  Another issue they regard as 
problematic is the Convenio de Coordinación Fiscal.  The treasurer believes that the 
Convenio’s stipulations are too many, and that there is lack of clarity regarding how 
investment resources will be distributed, since state agencies have substantial 
discretionary power over those decisions, without the participation of municipal 
governments.  Also, the Convenio originally attempted to withdraw a portion of the 
revenue-share transfers from municipalities who failed to cover their financial obligations 
with the state government, but that measure was finally left out.  Despite municipal 
authorities of Villa del Carbon regard the Convenio as having several shortcomings, they 
finally agreed to sign it, which in my view reflects once more that smaller municipalities, 
lacking sufficient revenues from their own sources, have no other choice than agreeing to 
the terms established by the state government in order to secure its funding.  The 
treasurer points out that the investment decisions of the state government are heavily 
influenced by political motivations, but this does not occur in the case of federal funds.  
On the other hand, the earmarking of federal resources is, in her view, too rigid.  In the 
case of the FORTAMUN resources, for example, the treasurer asserts that the 
municipality would prefer to use them for public works, but the law prevents them to do 
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it.  Something similar occurs in the case of projects strongly favored by residents of Villa 
del Carbon (for example the construction and conservation of churches, parks or 
markets), where federal resources cannot be spent.  In order to support the development 
of these projects, the municipal government has no other source of funding than its own 
revenues. 
The mechanisms for setting up the public works agenda in Villa del Carbon have 
involved the participation of both municipal delegates and community representatives, 
but they acknowledge that their roles should be further clarified in order to avoid 
confusions and overlaps.  The current administration has encouraged the representatives 
of every locality to visit the other communities in the municipality, so they all can get to 
know the works that have been carried out all around the municipal territory.  This 
constitutes, in my view, an indication of the willingness of local authorities to inform the 
public about their actions, and that they do not regard this practice as a potential source of 
conflict with the residents of other localities.  However, as in the other cases, my 
interviewees claim that opposition groups (especially the PRI regidores at the local 
council) systematically try to block every presidential initiative, since their party instructs 
them to do so.  Dealing with opposition groups constitutes, in their view, one of the most 







My interviewees asserted that there is too much influence of the state government 
on the regulation of the FISM and FORTAMUN funds.  Actually, they claim that the 
state regulatory framework should not exist in the first place because it goes against the 
principle of “municipal autonomy” established in the national constitution, and it also 
contradicts the federal fiscal coordination law.  In their view, not only the state 
government excessively earmarks the federal funds, but its system of supervision and 
control of municipal budgets are disproportionate and confusing.  In addition to the state 
legislature’s general accounting office, the state executive branch has its own controlling 
department, and all municipalities are required to report every month their use of federal 
resources.  According to the treasurer, this system is burdensome, since all municipalities 
in the Estado de México have to physically transport every month tons of documents to 
the central headquarters of the state government in Toluca, and it is unclear whether all 
that information is actually used for evaluation purposes.  The enforcement of the 
oversight system is, in his view, very discretionary, since the financial inspections 
performed by the state controlling office are not subject to clear and stable rules.  This 
evidently creates an environment of confusion among municipal governments, since the 
oversight system is often used as an instrument to punish the governor’s political 
opponents.  Another problem created by the state fiscal norms is that they have changed 
the incentives of municipal authorities on how they report their budgets.  My respondents 
assert that, since the FORTAMUN has so many restrictions for its use, municipalities 
have been left with no other choice than defining many of their spending categories as 
debt in order to be able to use those funds.  This confirms what most state government 
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officials reported during my interviews, but Toluca authorities blame the excessive state 
regulations as directly causing these problems. 
One of my interviewees uses several examples to support his claim about the 
political motivations of the state government in its relationship with municipalities.  His 
first example is the case of the previous local government of Toluca (also from the PAN), 
which had a bad relationship with the Estado de México government.  According to my 
informant,  that fact implied that the former Toluca administration was subject to a series 
of unnecessary financial inspections performed by the state government, thus suggesting 
that the system is often used as a political punishment tool.  The previous administration 
also faced considerable delays in the delivery of resources by the state government, and 
my informant claims, once more, that this was due to their bad relationship.  Another 
instance exemplifying the political biases in the allocation of resources by the state is, 
according to my informant, the favoritism in the funding of major urbanization projects.  
He mentions the case of Atlacomulco (another important municipality of the Estado de 
México that has always been under the control of the PRI), where the state government 
financed totally the construction of a new viaduct.  A very similar transportation facility 
was initiated in Toluca, but the state government refused to provide support for it, thus 
the project had to be financed only through the resources of the municipal government.  
According to the treasurer, this case illustrates the preferential treatment that that the state 
government gives to municipalities governed by the PRI. 
One of the informants mentioned that authorities of several municipalities 
governed by the PAN in the Estado de México, including Toluca and those in the 
metropolitan areas nearby the Federal District, have considered the possibility of taking 
legal action against the state regulations regarding the operation of federal funds, which 
again corroborates what state officials reported in their interviews.  However, they have 
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decided not to start such a legal controversy in order to avoid further conflicts with state 
authorities.  On the other hand, Toluca has refused to sign the Convenio with the state 
authorities, since the treasurer claims that its rules are too vague, and it is intended to 
satisfy only the priorities of the state government, not those of municipalities.  For 
example, the treasurer asserts that Toluca can easily meet the taxing effort standards 
established in the Convenio, making it eligible to receive investment funds from the state.  
However, they still do not have enough incentives to join it, since the amounts of the state 
funding are uncertain and they would nevertheless not respond to local priorities.  This 
assertion confirms my suggestion that larger municipalities are not motivated to accept a 
fiscal relationship with the state government in which the latter defines most of the terms, 
since those municipalities have more resources of their own that can be allocated with 
more autonomy to the specific priorities of local policymakers.  In contrast, smaller 
municipalities have less choice. 
Regarding the relationship between the municipal president and the local council 
(cabildo), my interviewees reiterated what other local officials reported during the 
interviews: that the systematic opposition of councilors to the initiatives of the president 
obstructs the negotiations in the cabildo.  They contend that the current Toluca 
administration has, nevertheless, adopted a lenient attitude in the negotiation with all 
council members, and still has agreed to carry out policy initiatives coming from non-
PAN representatives. 
 
5.4.5. The municipality of Zapopan, State of Jalisco 
When the current local administration of Zapopan took office, it found three 
principal problems. First, authorities encountered a marked situation of social inequality 
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across the different localities of the municipal territory, despite the fact that the 
municipality, as a whole, ranks reasonably well in several socioeconomic indicators 
compared to other municipalities in the state of Jalisco.  The current administration has 
identified at least six areas with high poverty concentration levels.  Second, there is a 
preoccupation regarding the disordered urban growth, which has started to affect several 
agricultural areas and natural reserves.  Third, authorities assert that the local budget is 
heavily tagged, thus restricting considerably the capacity of the local government to 
reallocate resources toward the development of public works. 
Officials regard the increase in electoral competition as a positive sign, since it is 
an essential condition for local democracy.  In their view, the fact that the current 
government won the presidency with very low margins of victory and with the 
recognition of all the contending parties, has increased its legitimacy.  They also believe 
that, as a result of electoral competition, citizens have become more aware and better 
informed about the actions of their government, since they know that their votes matter 
for the political survival of local politicians.  Officials claim to be conscious about this 
new reality, thus trying to improve their performance. 
The process of policy formulation in the area of basic infrastructure in Zapopan is, 
to a large extent, similar to that in the Estado de México.  The basic level taking part in 
the process of agenda-setting is the neighborhood (in the case of urban areas) or the 
locality (in the case of rural zones).  Community leaderships and organizations are 
articulated at this level, starting by performing an initial assessment on the needs of their 
communities, and elaborating a list of priorities.  Once communities have defined their 
most urgent needs, regional subcommittees representing the 13 regions of the 
municipality are in charge of analyzing and approving all the proposals generated.  
Finally, a work commission integrates all the proposals and validates them.  The 
 190
participation of communities is not restricted only to the formulation of public works 
priorities, but people also take part in the evaluation and oversight of the projects.  My 
informants never mentioned any problem related to opposition parties or groups 
obstructing the process of agenda-setting (as it was the case in the municipalities of the 
Estado de México included in this study).  In their views, the only difficulties that 
occasionally emerge have to do with personal antagonisms between neighborhood 
representatives.  They claim that the intensive public consultation process that precedes 
the approval of the local budget restricts the capacity of the local government to use 
federal resources as a political instrument.  Also, the local government would risk paying 
a large political cost if authorities attempted to allocate resources giving preferentiality to 
some groups for political reasons. 
It is important to note that, prior to the beginning of the agenda-setting process, 
the Zapopan government defines upper budgetary limits for each of the 13 regions, 
according to the poverty levels existing in each of them, giving preferentiality to the most 
disadvantaged regions.  Besides improving the focalization of resources, this practice 
considerably reduces the possibility of political manipulation of funds by local leaders.  
In my analysis of municipalities in the Estado de México I did not find any case in which 
such a process of ex-ante budgetary management was carried out. 
Officials reported that the Jalisco state government does not have too much 
influence on the allocation and operation of federal resources, but in general they were 
very reluctant to go into more details about the relationship between Zapopan and the 
state authorities.  When asked about any problems arising from the party divergence 
between the municipal president and the state governor, my informants declared only that 
these two actors maintain an official and respectful relationship. 
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5.5. SUMMARY OF IMPLICATIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES  
 
The interviews with state and municipal officials provided valuable insights about 
the operation of intergovernmental resources at the local levels.  They also allowed 
substantiating some of the findings obtained from the quantitative analyses.  However, in 
no way the interviews and focus group exercises constitute conclusive evidence on this 
matter, since their views are evidently influenced by their respective political positions 
and bureaucratic loyalties. 
The financial shortages that municipal administrations faced during the first 
months of their term was a recurrent issue in most of the municipalities included in this 
study.    Previous administrations were usually blamed for being the direct cause of fiscal 
deficits, given the excessive spending levels they incurred during the last year of their 
terms and their propensity to inherit their obligations to the subsequent government.  
Evidently, political factors played a relevant role in creating these problems, for example 
in the case of Soyaniquilpan, where the first experience of party alternation from the PRI 
to the PAN was marked by the attempt of the defeated PRI group to harm the governing 
capacity of the new PANista presidency by withholding important administrative and 
financial information. But the problem also took place in a case in which alternation of 
parties did not occur, as in Jilotepec, where the former PRI administration inherited a 
large deficit to its successor.  Thus, although the problem has a political component, I 
believe that it is symptomatic of the low levels of institutionalization that characterize the 
governance of municipalities all along the country, particularly the absence of effective 
mechanisms for public accountability in the municipal sphere.  For example, in none of 
the cases analyzed the state legislature took any action to penalize the lack of fiscal 
discipline of the authorities of the preceding administrations, which implies that the 
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public oversight system in the Estado de México does not have the sufficient capacity to 
hold local politicians accountable for their actions.  It should be also noted that the 
tendency of previous administrations to overspend before they leave office confirms what 
my statistical analysis of local budgetary allocations revealed: that in electoral times 
municipal governments are more likely to increase their spending on public works 
projects, while decreasing their administrative expenses.   
The high levels of instability that characterizes the municipal staff is another 
factor affecting the transition from one government to another.  During their first months 
in office, not only municipal authorities have to deal with the financial problems inherited 
from the previous administration, but they also spend most of their time learning the 
necessary skills to run the local government.  Consequently, there is little scope for policy 
innovation.  Only in the case of Villa del Carbon a new managerial instrument was 
adopted for the modernization of the local administration, and this improvement was part 
of the candidate’s programmatic agenda during his campaign.  The relative stability of 
the municipal staff in Villa del Carbon since the PAN won the presidency in 1997 might 
be a factor allowing at least incremental policy innovations.  It also permitted that the 
most recent transition process took place in a relatively well-organized way.  Evidently, 
the relative stability in the municipal workforce is attributable to the continuity of the 
local PANista group in the presidency since 1997.  However, this equilibrium is fragile, 
since it is not based on enduring institutions (for example on the existence of a civil 
service system), but on a short-term political agreement that might come to an end if the 
PRI recovers the Villa del Carbon presidency in 2006. 
The perception of municipal authorities regarding the increase in electoral 
competition was, in all the cases analyzed, a positive one, since most of my interviewees 
believe that competition fosters governmental accountability.  However, most of my 
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informants had an unfavorable opinion about allowing the consecutive reelection of local 
mayors.  In all cases, their rationale for opposing such a measure was based on the notion 
that reelection would enable ineffective leaders to stay in office for too long periods.  
This justification implies, in my view, that local politicians distrust the capacity of 
electoral constituents to use their vote as an accountability mechanism.  Only in the case 
of Villa del Carbon, respondents supported reelection, although they mostly regarded it as 
a measure for improving policy continuity and administrative professionalization. 
Regarding the allocation of federal resources, there is a widespread consensus 
among municipal officials that the rules for their distribution and local operation are more 
transparent and better structured than in the past.  The fact that their distribution is 
formula-based has considerably reduced the uncertainty about the availability of funds in 
every fiscal year.  On the other hand, I noticed that municipal authorities (especially those 
in rural or semi-urban areas) lack sufficient knowledge about the precise distributional 
criteria of federal funds.  Despite the advantages of having a stable system of 
intergovernmental transfers, several municipalities coincide in pointing out some 
problems coming from the regulations established by the Estado de México government.  
One is that the state government frequently fails to deliver funds on time.  Although state 
officials claim that those delays are due to discrepancies between the federal and the state 
fiscal calendars, some municipalities strongly believe that they are the result of political 
tensions between state and local authorities.  I have reservations accepting this view, 
since the delays in the delivery of funds was present in all the cases analyzed, regardless 
of the party affiliation of the municipal president.  Municipalities also consider that the 
state government puts too many restrictions on the use of federal funds, particularly in the 
case of the FORTAMUN, where there have been attempts to limit the capacity of 
municipalities to cover their financial obligations through that fund.  In my view, it is 
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misleading to conclude that the fiscal regulations of the state have exclusively a political 
motivation, particularly if we take into account that the state government has introduced 
different strategies to strengthen the fiscal and managerial capacity of all municipal 
governments within the state, and that, in the absence of budgetary labels, local 
governments would spend most of their resources to cover administrative expenses 
(recall my findings in the chapter addressing local budgetary allocations, in which I 
demonstrate that for every additional peso that municipal governments receive in the 
form of unrestricted transfers, they spend most of it to finance current expenditures, 
rather than public works). 
It seems that the discretionary power of the Estado de México government is 
more likely to take place in the case of its own investment funds for municipal 
development, since all my informants coincided in pointing out that those funds are 
subject to the political manipulation of state authorities.  A large concern regarding state 
funds is that they are not subject to transparent rules for their distribution, since state 
agencies can freely decide where to spend them.  In order to be eligible to receive those 
investments, municipalities have to agree to the terms established in the Fiscal 
Coordination Agreement, in which they commit to increase their effort to collect property 
taxes, water fees, and other revenues.  Although the Agreement seems to be a valuable 
instrument to strengthen the fiscal capacity of municipal governments, one of its principal 
drawbacks is that it never makes explicit the rules for allocating state investments to 
municipalities, nor the precise amount of the aid.  This lack of clarity has discouraged 
larger municipalities in the Estado de México governed by the PAN (including Toluca) to 
sign up the agreement: not only their level of financial dependency with respect to state 
resources is relatively low (at least compared to small municipalities), but also local 
politicians  would not be able to claim credit for the projects financed through state funds, 
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since these mostly correspond to the policy priorities of state agencies.  This outcome is 
consistent with my earlier claim that the ambition of opposition mayors to claim credit 
for their actions (which at the same time implies that they seek that local voters clearly 
differentiate them from other political levels) makes them more inclined to be more 
active in the policy sphere, for example by investing on areas with more political 
visibility (such as public works projects), or by increasing their levels of financial 
autonomy, as it was shown in Chapter 4.  The fact that PANista governments in the 
Estado de México have been reluctant to accept the terms established by state authorities 
in the Agreement is consistent with that argument. 
In my view, one of the most serious problems of the federal resource allocation 
system is the difficulty to evaluate to what extent are municipalities making their 
spending choices consistent with the objective of alleviating poverty.  In other words, 
despite the fact that distribution of funds to municipalities has improved its transparency 
due to the existence of a federal formula, there are not public mechanisms to verify that 
local authorities are actually spending the resources according to the stated goals of the 
decentralization policy.  Only in the case of Zapopan, Jalisco, the municipal government 
established a system where budgetary limits are set in advance, according to the relative 
deprivation levels of localities.  Furthermore, information on how federal resources are 
spent across projects and regions in Zapopan is made known to the public through their 
website.  But none of the municipalities I examined in the Estado de México had such a 
budgetary system, nor all of them make spending information available to the public.  
This lack of transparency has to do, at least in part, with the way the decentralization 
policy was designed originally, since the federal government basically gave up its 
oversight authority and transferred it to subnational institutions, under the expectation 
that the local policymaking process would assure the transparency of decentralized 
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resources and the accountability of local officials.  However, I did not find evidence 
supporting that expectation.  To begin with, none of the municipalities of the Estado de 
México were willing to share with me data on their budgetary allocations, although they 
are required by law to disseminate such information to the public.  Neither the accounting 
office of the state legislature nor the finance department of the state government disclose 
that information.  Thus, it is almost impossible to evaluate how municipalities are making 
use of federal resources, unless one has an informal access to that information. 
The accountability and transparency problems outlined above can also be 
explained by the limited capacity of the town councils to moderate the political power of 
the president.  The representation rules established by the state electoral legislation give a 
disproportionate share of seats to the party of the president, thus weakening the political 
power of opposition representatives at the cabildo.  Opposition regidores are often 
excluded from important policy issues, and do not even have a regular contact with 
community representatives and delegates.  Nevertheless, opposition representatives are 
commonly accused by other municipal authorities of blocking all presidential initiatives 
(although these are ultimately approved by the president’s party at the cabildo), 
manipulating the people of the communities, and creating rumors against the president.  
Probably, the use of these informal methods actually reveal the opposition regidores’ lack 
of formal political power. 
The lack of transparency in the local spending process and the weak capacity of 
the local cabildo to check the influence of presidents evidently create the conditions for a 
discretionary use of federal resources by municipal presidents, as it has been pointed out 
by most state officials and some local council representatives from opposition parties.  If 
local budgetary allocations are essentially made through the use of political 
considerations, then we can expect that the original policy goals of the federal funds will 
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get distorted once they reach the municipal level, even though the existing formula has 
improved the distribution of funds from the federal government to the states, and from 
the states to the municipalities.  The final section of this chapter provides an empirical 
test to the proposition that the allocation of federal funds by municipal authorities is 
driven by political motives.  It also analyzes whether municipalities are allocating 
resources according to the compensatory goals of the decentralization policy. 
 
5.6. THE LOGIC OF MUNICIPAL SPENDING IN FIVE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE ESTADO 
DE MÉXICO: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
This section presents an empirical model to analyze how municipal authorities 
make their budgetary choices regarding the resources they obtain from the federal 
government for developing social infrastructure projects.  It tests the widespread idea that 
municipal authorities in the Estado de México use political considerations in their 
resource allocations of federal funds.  It also evaluates to what extent are municipalities 
prioritizing resources to assist the most deprived areas of their territory, thus complying 
with the goals of the national decentralization policy. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I will assume that a political use of resources 
implies that municipal presidents will tend to spend more funds to reward their party 
supporters, without necessarily taking into account their constituents’ actual need for 
public goods and services.  Note that I disregard the possibility that within the same party 
there could be different groups competing for public resources, and that the incumbent 
president might favor only some of them.  Thus, for the sake of simplicity (and also due 
to the lack of more detailed data on the political preferences of presidents), I will assume 
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that the only political consideration of the incumbent president would be attempting to 
support his/her own party loyalists. 
Since my aim is to investigate how municipal authorities distribute federal 
resources across their territory, the observation units for this analysis will be the 
localities, which constitute the smallest territorial entity for which data are available.   
The analysis is based on a small dataset covering five municipalities of the Estado de 
México: Jilotepec, Soyaniquilpan, Villa del Carbon, Atlacomulco and El Oro, given that I 
was only able to obtain data for these cases.  The sample size of my dataset is equal to 
154 localities.  
The analysis focuses only on federal funds earmarked for basic infrastructure (the 
FISM), thus I pay no attention to the fund for municipal strengthening and development 
(the FORTAMUN).  The reason for looking only at the FISM is that municipalities must 
always report the physical location in which public works are carried out, thus allowing 
to identify how spending is geographically distributed.  On the other hand, it is practically 
impossible to identify the geographic distribution of FORTAMUN resources, since these 
are mostly spent on the financial obligations of municipalities and on other administrative 
activities, which are not attached specifically to any locality. 
It should be noted that data on municipal localities of Mexico is very hard to 
obtain.  Nevertheless, I was able to get data from the 2000 population census for the five 
municipalities of the Estado de México included in this study, disaggregated at the level 
of locality.114  The electoral information was harder to match up with the rest of my 
dataset, since the smallest unit of information reported by the electoral institution of the 
Estado de México is the “electoral section”.115  In some cases, there is a perfect match 
                                                 
114 Sociodemographic data disaggregated at the level of localities were obtained through INEGI, Censo de 
Población y Vivienda 2000, Principales resultados por localidad. 
115 Electoral data at the sectional level were provided by the Instituto Electoral del Estado de México. 
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between sections and localities (i.e. one locality per section), thus combining the electoral 
data with sociodemographic and financial information does not present any significant 
problem.  But in others, either one section comprises more than one locality (typically 
localities with few residents), or a single locality might span more than one electoral 
section (normally the cabecera municipal or county seat, where most of the population is 
concentrated).  In the first case, I made all electoral variables to take identical values 
across the localities belonging to the same electoral section.  In the second, for each 
locality I calculated a weighted average of the respective electoral variable across the 
sections, based on the distribution of the population of potential voters. 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the proportion of FISM funds assigned 
to each locality by the municipal government in 2004 (i.e. the first year in office of the 
2003-2006 municipal administration).  That is, the total amount of FISM resources spent 
per locality, divided by the total amount of FISM funds that each municipality received 
for the fiscal year 2004.  This measurement strategy attempts to reflect the relative 
importance that municipal authorities give to each locality in terms of their budgetary 
priorities, at least in the first year of their mandate.  Thus, the dependent variable can take 
any value between zero and one.  Data for this variable was obtained through the 
planning and finance department of the Estado de México government.116 
The explanatory variables in the model include indicators about the level of need 
for public goods and services.  The model also incorporates political influences.  The 
most evident measure of public goods need is the population size of the locality, which is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the proportion of federal resources spent.  
The proportion of people earning less that one minimum wage, which measures the 
relative level of poverty in the locality, is also incorporated in the estimation.  Given that 
                                                 
116 I am grateful to Lic. Alejandro Hinojosa, Undersecretary of Expenditure at the Planning and Finance 
Ministry of the Estado de México government, for providing me with FISM data. 
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FISM funds are aimed to play a compensatory role (at least in the official discourse), I 
would expect it to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable, implying that 
municipal authorities tend to support areas where poverty levels are more concentrated.  
Another two indicators measuring the level of basic infrastructure need are included.  
These are the proportion of households in the locality without access to water, and the 
proportion of households without access to drainage.  Once more, we should observe a 
higher share of FISM funds allocated to localities exhibiting lower rates of water and 
drainage coverage.  Given that previous analyses consistently revealed the importance of 
literacy for municipal performance, literacy rates at the locality level are also included in 
the model, under the expectation that better educated residents might attract more 
resources to their communities.  I include a dummy variable to identify the cabecera 
municipal (county seat), which normally constitutes the most urbanized area of the 
municipality, thus requiring more public works investments.  A set of four dummy 
variables are included to account for any municipal-level effect (the municipality of El 
Oro is taken as the baseline). 
The political variable in the model is the proportion of votes in favor of the 
president’s party.  This implies that the variable will take the value of the relative vote for 
the PRI in localities belonging to municipalities where the PRI won the presidency in the 
2003 election, and the relative vote for the PAN in those where this party governs the 
municipality.  If the coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant, 
that would confirm the claim that municipal presidents make a political use of the FISM, 
tending to favor localities where their parties received more electoral support.  The 
estimation is performed using ordinary least squares, but all data are weighted by the 
electoral importance of each locality (the weighing variable is the number of potential 
voters, that is the number of people of ages 18 and older).  In order to allow for 
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heteroscedasticity in the error term, I report robust standard errors.117 Results are reported 
in Table 5.3. 
 
TABLE 5.3.  Weighted Least Squares Regression on the Proportion of FISM Funds 
Allocated by Five Municipal Governments Across their Localities in 2004 
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N 154 154 
R-Squared 0.813 0.799 
 
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  The municipality of El Oro is taken as the baseline.  
Locality-level observations are weighted according to the number of eligible voters (people ages 18 and 
older) 
***p<.001  **p<.01 *p<.05 
 
                                                 
117 It could be argued that a problem of reciprocal causality or endogeneity might be present in my model, 
since relative spending levels (the dependent variable) may possibly affect the votes obtained by the 
president’s party.  However, this problem is ruled out by the fact that the electoral variable is measured 
with data from the election before the new government took office, while local spending data belong to the 
first year of the municipal mandate, thus excluding the possibility that public spending could have affected 
electoral results. 
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Before discussing the results, we should be aware that the dataset is not 
representative of all municipalities in the Estado de México.  Although the use of 
localities as units of observation considerably increases the size of the sample, the dataset 
is still restricted to five municipalities in the state.  I have excluded large urban cities, 
which concentrate most of the state population.  The reason for leaving them out is that 
FISM resources only account for a small fraction of their total available resources.  
Furthermore, I have found that large cities tend to spend most of FISM resources on 
policy sectors that cannot be attached to specific geographic areas (for example, 
scholarships for children), thus preventing me to adopt a methodological approach based 
on territorial distributions.  Therefore, we should regard this analysis only as an initial 
exercise that can be replicated with more detailed and extensive data.  Nevertheless, it 
can provide us with some interesting insights. 
Regarding the variables measuring the level of need for public goods and 
services, the population size of localities is clearly an important one: for every additional 
10 thousand people residing in a given locality, municipal governments tend to allocate, 
on average, more than 10 percent of their available FISM budget.  It is evident that 
population is the most relevant variable in the model, since it explains 35 percent of the 
total variation.  On the other hand, the county seat control does not appear to have any 
independent effect on budget allocations.  Evidently, its high correlation (0.76) with the 
population variable (county seats are typically the most populated areas) explains why it 
fails to have statistical significance.  Nevertheless, including it improves the model’s 
adjustment, thus suggesting that county seats might receive an extra benefit in terms of 
budgetary allocations, regardless of their population size.  A sample with more 
observation might confirm this proposition. 
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The next question is whether municipal authorities tend to give more budgetary 
priority to localities where poverty levels are more concentrated.  The negative 
coefficient associated to the minimum wage variable clearly suggest the opposite: for 
every ten percent increase in the share of the working force earning less than one 
minimum wage in a given locality, the proportion of FISM funds assigned to that locality 
decreases by 6.6 percent on average.  Therefore, the empirical evidence indicates that 
municipal authorities penalize localities with higher poverty levels, thus distorting the 
compensatory goals of the decentralization policy.  There might be several reasons 
explaining this outcome.  For example, poorer localities might have less capacity to 
advocate their needs and influence the local policy agenda.  Also, they might tend to be 
isolated from the most populated areas, thus making it more costly for the municipal 
government to make further public works investments.  Evidently, it might well also be 
the case that poverty levels do not precisely reflect the actual needs of infrastructure 
within localities.  For example, a locality with high poverty levels might be more in need 
for private goods (food, housing, transportation) that cannot be provided through the use 
of federal funds.  Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the case that public spending is 
responsive to other indicators of infrastructure need.  For example, localities exhibiting a 
higher proportion of households without access to drainage are not compensated with 
more FISM funds.  Similarly, localities with a high proportion of households not having 
access to water are only marginally rewarded (the effect of this variable is only 0.045).  
In any case, these outcomes reveal that local authorities are probably not doing what they 
are supposed to do with the funds for basic infrastructure. 
Literacy rates turn out to be important factors explaining increases in municipal 
spending, although its level of statistical significance marginally fails to meet the 
customary 0.05 threshold, probably due to their correlation with other socioeconomic 
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variables.  Its large coefficient widely confirms what I have been arguing throughout this 
dissertation: that a better educated population is an essential ingredient to foster the 
accountability of governmental officials. 
Are FISM resources subject to any party influence?  The results suggest that they 
are, although not to a very large extent.  For example, a locality where the president’s 
party had obtained the totality of the votes would be assigned nine percent more of the 
FISM budget, in comparison to another locality where nobody had voted for that party.  
The effect increases to 12 percent if we exclude from the estimation the indicators 
measuring the lack of access to water and drainage services, as well as literacy rates. 
In summary, the available statistical evidence strongly supports the claim that 
municipal governments are not giving budgetary priority to localities that require public 
investments the most, thus distorting the stated goals of the decentralization policy of 
basic infrastructure.  Also, the evidence suggests that public spending decisions are not 
politically neutral, although it would be excessive to assert that electoral considerations 
constitute the principal criteria driving the formulation of municipal spending choices.  
The results are, nevertheless, not very surprising, given the several problems I pointed out 
regarding the lack of effective mechanisms for policy monitoring and oversight in the 





Democratization and Local Government Strengthening: The Ongoing 
Challenges and Imperatives for Public Policy 
 
The research objective of this dissertation has been to investigate the factors that 
cause variations in local government performance.  Drawing on basic premises developed 
by the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization, as well as on electoral theories 
of governmental accountability, my study has focused on the ability of competitive 
elections to motivate local policymakers to improve the quality of governmental outputs 
and processes, under the assumption that the threat of being removed from office would 
compel local governments to be more accountable to their electorate.  In the Mexican 
case, where the consecutive reelection of local mayors is constitutionally forbidden, I 
acknowledged that the link between competition and performance would be a less direct 
one, since local officials are more likely to respond to the political imperatives of top 
party leaders, rather than to the policy preferences of their electorate.  Nevertheless, I 
hypothesized that the connection between electoral competition and government 
performance might have its roots in the motivation of municipal presidents to assure the 
victory of their party in the subsequent election, given that this is an important condition 
for their political survival.  In other words, that there could be reasons to believe that the 
interests of parties, governments, and voters could be aligned, even in the absence of 
reelection. 
My dissertation addressed the issue of government performance from a variety of 
perspectives, looking at the provision of basic services local governments are responsible 
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to supply, the willingness and ability of municipal officials to build up the institutional 
capacity of local bureaucratic apparatuses, the formulation of local spending choices, and 
the enforcement of taxing authority.  Each chapter, looking separately at each 
performance dimension, constitutes a building block in the development of the general 
argument.  The empirical evidence generated in this research has revealed that the more 
contested and participatory electoral environment that characterizes Mexican 
municipalities has in fact transformed the strategies of local politicians to allocate public 
resources, and it has also increased the autonomy of local governments with respect to 
higher governmental levels.  However, these undeniable changes have not necessarily 
been translated into better social outcomes, given persistent problems of governmental 
accountability, shortcomings in the design of decentralization instruments, and the 
recurrent opportunistic behavior of local political actors. On the other hand, my research 
found that local governments in Mexico are considerably more responsive to demand-
driven factors, essentially those reflecting broader processes of socioeconomic 
modernization across the country, such as improvements in the educational levels of 
citizens, reduced poverty indicators, and higher levels of voter participation in local 
elections. Overall, my results cast serious doubts on the ability of electoral democracy to 
produce by itself better developmental consequences. 
In this concluding chapter I present an overview of the principal findings of the 
dissertation, drawing attention to their main theoretical and policy implications, 
identifying the principal puzzles that remain unanswered, and suggesting alternatives for 
future research. The findings are also discussed in light of the current debate on the 







6.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
6.1.1. Electoral democratization and local development: an unfinished business? 
 
An important dimension of the performance of local government that this 
dissertation utilized concerned the outcomes municipal governments are expected to 
produce on the well-being levels of their electoral constituencies.  Taking into 
consideration the availability and reliability of municipal-level data in Mexico, the rates 
of coverage for water, drainage, and electrification served as performance indicators 
under this dimension, given that they constitute part of the legal responsibilities of 
municipal governments in the country.  Furthermore, the provision of basic services is 
what the average citizen can expect from his/her authorities as a minimum.  One of the 
main goals of this project was to find out whether differentials in electoral competition at 
the municipal level account for the variations in the rates of coverage for those three 
services.  More specifically, I tested the hypothesis that increases in the competitiveness 
of municipal elections improve the access of citizens to water, drainage, and 
electrification.  In order to corroborate that proposition, Chapter 3 provided an empirical 
framework based on a cross-sectional dataset in which municipality-level observations on 
service coverage were combined with information on local elections and other control 
variables measuring the financial and sociodemographic characteristics of Mexican 
municipalities throughout the 1990-2000 period.  Overall, the results revealed that neither 
electoral competition nor party alternation have improved the rates of coverage for any of 
the three services analyzed.  This outcome was robust across different model 
specifications and after using alternative measurements of electoral competition. 
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In addition, the research investigated other rival hypotheses that have been 
proposed to explain variations in government performance, namely the ability of citizens 
to make local authorities more responsive to local demands using more direct means of 
influence, such as political mobilization.  Using basic literacy and voter turnout rates as 
proxies for citizen awareness and involvement in public affairs, the analysis revealed that 
these factors positively affect the provision of water, drainage, and electrification.  These 
results suggest that government performance is more responsive to demand-driven 
mechanisms than to the deliberate attempts of local authorities to guard themselves 
against the possibility of being removed from office in subsequent elections.  In other 
words, that governmental authorities are more likely to react when citizens use 
participatory means of pressure than when they merely employ their vote. 
In summary, the results suggest that the electoral component of democracy has 
been unable to improve the levels of development in Mexican municipalities.  However, 
we should take into account that the analysis of public services faced a number of 
limitations.  Maybe one of its principal shortfalls was the inability to track down changes 
in performance occurring at time intervals shorter than ten years, given that data on 
public service coverage was only available for 1990 and 2000, but not for the years in-
between.  In consequence, the results obtained in the analysis of municipal services 
should be regarded as a long-term picture of performance that emphasizes the 
accumulated effect of competitive elections on performance throughout an entire decade.  
Another plausible limitation might involve the possibility that some municipal 
governments could be simply unable to comply with the constitutional responsibility of 
providing basic services to their constituencies, especially those in rural areas that lack 
sufficient technical and financial capacity.  With the aim of filling these potential gaps, 
this dissertation not only looked at the policy outcomes, but also at the policy processes 
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through which municipal governments develop their internal organizational capacities, 
their budgetary allocations, and their ability to collect tax revenues from their own 
sources.  The following sections discuss these issues in more detail. 
 
6.1.2. Building up governmental capacity: merit-based administrative 
modernization or political patronage? 
 
Besides having looked at the policy outcomes of municipal governments, this 
dissertation focused on the processes through which local governments develop their 
managerial capacities which are important conditions for improving the quality in the 
implementation of local public policies.  The procedural dimension of performance was 
operationalized with the use of three institutional capacity indicators constructed on the 
basis of survey data at the municipal level.  They measure the capacity of local 
governments to standardize their operations through the creation of impersonal rules, the 
levels of formal education of high-level officials, and the degree of professionalization of 
their bureaucratic recruitment systems.  The analysis of institutional capacity was framed, 
once more, under the theoretical premise that electoral competition induces local 
governments to improve their performance. In addition, the investigation incorporated 
governmental juxtaposition as another potential explanatory factor, given the assumption 
that municipal authorities that arrive into power under the banners of a party other than 
the state governor’s have incentives to modernize the local administration in order to 
foster their policymaking autonomy.  The results revealed a favorable, even if modest, 
influence of competition and governmental juxtaposition on the institutional performance 
of municipal governments, although we could never rule out the possibility that such 
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positive results could have been influenced by potential selection biases in survey 
responses. 
Even though the results tended to support the argument that competition improves 
local performance, the influence of participatory mechanisms appeared, yet again, as 
having a stronger effect on administrative modernization.  Higher rates of literacy and 
lower poverty levels were found to significantly improve all the indicators of institutional 
capacity, thereby confirming the early claim that a more educated and better organized 
citizenry are essential conditions for performance.  This results reinforced the argument 
that the responsiveness of local authorities does not only depend on the capacity of voters 
to threaten the political survival of incumbent leaders, but also on their ability to 
articulate their demands through participatory mechanisms. 
In contrast, increasing rates of voter participation appeared as being highly 
detrimental for the development of local institutional capacity, an outcome that seems 
contradictory at first glance, but that might reveal an important pattern of participatory 
politics in Mexico; namely, the capacity of political mobilization to frustrate reforms 
aimed at reducing patronage styles in policymaking.  The negative relationship between 
voter turnout rates and all indicators of institutional capacity might be a strong indication 
that a highly mobilized electorate (presumably led by parties) precludes local politicians 
to give up their ability to use public resources for political patronage.  In other words, that 
incumbent politicians are relatively unwilling to adhere to a set of impersonal rules based 
on merit and technical rationality, since that would force them to give up their 
discretionary use of resources.  Evidently, a skeptical reader might have reservations to 
agree with this interpretation, particularly if the outcome could have been influenced by 
the subjective nature of the survey data, by the way the dependent variables were 
measured, or by other likely biases.  However, the same result was obtained from the 
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analysis of local taxation, in which the nature and sources of the data are of higher quality 
and reliability, thereby strengthening the statistical modeling.  The analysis revealed that 
increases in higher turnout rates decrease the amount of revenues municipal governments 
collect from local sources, even after controlling for socioeconomic levels, for the 
concurrence of municipal, state, and national elections, and for many other potential 
influences.  The result provides another piece of evidence supporting the argument that 
party mobilization precludes local governments to strictly enforce their taxing authority, 
making them strongly dependent on the policy choices of higher political levels and, 
probably, deteriorating the quality of local policies. 
 
6.1.3. Increased policymaking autonomy: when competitive elections make a 
difference 
 
The analysis of municipal budgets in Mexico provided an opportunity to 
investigate how local spending decisions are affected by the political pressures created by 
a more contested electoral environment.  Drawing on the premise that incumbent 
policymakers attempt to maximize their political survival by targeting public resources 
according to their bases of support, I tested the hypothesis that increases in electoral 
competition, party alternation, and voter participation encourage municipal governments 
to invest their available resources on public works projects.  The rationale behind this 
proposition is that, under a context of voter apathy and party hegemony, municipal 
authorities are more likely to expand their political support by selectively targeting 
resources to their political loyalists, for example by rewarding them with jobs in the local 
bureaucracy (i.e., they would be inclined to adopt a strategy of patronage).  In contrast, a 
very competitive and participatory electoral setting might compel politicians to broaden 
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the target of their spending choices, thus investing on areas that spill over a wider range 
of constituents. 
In order to test the previous hypothesis, the study exploited a panel of data in 
which a number of municipal-level variables (electoral, financial, and sociodemographic) 
were observed throughout the years over the 1990-2001 period, allowing to analyze 
variations in budget allocations both within and between municipalities.  The data 
allowed also investigating whether the electoral calendar of Mexican municipalities is 
also a factor explaining the allocation of local budgets; specifically, whether municipal 
governments, in their attempt to maximize the probability of their parties to remain in 
office in the upcoming election, invest more resources in public works in years when 
local elections are held.  In addition, the analysis investigated whether vertically divided, 
or juxtaposed, municipal governments are more inclined to favor public works as a means 
to reaffirm their political autonomy. 
The analysis revealed that the hypothesized effects of competition and alternation 
on public works investments did not materialize until 1998, when municipal governments 
acquired the responsibility to allocate a new federal fund for social infrastructure 
projects, which represented a substantial increase in their budgets.  In other words, the 
evidence suggested that the interaction between decentralization and electoral democracy 
has encouraged local authorities to invest in areas yielding collective benefits, rather than 
just expanding the bureaucracy.  This finding implies that electoral democracy per se is 
not a sufficient condition for performance, as local governments require as well having 
more decision-making autonomy over social investment funds, so that they can better 
take advantage of the opportunities that a more competitive electoral environment 
presents. 
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Spending in public works was found to increase in years when municipal 
elections are held, thereby confirming the assumption that electoral years provide local 
authorities with the best opportunity to make their actions more visible to the population. 
In addition, a situation of vertically divided government, in which the party affiliations of 
local mayors and state governors differ, appears to encourage municipal authorities to use 
public works investments as a means to differentiate themselves from the state 
government, an outcome that is in line with recent developments in fiscal federalism 
research. 
Personal interviews with municipal-level actors in the Estado de México provided 
additional evidence on the proposition that juxtaposed local governments tend to push for 
additional autonomy from state authorities.  The rejection of some municipalities under 
the control of the PAN to accept the terms of a new fiscal agreement designed by state 
authorities constitutes, in my view, an indication in support of such hypothesis.  Under 
the Estado de México’s Fiscal Coordination Agreement (aimed at rewarding 
improvements in municipal taxing effort with additional state investments), 
municipalities would not be able to claim credit for the projects financed through state 
funds, since these would correspond to the policy priorities of state agencies, rather than 
to the preferences of local governments.  The impossibility to derive a direct political 
benefit from the fiscal agreement, plus the perception that the policy lacked sufficient 
clarity in its operation rules, discouraged PANista municipalities to sign up the 
agreement.  However, the tendency of local governments to challenge the policies 
designed by upper levels seems to hold only for the case of the most populous and 
wealthiest municipalities.  Smaller and poorer PANista municipalities do not have the 
same opportunity to confront the state government because they lack enough resources to 
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undertake investment projects by themselves.  In consequence, they generally have no 
other choice than agreeing to the contractual terms established by state policymakers. 
In summary, the empirical evidence implies that the changing nature of electoral 
politics at the local levels of government has encouraged local politicians to expand their 
policymaking autonomy, which corroborates the hypothesis that electoral competition, 
party alternation, and governmental juxtaposition are inducing local leaders to be more 
aware about the policy preferences of their constituencies than to the political imperatives 
of higher levels of government. 
 
6.1.4. Decentralization without accountability? 
 
A major concern among fiscal decentralization scholars is the inclination of local 
and subnational authorities to shift the costs of their spending choices to national 
taxpayers, an outcome that typically emerges as a consequence of the imperfect ability of 
central governments to monitor the actions of lower political levels.  With the aim of 
investigating the relevance of this problem in the Mexican case, this dissertation analyzed 
whether the taxing performance of municipal governments in Mexico has declined as a 
consequence of the decentralization of federal funds.  I tested the widespread perception 
that the decentralization of federal funds to local governments in Mexico has displaced 
the collection of locally-generated revenues, given that incumbent authorities refuse to 
bear the political costs entailed by local taxation and prefer to rely on transfers from 
upper levels.  The results tend to confirm that proposition, given that local taxation 
decreased once the federal government started to decentralize social infrastructure funds 
to municipalities, although the reduction in revenues has not been as severe as it has been 
claimed.  In addition, municipalities receiving more federal funds were found to collect 
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fewer taxes from their own sources, even after controlling for socioeconomic well-being 
levels. Another finding was that the adverse consequences of fund decentralization over 
local taxation are aggravated when incumbent authorities face higher levels of electoral 
competition, thereby supporting the assertion local taxation entails a political cost (or at 
least that local politicians perceive that such a cost in fact exists).  Finally, high rates of 
voter turnout were found to decrease the levels of revenue collection, in support of the 
hypothesis that political mobilization is unfavorable to the strict enforcement of taxation. 
In summary, there are reasons to believe that the current decentralization strategy 
toward municipalities in Mexico has problems in its structure of incentives, which seem 
not to reward improvements in local tax performance.  Problems are not confined to the 
revenue side, but also to the way municipal governments formulate their spending 
decisions.  For example, state government actors of the executive branch in the Estado de 
México consider that municipalities distort the objectives of the decentralization of social 
funds.  They called attention to the propensity of mayors to centralize the agenda-setting 
process, the low technical expertise of the municipal staff, and the high level of 
politization that characterizes the allocation of resources.  The fieldwork carried out in 
four municipalities of the Estado de México corroborated those perceptions to some 
extent, but it was also clear that some of the problems pointed out by state officials have 
their roots in the relationship between state and municipal authorities.  Frequent delays in 
the disbursement of funds from the state government to the municipalities, lack of 
transparency in the criteria through which funds originated from state programs are 
distributed, and the proclivity of the state government to inspect the public finances of 
municipalities in a discretionary way were the kind of problems that municipal actors, 
particularly those whose party differs from the state governor’s, pointed out during the 
interviews.  Therefore, despite the fact that the allocation of federal funds to 
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municipalities seems to be less vulnerable to be manipulated politically by state actors, 
these still have other instruments to penalize municipal governments controlled by 
“opposition” parties.   
In order to confirm empirically whether the social objectives of the 
decentralization of funds for infrastructure get distorted as soon as they reach the 
municipal level, a final statistical analysis was performed, based on a dataset with 
locality-level observations from a small number of municipalities in the Estado de 
México.  Specifically, I analyzed to what extent the spending decisions of municipal 
governments tend to benefit poorer localities, in accordance with the compensatory goals 
of the decentralization policy, and whether local mayors tend to invest more funds in 
localities where their parties enjoy a larger electoral support, which would confirm the 
idea that the allocation of resources is politically biased.  The results revealed that poorer 
localities receive significantly less infrastructure investments, and that the spending 
choices of local governments are influenced by political considerations. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the low levels of policy accountability and 
institutionalization characterizing municipal governance in the state, the lack of effective 
intergovernmental oversight systems, and the absence of operational checks and balances 
at the local level, are important obstacles to make decentralization a more effective 
instrument for an improved municipal performance.  This implies that the current 
decentralization strategy in Mexico requires important changes for its success, placing 
special emphasis on the design of adequate structure of incentives to make the local 
levels more likely to comply with relevant policy goals, such as improving the access of 
people, particularly the poorest, to basic services, improving the collection of own-source 
revenues, increasing the levels of professionalization of local bureaucracies, and 
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involving communities, in a more genuine fashion, in the formulation, execution, and 




6.2. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.2.1. Implications for theory  
 
 One of the contributions this dissertation has attempted to make to the literature 
on local governance and decentralization is to disaggregate the large-scale concept of 
government performance into more specific and operational components.  Given data 
restrictions at the level of municipalities in Mexico, I developed performance indicators 
emphasizing at least two important dimensions of the concept.  One has to do with the 
things governments do to generate tangible policy outcomes in the society, such as 
providing basic services to their constituents and increasing public expenditures.  This 
“activist” dimension of performance has been found to be highly responsive to demand-
driven mechanisms, rather than to supply-motivated forces.  The second dimension of the 
concept is the procedural (or institutional) component of government performance, which 
has to do more with how governments improve their internal capability to manage their 
day-to-day operations, and their willingness and ability to enforce taxation.  I have 
intended not to make strong normative assumptions regarding the importance of each of 
these two performance dimensions, since I believe that both are relevant in a democratic 
system.  Nevertheless, I have suggested that building-up the institutional component of 
performance probably entails bigger complexities.  Although developing the institutional 
capacity of a government provides a very valuable collective good with high social 
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returns for the society (for example, better-trained public servants, more meritocratic 
recruitments systems, higher financial autonomy, etc.), it also implies important sacrifices 
from the point of view of incumbent politicians, who would have to give up their ability 
to make a discretional use of public resources that could be otherwise used to strengthen 
clientelistic relationships with certain groups (frequently with those that provide them 
with political support).  For instance, developing institutional capacity entails establishing 
impartial rules to assure a bureaucratic recruitment based on merit, rather than on 
political patronage.  Also, it means increasing the fiscal autonomy of governments, which 
in turn implies enforcing their taxing authority, no matter what political costs incumbent 
authorities might bear as a result of that.  The problem of institutional reform has been 
one of the main concerns of contemporary social science research, particularly in the case 
of developing countries, since improving the level of professionalization of civil service 
systems faces considerable obstacles entrenched in the self-interest maximizing behavior 
of individual politicians, for whom reforming the state apparatus is in itself a collective-
action dilemma.118  Under a context of high party mobilization and activism, the 
institutionalization of Mexican municipal governments has been shown to be 
problematic: high voter turnout rates were found to negatively affect virtually every 
indicator of institutional performance, such as the regulatory capacity of local 
governments, the formal training of public officials, the professionalization of civil 
service hiring procedures and, most importantly, the levels of local taxation.  
Municipalities where political parties have a significant capacity to mobilize the 
electorate, the decision-making of incumbent policymakers might be highly influenced 
                                                 
118 For example, the excellent work by Geddes (1996) frames the problem of administrative reform in 
Brazil as a collective action dilemma from the point of view of legislators who refuse to give up their 
access to patronage resources.  Also, research on political clientelism highlights the fact that politicians 
have a tendency to use private transfers as a means to reward political supporters, even though a 
competitive electoral system also induces them to invest in universalistic public goods.  For the Mexican 
case, see the article by Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez (2002). 
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by partisan considerations.  Since party activists are continuously exerting pressure on 
governmental authorities to target particularistic benefits to specific clienteles, 
governments are generally reluctant to base their policy choices on more technical and 
impersonal criteria.  In other words, local politicians are overtly unwilling to give up their 
discretionary powers that help them to construct a clientelistic relationship with local 
political supporters.  On the other hand, expanding the scope of government action does 
not necessarily entail the same kind of trade-offs, especially taking into account that local 
governments can have access to intergovernmental funds without incurring into big 
political burdens. 
It is important to note that the findings involving the role of the turnout rate on 
local government performance are by no means conclusive, given that the interpretation 
of voter turnout is not straightforward.  At one end of the spectrum, high levels of voter 
turnout could be regarded as a sign of civic engagement in public affairs, an 
interpretation that, consistent with social capital perspectives, should be expected to 
promote the performance of public institutions.  At the other end, high turnout rates could 
just be an indication of the increasing capacity of political parties to mobilize the 
electorate, which implies that variations in government performance have a political, 
rather than a civic, explanation.  Unfortunately, disentangling how much of these two 
dimensions is reflected in the voter turnout rate requires further exploration, as well as 
more refined data on the many other forms of influence that citizens have on their local 
authorities.  In other words, further research is require to collect information on 
alternative ways by which people take part in the definition of policy priorities and the 
implementation of public decisions, for example their participation in NGOs, informal 
contacts with local officials, petitioning, street protests, and rates of newspaper reading.   
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Another contribution of this dissertation to public policy inquiry has been to 
highlight the fact that the performance of local governments (in both its “activist” and 
“institutional” dimensions) seems to be more responsive to demand-driven factors than to 
the deliberate attempts of incumbent policymakers to deal with the challenges imposed 
by a very contested electoral environment, which casts doubts on the ability of the 
electoral process to create by itself  the right incentives for better developmental results.  
This is not to say that electoral competition and party alternation do not matter at all; 
certainly, as many of the findings revealed, electoral conditions are significantly 
transforming the approaches of local decision-making, pushing local politicians to 
acquire further autonomy from upper governmental levels, increasing the levels of 
spending on public works, and, to some extent, improving the institutional capacity of 
local bureaucratic apparatuses.  However, these important changes have not yet implied 
improvements in policy outcomes, as the analysis of basic services reveals.  What’s more, 
the effects of these “supply-driven” factors on performance are considerably lower in 
magnitude, compared to the influence of socioeconomic modernization forces, such as 
higher literacy rates and lower poverty levels. 
The several empirical findings obtained in this dissertation suggest, on the whole, 
that electoral democracy has been an insufficient condition to motivate per se better 
developmental outcomes from municipal governments in the country.    This general 
conclusion implies that the relationship between electoral competition and government 
performance is probably mediated by a number of institutional factors, some of which 
were highlighted in this dissertation, but others that are extremely difficult to identify 
given the lack of variation across Mexican municipalities on many of those factors, such 
as the reelection prohibition and the duration of the term of office.  One institutional 
factor whose mediating effect was distinguished is the decentralization of social 
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infrastructure funds, analyzed in Chapter 4.  The major finding was that decentralization 
plays an intervening role between competition and public works investment: only under 
conditions of decentralization does electoral competition encourage municipal 
governments to allocate additional resources for public works, but not in the absence of 
it.  The theoretical implication of this result is that the link between competition and 
performance depends on the degree of decision-making authority local governments have 
over the formulation of social infrastructure projects, which allows them to derive a 
tangible political reward from their spending choices. 
Most of the empirical work in this dissertation has heavily relied on the 
availability of data at the level of municipalities in Mexico. Despite the fact that there 
have been significant improvements in the data over the last years, there are still 
considerable information shortages that prevent a more comprehensive evaluation about 
the quality of public policy outcomes and processes at the local sphere of government.  
This dissertation has taken advantage of the few measures on public service provision 
available, however there are many other services under municipal responsibility for 
which reliable data is lacking.  Also, I left out an important dimension that should be 
explicitly accounted for in future studies: the perception of citizens regarding the 
performance of their public authorities.  After all, it can be argued that in a democratic 
system the fundamental judgment of government performance is public opinion, since the 
ultimate aim of a democratic government is to satisfy its citizens.  This is not to say that 
public opinion measurements of government performance do not entail complexities (for 
example, ordinary people might lack sufficient knowledge of the sort of things their 
governments do, they might not necessarily understand how policy responsibilities are 
distributed between different levels of government, and their perceptions might be biased 
by factors outside the control of policymakers).  Nevertheless, public satisfaction 
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measures should be at least one of the components of a broader evaluation of the 
government performance. 
The high level of aggregation in the data on local public finances has prevented 
me to analyze in more detail how and where local governments are spending their 
resources, and what consequences those choices have on the well-being levels of people.  
Although I have provided a small-scale analysis of municipal spending decisions at the 
level of localities, it is necessary to increase the number of observations in order to be 
more confident on the level of generalization of the results obtained.  Unfortunately, as it 
has been pointed out, this lack of information constitutes one of the principal drawbacks 
of the current decentralization policy, which has failed in compelling states and 
municipalities to report spending data. 
 
6.2.2 Policy implications 
 
Several findings obtained in this dissertation indicate that further institutional 
changes are required in order to make local democracy and decentralization functional for 
local performance.  In my view, most of those changes have to deal with the fundamental 
problem of improving the levels of policy and political accountability characterizing local 
governance in the country.  This problem is manifest in at least two distinctive 
dimensions.  The first has to do with the lack of effective intergovernmental mechanisms 
inducing local governments to comply with the goals that national decentralization 
policies aim to accomplish.  The second regards the problem of municipal accountability 
toward local constituents.  My dissertation has provided several pieces of evidence 
showing weaknesses in both dimensions.  On the vertical or intergovernmental 
component, this research has revealed that municipal governments have a low propensity 
 223
to strictly enforce local taxation, while heavily relying on transfers from the federal 
government, particularly when they regard that taxing local constituents might entail big 
political costs.  Another piece of evidence implying failures in the system of 
intergovernmental accountability is the apparent unwillingness of local governments to 
prioritize resources in favor of the poorest localities, which presumably  are the ones 
requiring more social investments.  The evidence also suggested that municipal 
governments have a marked bias in favor of county seats, despite the fact that poverty 
levels tend to concentrate on the rest of the localities. As one of the chapters suggested, 
that outcome seems to be caused by electoral bias in the spending choices of municipal 
governments.  But it also reflects inadequacies in the oversight and evaluation 
instruments of the federal and state governments, and the lack of performance-based 
formulas for the distribution of funds to municipalities. 
On the dimension of accountability toward local citizens, probably one of the 
most serious limitations is the absence of consecutive reelection of local mayors, which 
precludes them to better match the preferences of the electorate, while making them more 
dependent on the political priorities of party elites.  The lack of the reelection incentive, 
coupled with the shortness of the municipal term of office, can also be blamed for the 
poor degree of bureaucratic professionalization that characterizes local governments, 
since incumbent politicians look forward to move on to higher positions in their states or 
even at the national congress, thus failing to introduce more enduring changes in the local 
administration.  Unfortunately, I was unable to directly test that proposition in this 
research: since all municipalities in the country are equally affected by the constitutional 
prohibition on reelection, it is impossible to find a counterfactual to rigorously test 
whether reelection can produce more accountable governments. 
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Besides the potential benefits that could be created by removing the constitutional 
ban to the consecutive reelection of mayors, other changes on the institutions of local 
representation might be desirable, particularly on the rules for the integration of town 
councils or cabildos.  Although this dissertation did not formally analyze the role of 
cabildos to effectively hold municipal presidents accountable for their decisions, 
anecdotal evidence obtained from interviews with some local representatives and other 
informants in the Estado de México suggested that town councils are the weakest element 
of local policymaking.  The failure of cabildos to actually serve as public watchdogs of 
local decision-making has its roots, in my view, on the methods of political 
representation established by the electoral and municipal legislation in some states of 
Mexico.  The rules for the integration of the council tend to give the majority party a 
disproportionate share of seats, which do not reflect the real distribution of electoral 
power in a municipality.  In addition, town councilors (regidores and síndicos) are 
elected on the coattails of the municipal president under a system of slates (planillas), 
where candidates are jointly nominated by party leaders.  These institutional features 
generate very poor incentives for local councilors to carry out their responsibilities on the 
design and oversight of local public policies: opposition councilors are too few to be able 
to influence policies, majority councilors lack the incentives to oppose the municipal 
president, and everyone tends to follow the guidelines of party elites instead of the 
preferences of the electorate.  Strengthening the system of proportional representation 
would certainly increase the presence of opposition parties at the local councils, giving 
them more power to restrain the decisions of the president.  However, this might also 
cause a situation of policy deadlock, where the normal operation of the local government 
would be seriously hindered.  Therefore, probably the most desirable change for 
improving the accountability and decision-making authority of the town council would be 
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to stop the current system of slates, allowing individual candidates to compete in their 
districts or localities under a simple majority principle.  As in the case of reelection, this 
institutional reform would considerably reduce the party discipline of local 
representatives, while making them more responsive to their preferences of their 
constituents.  However, further research is required to elucidate this proposition, taking 
advantage of the fact that several states in Mexico have started to introduce changes in 
their electoral and municipal institutions, promoting a more plural representation in the 
town councils. 
A change that, in my view, deserves special consideration in the current debate on 
local governance in Mexico has to do with the creation of a civil service system at the 
level of state and municipal governments.  The low degree of administrative 
professionalization of the municipal staff, which also seems to be aggravated by the 
absence of consecutive reelection and by the shortness of the municipal term of office, 
would probably be improved by the existence of an institutional mechanism assuring the 
stability and competence of public officials.  At the same time, a more meritocratic 
method of personnel recruitment and professional development would certainly reduce 
the use of political patronage in the appointment decisions of local governments.  It is 
important to mention that the current federal government in Mexico (2000-2006) has 
already enacted a civil service law regulating the processes of  selection, incentives, and 
career advancement for all federal employees in the country.119  However, since that 
legislation cannot affect public workers at local and sub-national levels of government, it 
is important for each state in the country to take the necessary steps to establish a civil 
service system preventing public appointment decisions to be affected by political 
considerations, while assuring the quality of governmental human resources. 
                                                 
119 The Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Administración Pública Federal in Mexico was 
enacted on April 10, 2003.  
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Another crucial aspect to improve the quality of local governance in Mexico 
concerns the adoption of a legal instrument assuring the transparency of governmental 
information at the local and sub-national levels.  As I have pointed out, the lack of access 
of ordinary citizens to such information constitutes one of the principal drawbacks of the 
current decentralization strategy.  Not only does this problem preclude a rigorous 
evaluation of local public policies, but it also represents a serious peril for the democratic 
consolidation of the country: unless voters know how public resources are utilized by 
governmental decision-makers, democratic accountability will be impossible to attain.  
As in the case of civil service reform, the current national government has recently 
enacted an ambitious legislation that establishes a set of transparent principles by which 
the public can require federal agencies to disclose governmental information.120  It is 
essential that an equivalent type of legislation be adopted by all the states in the country 
in order to assure the transparency of information of state and municipal governments.  
Also, it would be desirable to develop new mechanisms encouraging municipal 
governments to invest in technologies that facilitate the access of citizens to 
governmental information.  For example, the system of intergovernmental funding could 
provide special funds aimed at the modernization of municipal information systems, a 
feature that is currently lacking. 
 
 
6.3. THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE IN MEXICO 
 
 
In recent years, the whole system of fiscal federalism in Mexico has become one 
of the main issues debated in the country.  One of the principal claims of scholars, 
                                                 
120 The Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental was enacted on 
June 11, 2002. 
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politicians, and policy analysts is that its current mechanisms of resource generation and 
allocation are no longer functional for a country that has considerably opened its 
economy to the global market, and where regions attempt to take advantage of the 
opportunities that free trade provides.121  At the same time, the monopoly of political 
power in Mexico has come to an end, particularly after the defeat of the PRI in the 
national elections of 2000, leading states and municipalities to push for a redefinition in 
the terms of the fiscal agreement originally established during the eighties.  The political 
diversity that now characterizes all levels of government in Mexico has given rise to the 
emergence of new actors that demand more autonomy from the central government, thus 
attempting to recover the several decision-making instruments that they yielded more 
than twenty years ago. 
In 2004 the principal political actors in the country (which included the Mexican 
president, all state governors, representatives of the national and state congresses, and a 
selected number of municipal presidents) inaugurated the First National Tax Convention 
as a forum to discuss new proposals to modernize the current fiscal federalism 
arrangement.  The debate covered several topics, including public spending and revenues, 
national debt, the administration of the tax system; the mechanisms for inter-
governmental coordination; and issues regarding transparency, public supervision, and 
account rendering.122  It is not my objective here to cover all the points raised and 
proposals generated during that forum, thus I will only concentrate on the issues more 
directly related to municipal governments in order to appraise them in light of the 
findings obtained in this dissertation. 
                                                 
121 An interesting assessment about the limitations of the current federal pact in Mexico can be found in 
Díaz-Cayeros (1995).  See also the collection of essays in Arellano (1996), and the work of Ward and 
Rodríguez (1999b). 
122 For an overview of the principal diagnosis and proposals generated during the first tax convention, see 
its first general report (Declaratoria a la nación y acuerdos de los trabajos de la Primera Convención 
Nacional Hacendaria, Agosto de 2004). 
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One of the principal problems that the tax convention identified related to the 
decentralization of infrastructure spending to municipal governments, is that the criteria 
established to distribute social infrastructure funds across municipalities introduce wrong 
incentives for performance.  In their attempt to prioritize the allocation of funds toward 
states and municipalities whose levels of socioeconomic deprivation are more intense, the 
current formulas have discouraged local governments to take the necessary steps to 
reduce poverty levels, since that would evidently imply a reduction in the amount of aid 
local governments would receive.  The results obtained in this dissertation tend to 
corroborate that proposition, given the strong negative relationship found between social 
spending and poverty levels across some localities.  Another problem that the tax 
convention pointed out is that the existence of two alternative formulas for the 
distribution of the FISM might generate inequality problems.  For example, 
municipalities belonging to different states, but exhibiting comparable deprivation levels 
might receive different amounts of the fund, if the each state government decides to use 
different formulas.  But the problems that the tax convention identified as being most 
urgent, which my dissertation strongly emphasized as well, are related to the system of 
policy monitoring and evaluation, which are widely deficient across the country.  Only a 
minority of states and municipalities comply with their obligation to inform the federal 
government about their expenditure decisions funded through the FISM.  This is caused 
by the lack of sanctions in the current law, which does not penalize state and local 
governments who fail to comply with that disposition.  Accounting methods are not 
uniform across municipalities, which makes very difficult to know exactly how are 
governments applying the decentralized resources. 
The policy proposals generated in the forum are to establish a unique formula for 
the distribution of FISM resources, in order to avoid potential inequality problems in the 
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allocation of funds.  Also, the convention suggests to introduce in the distribution 
formula a mechanism to encourage efficiency in the operation of funds,  for example a 
compensatory component to reward municipalities that had achieved reductions in 
poverty rates.  Another suggested strategy is to allow for a gradual relaxation in the 
earmarking of FISM resources to municipalities attaining better results.  That is, once 
municipalities had covered their most basic infrastructure needs, they could be entitled to 
spend FISM resources on other expenditure areas that might be of higher importance to 
them.  An advantage of this proposal is, in my opinion, that it deals with the problem of 
providing local governments with more decision-making autonomy over decentralized 
resources (an essential ingredient for a better local performance, as this dissertation 
argued), while stimulating them to make a more effective use of funds (i.e., by allocating 
them to areas where poverty levels are more concentrated).  On the other hand, if the 
earmarking of the fund were completely cut off, or if its relaxation would not depend on 
local governments demonstrating a more efficient use of them, it is highly probable that 
municipal governments would end up spending those resources on areas of low 
developmental impact. 
Although the diagnoses and proposals of the tax convention identify some critical 
problems affecting the performance of Mexican municipalities, I think there are several 
elements that are not fully discussed.  Possibly, one of the central issues that require 
urgent attention is the need to adopt a more differentiated decentralization strategy that 
takes into account the different institutional capacities across local governments in the 
country.  The extraordinary heterogeneity of municipalities in Mexico makes it unfeasible 
to apply uniform solutions.  I do not want to imply that the state of the federal 
governments should re-centralize spending decisions, but that any further devolution of 
resources should be tied in with a clear definition of responsibilities, in such a way that 
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sub-national and local governments could still be held accountable for their performance.  
For example, the design of earmarked resources transferred to local governments should 
prevent them to substitute their own taxation levels, probably by requiring them to match 
the federal aid with their own-source funds in a certain proportion, according to their 
potential revenue-generating capacity.  Also, a more intensive use of performance-based 
indicators for the distribution of funds to municipalities is required, which in turn entails 
more transparency in the information regarding local spending, a feature that is simply 
absent in the current system. 
Evidently, the feasibility of these reforms (plus many others related to the whole 
fiscal system in Mexico, such as the devolution of some taxes to the states, a further 
clarification of policy responsibilities across all levels of government, and the redefinition 
of the criteria of the revenue-sharing system) will strongly depend on the agreements key 
political players at the national level reach on how to renovate the existing federal pact in 
Mexico.  At the present moment, arriving to such an agreement is problematic, given the 
political fragmentation that characterizes the national legislature, and the increasing 
number of veto players in the Mexican political system.  All these complex issues were 
beyond the scope of this research, but I hope that the findings and arguments presented 
here will contribute to the analysis and debate on how to make local governments and 
decentralization more effective instruments for social development in Mexico. 
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Appendix A. Municipal presidencies won by each party in Mexico, 
1989-2001 
TABLE A.1. Distribution of Municipal Presidencies Across Parties in Mexico, by State 
and Terms of Office (Part I) 
State Term of municipal government PAN PRI PRD PT PVEM OTHERS
        
Aguascalientes 1989-1992 0 9     
 1992-1995 0 9     
 1995-1998 4 5     
 1998-2001 5 4     
        
Baja California 1989-1992 2 2     
 1992-1995 3 1     
 1995-1998 2 2     
 1998-2001 2 2     
        
Baja California Sur 1990-1993 0 4 0    
 1993-1996 2 2 0    
 1996-1999 0 4 0    
 1999-2002 1 0 3    
        
Campeche 1988-1991  8 0    
 1991-1994  9 0    
 1994-1997  9 0    
 1997-2000  8 1    
        
Chiapas 1988-1991 0 109 0 0  0 
 1991-1994 1 109 0 0  0 
 1995-1998 5 85 17 2  1 
 1998-2001 6 89 16 0  0 
        
Chihuahua 1989-1992 0 66 0 0   
 1992-1995 12 54 0 0   
 1995-1998 11 54 1 1   
 1998-2001 18 47 2 0   
        
Coahuila 1990-1993 4 33 0   1 
 1993-1996 3 34 0   1 
 1996-1999 9 28 1   0 
 1999-2002 3 35 0   0 
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TABLE A.1. (Part II) 
 
State Term of municipal government PAN PRI PRD PT PVEM OTHERS
        
Colima 1988-1991 0 10 0    
 1991-1994 0 10 0    
 1994-1997 1 9 0    
 1997-2000 4 5 1    
 2000-2003 4 6 0    
        
Durango 1989-1992 1 38 0 0   
 1992-1995 2 35 0 1   
 1995-1998 12 21 2 4   
 1998-2001 4 31 1 3   
        
Guanajuato 1988-1991 1 44 0  0 1 
 1991-1994 13 33 0  0 0 
 1994-1997 4 38 2  0 2 
 1997-2000 21 18 6  1 0 
 2000-2003 28 14 4    
        
Guerrero 1989-1993 0 55 9   5 
 1993-1996 0 67 6   2 
 1996-1999 1 53 18   3 
 1999-2002 1 61 13   0 
        
Hidalgo 1990-1993 1 80 1 0  2 
 1993-1996 0 83 1 0  0 
 1996-1999 2 74 7 1  0 
 1999-2002 9 65 7 3  0 
        
Jalisco 1988-1992 2 120 0 0 0 2 
 1992-1995 15 106 1 0 0 2 
 1995-1997 53 62 6 1 0 2 
 1997-2000 39 71 11 2 1 0 
 2000-2003 50 64 6 0 3 1 
        
Estado de México 1990-1993 2 117 2 0 0 0 
 1993-1996 6 109 3 0 0 3 
 1996-2000 23 70 26 0 1 1 
 2000-2003 30 66 23 1 0 1 




TABLE A.1. (Part III) 
 
State Term of municipal government PAN PRI PRD PT PVEM OTHERS 
        
Michoacán 1989-1992 2 58 52 0  1 
 1992-1995 4 77 31 0  1 
 1995-1998 14 44 53 1  1 
 1998-2001 8 74 29 1  0 
        
Morelos 1988-1991 0 33 0   0 
 1991-1994 0 32 1   0 
 1994-1997 0 32 1   0 
 1997-2000 2 16 13   2 
 2000-2003 8 16 7 0 1 1 
        
Nayarit 1990-1993 0 20     
 1993-1996 0 20     
 1996-1999 1 19     
 1999-2002 6 14     
        
Nuevo León 1988-1991 2 48 0 0  1 
 1991-1994 5 46 0 0  0 
 1994-1997 6 44 0 1  0 
 1997-2000 15 34 1 1  0 
 2000-2003 16 34 1    
        
Oaxaca 1989-1992 3 95 6  0 6 
 1992-1995 4 124 13  0 2 
 1995-1998 10 94 29  1 2 
 1998-2001 9 112 30  0 1 
        
Puebla 1989-1992 6 193 6 0 0 9 
 1992-1995 4 204 5 0 0 3 
 1995-1998 22 187 7 0 1 0 
 1998-2001 14 183 14 2 3 0 
        
Querétaro 1988-1991 0 18     
 1991-1994 1 17     
 1994-1997 0 18     
 1997-2000 3 15     
 2000-2003 5 13     
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TABLE A.1. (Part IV) 
 
State Term of municipal government PAN PRI PRD PT PVEM OTHERS
         
Quintana Roo 1990-1993  7     
 1993-1996  7     
 1996-1999  7     
 1999-2002  7     
        
San Luis Potosí 1988-1991 3 53 0 0  0 
 1991-1994 7 49 0 0  0 
 1994-1997 7 46 0 0  2 
 1997-2000 15 35 4 1  1 
 2000-2003 12 40 2 1  1 
        
Sinaloa 1989-1992 1 17 0    
 1992-1995 1 17 0    
 1995-1998 5 12 1    
 1998-2001 3 14 1    
        
Sonora 1988-1991 0 68 0 0  1 
 1991-1994 0 70 0 0  0 
 1994-1997 5 63 1 1  0 
 1997-2000 17 44 8 1  0 
 2000-2003 14 46 8 1 0 1 
        
Tabasco 1988-1991  16 0   1 
 1991-1994  17 0   0 
 1994-1997  13 4   0 
 1997-2000  17 0   0 
 2000-2003  12 5    
        
Tamaulipas 1989-1992 1 40 0   2 
 1992-1995 3 40 0   0 
 1995-1998 6 33 3   1 
 1998-2001 0 41 2   0 
        
Tlaxcala 1988-1991 1 39 0 0 0 4 
 1991-1994 0 41 2 0 0 0 
 1994-1998 3 39 2 0 0 0 
 1998-2001 1 36 3 2 2 0 




TABLE A.1. (Part V) 
 
State Term of municipal government PAN PRI PRD PT PVEM OTHERS 
        
Veracruz 1988-1991 1 180 0 0 0 19 
 1991-1994 2 193 4 0 0 8 
 1994-1997 19 150 26 2 0 10 
 1997-2000 39 101 58 6 2 1 
 2000-2003 46 115 28 7 5 6 
        
Yucatán 1990-1993 5 99 0   2 
 1993-1995 3 103 0   0 
 1995-1998 12 92 1   1 
 1998-2001 10 92 4   0 
        
Zacatecas 1988-1992 1 55 0 0   
 1992-1995 0 55 1 0   
 1995-1998 11 41 2 1   
 1998-2001 10 34 10 2   
 





Appendix B. State governorships won by each party in Mexico, 1980-
2001 
TABLE B.1. Distribution of State Governorships Across Parties in Mexico, by Terms of 
Office (Part I) 
State Term of the governor’s mandate Party of the state governor 
   
Aguascalientes 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PAN 
   
Baja California 1983-1989 PRI 
  1989-1995 PAN 
  1995-2001 PAN 
  2001-2007 PAN 
   
Baja California Sur 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 PRD 
   
Campeche 1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 
  1997-2003 PRI 
   
Coahuila 1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 PRI 
   
Colima 1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 
  1997-2003 PRI 
   
Chiapas 1982-1988 PRI 
 1988-1995 PRI 
  1995-2000 PRI 





TABLE B.1. (Part II) 
State Term of the governor’s mandate Party of the state governor 
   
Chihuahua 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PAN 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Durango 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Guanajuato 1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1995 PAN 
  1995-2000 PAN 
  2000-2006 PAN 
   
Guerrero 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2006 PRI 
   
Hidalgo 1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 PRI 
   
Jalisco 1982-1988 PRI 
  1988-1995 PRI 
  1995-2000 PAN 
 2000-2006 PAN 
   
Estado de México  1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 PRI 
   
Michoacán 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1995 PRI 
  1995-2001 PRI 
 2001-2007 Coalition PRD-PT-PVEM and others 
 
 238
TABLE B.1. (Part III) 
State Term of the governor’s mandate Party of the state governor 
   
Morelos 1982-1988 PRI 
  1988-1994 PRI 
  1994-2000 PRI 
  2000-2006 PAN 
   
Nayarit 1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 Coalition between PRD and others 
   
Nuevo León 1979-1985 PRI 
  1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 
  1997-2003 PAN 
   
Oaxaca 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Puebla 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Querétaro 1979-1985 PRI 
  1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 
  1997-2003 PAN 
   
Quintana Roo 1975-1981 PRI 
  1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1993 PRI 
  1993-1999 PRI 
  1999-2005 PRI 
   
San Luis Potosí 1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 




TABLE B.1. (Part IV) 
State Term of the governor’s mandate Party of the state governor 
   
Sinaloa 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Sonora 1979-1985 PRI 
  1985-1991 PRI 
  1991-1997 PRI 
  1997-2003 PRI 
   
Tabasco 1982-1988 PRI 
  1988-1994 PRI 
  1994-2001 PRI 
  2001-2007 PRI 
   
Tamaulipas 1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Tlaxcala 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 Coalition PRD-PT-PVEM 
   
Veracruz 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRI 
   
Yucatán 1981-1987 PRI 
  1987-1995 PRI 
  1995-2001 PRI 
 2001-2007 Coalition PAN-PRD-PT-PVEM 
   
Zacatecas 1980-1986 PRI 
  1986-1992 PRI 
  1992-1998 PRI 
  1998-2004 PRD 
 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of CIDAC database of gubernatorial elections (www.cidac.org.mx) 
 240
Appendix C. Construction of the variables 
TABLE C.1. Definition and calculation of each variable and data sources (Part I) 
Variable Definition Calculation Data sources 
Political variables 
Margin of electoral victory Difference in the 
proportion of votes 
between the two 
strongest parties in a 
municipal election 
[(votes for the 
winning party)-(votes 
for the closest 
competitor)] / number 
of effective votes 

















where n stands for 
the number of parties 
participating in the 
election, and pi is the 
proportion of  votes 
of the ith party 
Laakso-
Taagepera (1979) 
and CIDAC, Base 




Voter turnout rate Effective votes as a 
proportion of potential 
voters 
Effective 
votes/people ages 18 
and older 





Party alternation Indicates whether the 
party governing the 
municipality is different 
than the party of the 
previous administration






divided local government) 
Indicates whether 
there is a divergence 
in party memberships 
between the president 
of a municipality and 
the state governor 





Electoral year Indicates whether the 
municipality had a 
local election in a 
specific year (see 
Appendix A for the 
electoral calendar of 
each state) 












TABLE C.1. (Part II) 
Variable Definition Calculation Data sources 
Public finance variables 
Revenue-sharing grants Unconditional funds 
that the federal 
government transfers 
to municipalities in 




sharing grants (in 
constant pesos of 






Earmarked grants for 
municipal development 
Earmarked grants that 
the federal government 
transfers to 
municipalities in 
Mexico (via the states) 
since 1998, which are 
used to cover the 
financial liabilities of 
municipal governments 
and public safety tasks 
(Fondo de 
Aportaciones para el 
Fortalecimiento de los 
Municipios y de las 
Demarcaciones 





constant pesos of 






Earmarked grants for 
basic infrastructure 
Earmarked grants that 
the federal government 
transfers to 
municipalities in 
Mexico (via the states) 
since 1998, which are 
used to cover basic 
infrastructure projects 
(Fondo de 
Aportaciones para la 
Infraestructura Social 
Municipal or FISM). 
Total FISM resources 
(in constant pesos of 











user fees (derechos), 
from sale or lease of 
municipal assets 
(productos), and fines 
and other sources 
(aprovechamientos) 
Sum of the four 
categories (in 
constant pesos of 









TABLE C.1. (Part III) 
Variable Definition Calculation Data sources 
Current (administrative) 
expenditures 
INEGI uses this 
category to include all 
expenditures on 
human resources and 
other supplies for the 
operation of the local 
government 
Current expenditures 
(in constant pesos of 






Public works expenditures Expenditures for public 
works and other assets
Public works 
expenditures (in 
constant pesos of 






Sociodemographic and service provision variables 





Poverty rate Percentage of working 
force earning less than 
one minimum wage 
Employed population 
earning less than one 








Literacy rate Percentage of people 
between ages 6 to 14 
who report they know 
how to read 
People between 
ages 6 to 14 who 
know to read / total 
population between 








Proportion of localities 
with a population less 
than 1000 inhabitants 
Localities with a 
population less than 
1000 inhabitants / 







Water coverage Proportion of 
households that have 
water inside their 
dwelling, within the 
terrain where the 
dwelling is settled, 
carried from the street, 
or carried from other 
dwellings 
Households with 
access to water / 







Drainage coverage Proportion of 
households whose 
sewer is connected 
either to the street or 
to a septic tank 
Households with 
access to drainage/ 










TABLE C.1. (Part IV) 
Variable Definition Calculation Data sources 















based on the following 
indicators: 
 1) % of houses 
without water; 2) % of 
houses without 
sewage; 3) % of 
houses without 
electricity; 4) % of 
houses with a dirt 
floor; 5) average 
number of occupants 
per room; 6) % of 
population 15 and over 
that are illiterate; 7) % 
of 
population that did not 
graduate from primary 
school; 8) % of 
population living in 
localities with less than 
5000 people; 
9) % of population with 
insufficient income to 
purchase a basket of 
basic goods. 





Appendix D. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
TABLE D.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (Part I) 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Margin of electoral victory 
1990 1906 0.559 0.33 0.002 1
1991 1906 0.559 0.33 0.002 1
1992 1916 0.524 0.328 0 1
1993 1950 0.49 0.328 0 1
1994 1956 0.465 0.317 0 1
1995 1955 0.392 0.302 0.001 1
1996 1950 0.296 0.257 0.001 1
1997 1950 0.26 0.241 0 1
1998 1951 0.216 0.216 0 1
1999 1967 0.201 0.199 0 1
2000 1967 0.194 0.197 0 1
2001 1967 0.189 0.195 0.001 1
Laakso-Taagepera index of the efective number of parties 
1990 1906 1.603 0.481 1 3.204
1991 1906 1.603 0.481 1 3.204
1992 1916 1.656 0.483 1 3.209
1993 1950 1.703 0.482 1 3.598
1994 1956 1.751 0.479 1 3.598
1995 1955 1.883 0.491 1 3.598
1996 1950 2.067 0.499 1 5.13
1997 1950 2.135 0.512 1 5.13
1998 1951 2.28 0.566 1 5.13
1999 1967 2.327 0.557 1 4.985
2000 1967 2.323 0.555 1 4.985
2001 1967 2.4 0.651 1 5.75
Voter turnout rate 
1990 1892 0.42 0.2 0.032 1
1991 1892 0.42 0.2 0.032 1
1992 1901 0.441 0.188 0.032 1
1993 1935 0.471 0.178 0.042 1
1994 1941 0.498 0.166 0.042 1
1995 1940 0.553 0.168 0.048 1
1996 1935 0.581 0.151 0.013 1
1997 1935 0.587 0.15 0.013 1
1998 1936 0.605 0.154 0.013 1
1999 1951 0.642 0.141 0.001 1
2000 1951 0.656 0.14 0.001 1
2001 1951 0.682 0.135 0.001 1
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TABLE D.1. (Part II) 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Administrative expenditures per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 301.801 451.814 0 10556.19
1991 1969 339.371 561.905 0 14673.81
1992 1969 368.247 532.556 0 13904.22
1993 1969 401.823 500.502 0 11352.57
1994 1969 436.051 497.433 0 10738.53
1995 1969 386.57 521.91 0 13334.68
1996 1969 415.891 643.635 0 19929.32
1997 1969 425.424 420.795 0 5945.16
1998 1969 482.898 468.762 0 7428.447
1999 1969 528.832 499.676 0 7670.566
2000 1969 577.069 551.3 0 8143.416
2001 1587 714.268 690.641 0 10457.93
Public works investments per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 168.479 373.154 0 7128.852
1991 1969 156.295 260.684 0 5646.08
1992 1969 157.716 226.895 0 4338.512
1993 1969 167.891 250.396 0 4739.315
1994 1969 184.232 255.17 0 4000.8
1995 1969 148.256 216.099 0 3462.835
1996 1969 164.34 269.716 0 4906.792
1997 1969 171.381 281.475 0 4282.653
1998 1969 221.004 280.232 0 4142.738
1999 1969 293.173 382.735 0 6809.253
2000 1969 303.146 377.71 0 4958.419
2001 1587 471.562 393.928 0 7078.398
Municipal tax revenues per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 44.538 203.751 0 7732.61
1991 1969 53.644 116.253 0 1789.448
1992 1969 58.444 111.949 0 1724.022
1993 1969 61.337 110.936 0 2007.972
1994 1969 62.388 109.898 0 2164.352
1995 1969 50.467 99.289 0 1834.963
1996 1969 43.632 79.987 0 1036.06
1997 1969 40.467 73.839 0 1720.189
1998 1969 40.246 77.743 0 1853.275
1999 1969 41.237 73.864 0 1188.686
2000 1969 41.963 87.842 0 1728.533







TABLE D.1. (Part III) 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue-sharing transfers per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 373.774 586.326 0 11732.22
1991 1969 389.814 603.692 0 15276.62
1992 1969 429.092 608.597 0 14600.3
1993 1969 444.953 553.66 0 10858.36
1994 1969 537.483 606.444 0 10271.05
1995 1969 451.233 579.671 0 13946.27
1996 1969 498.078 629.953 0 16261.76
1997 1969 535.117 521.925 0 6783.675
1998 1969 612.199 584.104 0 7473.684
1999 1969 648.624 634.217 0 8299.657
2000 1969 687.428 686.646 0 8838.807
2001 1587 749.029 847.589 0 12793.35
Municipal revenues per capita from user fees (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 22.003 60.488 0 1349.185
1991 1969 25.325 58.01 0 1435.705
1992 1969 27.888 61.306 0 1533.742
1993 1969 26.675 50.752 0 1011.09
1994 1969 25.041 40.815 0 481.672
1995 1969 18.819 33.021 0 562.601
1996 1969 25.044 78.51 0 2894.804
1997 1969 24.22 34.593 0 425.147
1998 1969 25.242 38.765 0 511.23
1999 1969 27.476 41.135 0 468.532
2000 1969 31.201 48.037 0 490.695
2001 1587 40.974 55.698 0 609.479
Municipal debt per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 28.125 95.304 0 2047.778
1991 1969 28.151 83.099 0 1338.241
1992 1969 22.001 57.406 0 717.496
1993 1969 48.109 125.083 0 2419.665
1994 1969 47.262 129.331 0 2788.164
1995 1969 33.556 98.685 0 1201.682
1996 1969 35.282 117.42 0 2033.646
1997 1969 22.954 71.734 0 1563.087
1998 1969 30.672 80.568 0 1164.773
1999 1969 20.054 64.557 0 1429.778
2000 1969 21.871 59.425 0 769.893







TABLE D.1. (Part IV) 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Earmarked grants for municipal development (FORTAMUN) per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 0 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 1969 102.605 6.825 42.281 262.12
1999 1969 187.408 15.205 78.531 478.301
2000 1969 203.64 162.266 0.888 5350.729
2001 1969 440.035 2449.535 0 58988.71
Earmarked grants for social infrastructure (FISM) per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 0 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 1969 238.153 135.355 13.755 1127.813
1999 1969 276.077 158.749 14.255 1153.097
2000 1969 291.415 179.322 13.334 1325.31
2001 1969 334.639 273.904 0 5751.797
CONAPO index of social deprivation 
1990 1969 -0.138 0.955 -2.36 3.39
2000 1969 -0.138 0.955 -2.36 3.39
2001 1969 -0.138 0.955 -2.36 3.39
Locally-generated revenues per capita (adjusted for inflation) 
1990 1969 117.19 307.486 0 10233.07
1991 1969 143.904 292.066 0 5971.43
1992 1969 139.957 234.567 0 4267.76
1993 1969 145.448 233.036 0 3930.29
1994 1969 150.015 225.553 0 3340.432
1995 1969 118.56 197.952 0 4470.526
1996 1969 98.952 195.089 0 4992.284
1997 1969 95.201 131.669 0 1777.968
1998 1969 110.57 162.945 0 2650.902
1999 1969 108.533 164.893 0 2805.708
2000 1969 108.917 168.151 0 2140.386
2001 1587 169.889 218.911 0 2722.403
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TABLE D.1. (Part V) 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population 
1990 1969 36497.58 95921.12 377 1650205
1995 1969 41099.25 108762.8 306 1632521
2000 1969 44059.83 118142.2 279 1646319
Literacy rate 
1990 1969 0.836 0.089 0.305 0.982
1995 1954 0.823 0.099 0.233 0.99
2000 1968 0.844 0.073 0.376 0.966
Poverty rate 
1990 1969 0.366 0.211 0.038 0.995
1995 1968 0.311 0.188 0.038 0.903
2000 1968 0.273 0.183 0.018 0.91
Water coverage 
1990 1969 0.665 0.233 0 1
2000 2008 0.786 0.192 0.003 0.995
Drainage coverage 
1990 1969 0.329 0.243 0.000 0.981
2000 2008 0.512 0.268 0.000 0.993
Electrification coverage 
1990 1969 0.767 0.210 0.000 0.997
2000 2008 0.899 0.115 0.097 0.997
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Appendix E.  Frequency distribution of the survey items utilized to 
construct the institutional capacity indices 
TABLE E.1. Frequency distribution of the survey item: “Which of the following 
regulation codes exists in the municipality?” (Part I) 
City code (Bando de policía y buen gobierno) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 380 18.9 No 307 15.3 
Yes 1629 81.1 Yes 1702 84.7 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Local government operation guidelines (reglamento interior del ayuntamiento) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 748 37.2 no 788 39.2 
Yes 1261 62.8 yes 1221 60.8 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Administration code (reglamento de administración) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
no 1161 57.7 no 1267 63.1 
yes 848 42.2 yes 742 36.9 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Public works act (reglamento de obras públicas) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
no 1001 49.8 no 944 47 
yes 1008 50.2 yes 1065 53 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Land use and zoning act (reglamento de zonificacion y uso de suelos) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1538 76.5 no 1366 68 
Yes 471 23.4 yes 643 32 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Housing estate act (reglamento de fraccionamiento y municipalizacion) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1583 78.8 no 1498 74.6 
Yes 426 21.2 yes 511 25.4 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
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TABLE E.1. (Part II) 
Citizen participation act (reglamento de participacion ciudadana) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1481 73.7 no 1480 73.7 
Yes 528 26.3 yes 529 26.3 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Public safety act (reglamento de proteccion civil) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
no 1151 57.2 no 1045 52 
yes 858 42.7 yes 964 48 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Public entertainment  act (reglamento de espectáculos y diversiones públicas) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1239 61.6 no 1245 62 
Yes 770 38.3 yes 764 38 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Alcoholic drink retail act (reglamento de expendios de bebidas alcohólicas) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 828 41.2 no 805 40.1 
Yes 1181 58.8 yes 1204 59.9 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
Fire regulations (reglamento de bomberos) 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
no 1899 94.5 no 1864 92.8 
yes 110 5.5 yes 145 7.2 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
 











TABLE E.2. Frequency distribution of the survey item: “What was the highest level of 
schooling that the following officials attained?” (Part I) 
Secretary (secretario del ayuntamiento) 
Index 
value 
 Frequency Percent 
0 None 1 0 
1 Elementary, incomplete 33 1.6 
2 Elementary, complete 105 5.2 
3 Middle school, incomplete 22 1.1 
4 Middle school, complete 231 11.5 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
9 0.4 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 155 7.7 
7 High school, incomplete 41 2 
8 High school, complete 206 10.3 
9 College, incomplete 95 4.7 
10 College, complete 1023 50.9 
11 Graduate, incomplete 12 0.6 
12 Graduate, complete 66 3.3 
 Missing 10 0.5 
 Total 2009 100 
Administrative director 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 6 0.3 
1 Elementary, incomplete 18 0.9 
2 Elementary, complete 117 5.8 
3 Middle school, incomplete 11 0.5 
4 Middle school, complete 131 6.5 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
1 0 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 74 3.7 
7 High school, incomplete 16 0.8 
8 High school, complete 125 6.2 
9 College, incomplete 48 2.4 
10 College, complete 439 21.9 
11 Graduate, incomplete 2 0.1 
12 Graduate, complete 26 1.3 
 Missing 995 49.5 








TABLE E.2. (Part II) 
Treasurer 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 3 0.1 
1 Elementary, incomplete 44 2.2 
2 Elementary, complete 181 9 
3 Middle school, incomplete 21 1 
4 Middle school, complete 191 9.5 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
4 0.2 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 196 9.8 
7 High school, incomplete 24 1.2 
8 High school, complete 178 8.9 
9 College, incomplete 67 3.3 
10 College, complete 1034 51.5 
11 Graduate, incomplete 10 0.5 
12 Graduate, complete 52 2.6 
 Missing 4 0.2 
 Total 2009 100 
Public works director 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 5 0.2 
1 Elementary, incomplete 52 2.6 
2 Elementary, complete 161 8 
3 Middle school, incomplete 13 0.6 
4 Middle school, complete 176 8.8 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
3 0.1 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 62 3.1 
7 High school, incomplete 14 0.7 
8 High school, complete 128 6.4 
9 College, incomplete 46 2.3 
10 College, complete 1004 50 
11 Graduate, incomplete 3 0.1 
12 Graduate, complete 27 1.3 
 Missing 315 15.7 










TABLE E.2. (Part III) 
Director of public safety 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 11 0.5 
1 Elementary, incomplete 106 5.3 
2 Elementary, complete 468 23.3 
3 Middle school, incomplete 42 2.1 
4 Middle school, complete 496 24.7 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
5 0.2 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 64 3.2 
7 High school, incomplete 26 1.3 
8 High school, complete 274 13.6 
9 College, incomplete 40 2 
10 College, complete 322 16 
11 Graduate, incomplete 1 0 
12 Graduate, complete 11 0.5 
 Missing 143 7.1 
 Total 2009 100 
Municipal comptroller 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 2 0.1 
1 Elementary, incomplete 31 1.5 
2 Elementary, complete 100 5 
3 Middle school, incomplete 5 0.2 
4 Middle school, complete 85 4.2 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
3 0.1 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 70 3.5 
7 High school, incomplete 7 0.3 
8 High school, complete 94 4.7 
9 College, incomplete 37 1.8 
10 College, complete 672 33.4 
11 Graduate, incomplete 4 0.2 
12 Graduate, complete 24 1.2 
 Missing 875 43.6 










TABLE E.2. (Part IV) 
Director of planning 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 1 0 
1 Elementary, incomplete 5 0.2 
2 Elementary, complete 17 0.8 
3 Middle school, incomplete 2 0.1 
4 Middle school, complete 31 1.5 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
28 1.4 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 0 0 
7 High school, incomplete 3 0.1 
8 High school, complete 40 2 
9 College, incomplete 23 1.1 
10 College, complete 447 22.2 
11 Graduate, incomplete 3 0.1 
12 Graduate, complete 31 1.5 
 Missing 1378 68.6 
 Total 2009 100 
Director of Evaluation 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None   
1 Elementary, incomplete 1 0 
2 Elementary, complete 13 0.6 
3 Middle school, incomplete 1 0 
4 Middle school, complete 16 0.8 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
21 1 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 0 0 
7 High school, incomplete 0 0 
8 High school, complete 31 1.5 
9 College, incomplete 13 0.6 
10 College, complete 185 9.2 
11 Graduate, incomplete 1 0 
12 Graduate, complete 12 0.6 
 Missing 1715 85.4 










TABLE E.2. (Part V) 
Director of social participation 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 2 0.1 
1 Elementary, incomplete 4 0.2 
2 Elementary, complete 48 2.4 
3 Middle school, incomplete 2 0.1 
4 Middle school, complete 83 4.1 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
1 0 
6 Technical or commercial, complete 62 3.1 
7 High school, incomplete 11 0.5 
8 High school, complete 113 5.6 
9 College, incomplete 38 1.9 
10 College, complete 404 20.1 
11 Graduate, incomplete 3 0.1 
12 Graduate, complete 16 0.8 
 Missing 1222 60.8 
 Total 2009 100 
Personnel Management Director 
  Frequency Percent 
0 None 1 0 
1 Elementary, incomplete 6 0.3 
2 Elementary, complete 27 1.3 
3 Middle school, incomplete 3 0.1 
4 Middle school, complete 55 2.7 
5 Technical or commercial, 
incomplete 
  
6 Technical or commercial, complete 51 2.5 
7 High school, incomplete 6 0.3 
8 High school, complete 85 4.2 
9 College, incomplete 29 1.4 
10 College, complete 324 16.1 
11 Graduate, incomplete 2 0.1 
12 Graduate, complete 14 0.7 
 Missing 1406 70 
 Total 2009 100 
 








TABLE E.3. Frequency distribution of the survey items: “Does the municipality have a 
personnel management department?” and “What are the tasks that the 
personnel management department carries out?” 
Does the municipality have a personnel management division? 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1188 59.0 No 1149 57.0 
Yes 821 41.0 Yes 860 43.0 
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100 
The division carries out recruitment, selection, and hiring functions 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1429 71.1 No 1284 63.9
Yes 580 28.9 Yes 725 36.1
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100
The division carries out job induction functions 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1643 81.7 No 1601 79.7
Yes 366 18.2 Yes 408 20.3
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100
The division carries out training and development functions 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1528 76 No 1401 69.7
Yes 481 23.9 Yes 608 30.3
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100
The division carries out incentives and performance functions 
1995 2000 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
No 1575 78.4 No 1503 74.8
Yes 434 21.6 Yes 506 25.2
Total 2009 100 Total 2009 100
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